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ABSTRACT 
Market microstructure is a relatively new area in finance which emerged as a 
result of inconsistency between actual and expected prices due to a variety of 
frictions (mainly trading frictions and asymmetric information) and the 
realisation that the trading process through which investors' demand is ultimately 
translated into orders and volumes is of greater importance in price formation 
than it was originally thought. Despite increased research in the area of 
liquidity, asset pricing, asymmetric information and trading systems, all subfields 
in the area of market microstructure, there are a number of questions that remain 
unanswered such as the effect of different trading systems on systematic 
liquidity, informational efficiency or components of the spread. This thesis aims 
at shedding light on those questions by providing a detailed empirical 
investigation of the effect of trading systems on systematic liquidity, pricing, 
informational efficiency, volatility and bid-ask spread decomposition mainly 
with respect to the UK market (FTSElOO and FTSE250) and to a less extent with 
respect to the Greek market. Those two markets are at different levels of 
development/sophistication and are negatively correlated. 
The aims of this thesis are outlined in chapter one with chapter two providing a 
detailed review of the theoretical literature relevant to this study. Chapter three 
is the first empirical chapter and tests for the presence of a common underlying 
liquidity factor (systematic liquidity) and its effect on pricing for FTSE I 00 and 
FTSE250 stocks under different trading regimes. Results show the presence of 
commonality for FTSEIOO and FTSE250 stocks although commonality is 
weaker for FTSE250 stocks and its role on pricing is reduced. Chapter four 
investigates the same issues with respect to the Greek market and we find that 
commonality appears to be stronger in some periods while it is reduced to zero 
for other periods. 
Chapter five focuses on the effect that changes in the trading systems can have 
on informational efficiency and volatility primarily with respect to FTSE I 00 and 
FTSE250. Different methodologies and data are employed for this purpose and 
produce similar results. We find that order driven markets are more responsive 
to incoming information when compared to quote driven markets. Volatility has 
a greater impact on the spread when the market is quote driven. We also 
examined if automated trading increased informational efficiency with respect to 
the Greek market. The results obtained indicated that the effect of automation 
was positive. 
Finally the last chapter focused on the effect of different trading systems on the 
components of the spread and their determinants. Our main finding is that the 
asymmetric component of the spread is higher under a quote driven market. 
Also stock volatility appears to affect the asymmetric component to a greater 
extent when the market is quote driven. We believe that the main justification 
for those findings is affirmative quotation. 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary empirical work m finance has concentrated on 
understanding financial markets and providing explanations for the 
observed behaviour. The most important concept in the finance literature 
is that of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The efficient market 
hypothesis postulates that asset prices reflect all available information 
quickly and accurately. The last two decades a new strand has developed 
in the finance literature, which is known as market microstructure. 
Market microstructure studies the process by which investors' demands 
are translated into prices and volumes. The central idea, which 
characterises this area of finance, is that asset prices do not necessarily 
reflect full information expectations of value because of a variety of 
frictions such as departures from symmetric information, different trading 
protocols etc. This study will concentrate on examining how those 
frictions affect full information expectations of value. 
Market microstructure literature has expanded tremendously the last few 
years into a versatile body of knowledge however it can be grouped in 
three generic areas namely: 
• Price formation and pnce discovery which looks into the 
determinants of trading costs and the process by which prices 
come to impound information over time 
• Market structure and design issues which looks into how different 
market rules affect trading, liquidity and therefore pricing and 
• Information and disclosure which focuses on the extent to which 
investors have access on information regarding the trading process. 
This study will concentrate on the first two areas of market microstructure 
and examine how different trading regimes/protocols can affect liquidity 
with special reference to systematic liquidity, pricing, the speed at which 
new information is incorporated into prices and the different ~omponents 
of the bid-ask spread (asymmetric and order processing component). 
All theoretical work in the area concentrates on the market maker that 
assumes a prominent role given the inability of traders to engage in 
transactions between themselves. This inability of traders to transact by 
themselves due to different time preferences was originally introduced by 
Demsetz (1968) who argued that demand does not necessarily equal 
supply at each time period (t), therefore there cannot be a single market-
clearing price, a fact that necessitates the existence of market makers. 
Market makers aim at providing immediacy at a cost dictated by inventory 
risks and asymmetric information. Two different 'schools of thought' 
have emerged as a result of the reasons for the existence of costs in 
providing immediacy. The first school postulates that immediacy costs 
arise as a result of inventory risks present due to lack of diversification. 
Stoll (1978), Amihud & Mendelson (1980), Ho & Stoll (1981) and 
O'Hara & Oldfield (1986), main advocates of this particular school of 
thought postulate that market makers have a desired inventory level and 
there are certain costs involved when they are forced to deviate from this 
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optimal level as a result of providing immediacy. The second school 
represented mainly by Bagehot (1971), Glosten & Milgrom (1985), Kyle 
(1985) and Easley & O'Hara (1992) view the existence of costs in 
providing immediacy as a result of asymmetric information and the 
inability of market makers to distinguish between informed and 
uninformed traders. To cover for costs and avoid losing money 
consistently, market makers buy stocks at a lower price than they are 
willing to sell them, hence the spread. However on average market 
makers lose money when trading with the informed and make money 
when trading with the uninformed. 
All the work presented above is clearly theoretical. Empirical work with 
reference to price formation and liquidity has concentrated on examining 
the relation of liquidity and asset returns. Amihud & Mendelson ( 1986) 
document the existence of a positive relation between liquidity and returns 
during 1961-1980 proxying liquidity as quoted bid-ask spread. 
Eleswarapu & Reinganum (1993) looking into a similar time period 
( 1961-1990) proxying liquidity as quoted bid-ask spread find that the 
positive relation documented in A&M is restricted only in January. 
Brennan & Subrahmanyam (1996) take an innovative approach and 
decompose transaction costs into variable and fixed components and find 
only weak evidence in favour of A&M (1986). Datar et al.(1998) look 
into the same relation proxying liquidity as turnover rate(number of 
shares/number of shares outstanding) find positive evidence. Generally 
speaking there are a number of studies looking into the relation of 
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liquidity and returns proxied in different ways but none of those looks into 
common factors in liquidity (commonality) and returns. All the studies 
mentioned above aim at providing an overview of the literature in the area 
of market microstructure & asset pricing and highlight the absence of 
research in commonality and returns, which is one of the areas this study 
concentrates on. It is well known that each security has its own liquidity 
dictated by a number of factors such as order flow, number of trades, 
trading volume, returns, volatility etc. The nature of the factors identified 
above is clearly idiosyncratic and we would expect each security to have 
its own liquidity. Alternatively we would expect to find correlation in 
liquidity across securities if there is a common component to the cost of 
providing liquidity or if securities are substitutes. In this study we wish 
to test the prospect that liquidity has common underlying determinants, 
which are not captured by the factors mentioned above and the extent to 
which this common factor affect stock returns over time. 
Three papers have appeared up to the moment looking into common 
underlying determinants such as returns, returns volatility, trading volume, 
and other macroeconomic factors for the US market namely i) Chordia et 
al (2000), ii) Huberman & Halka (2001) and iii) Hasbrouck & Seppi 
(2001). The first two papers come up with strong evidence supporting 
the existence of common underlying factors yet unidentified while the 
third finds only weak evidence of common underlying factors. Apart for 
the controversy mentioned above, the literature suffers from gaps as well. 
For example although there is some evidence regarding common 
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underlying factors with reference to the US market, there is no other 
single study for developed or developing countries. This provides us with 
an excellent opportunity to investigate the existence of this phenomenon 
in other markets. 
With reference to the second genenc area of market microstructure 
namely market structure and design, most empirical literature has 
concentrated on i) comparing execution costs between continuous 
auctions and dealerships (Huang & Stoll, 1996; Lee, 1993; Pagano & 
Roell, 1990; Stoll, 1993) finding higher execution costs in dealer markets 
when compared to continuous trading markets even though Affleck-
Graves, Hedge & Miller (1994) find that quoted spreads are the same for a 
matched sample of NASDAQ and NYSE/ ASE stocks in 1985 ii) trading 
mechanisms and price behaviour emphasizing the introduction of call 
auctions within continuous trading mechanisms (Ko, Lee & Chung, 1995; 
Amihud & Mendelson, 1987,1989,1991) with special reference to the 
Korean, Japanese and US stock market respectively iii) the value effects 
gained by changing from single call auctions to continuous trading 
(Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach, 1997) iv) the effects of full 
automation on trading (Naidu & Rozeff, 1994) with special reference to 
the Singapore Stock Exchange and v) a comparison between dealerships 
and continuous action with respect to informational efficiency (Greene & 
Watts, 1996). 
5 
Summarizing the empirical results, one could say that dealer markets 
appear to have higher execution costs in comparison to continuous 
markets although there is no unanimity. However little can be said about 
how informational efficiency/price discovery changes under the two 
primary exchanging regimes: dealerships and order driven markets. 
There is only a limited number of studies looking into informational 
efficiency under different trading regimes. The first study that 
investigates the value effects from changes in market microstructure and 
explicitly looks into price discovery and assesses the degree of 
informational efficiency achieved each time is that of Amihud, Mendelson 
& Lauterbach ( 1997). However the above study is confined to changes 
from single call auctions to continuous trading mechanisms with reference 
to the Tel Aviv stock Exchange. Stocks under the call auction regime 
used to trade once a day but after the introduction of continuous trading, 
trading frequency increased tremendously. As it was expected changes in 
informational efficiency/price discovery and liquidity were dramatic. 
Based on their approach and their findings we thought that it would be a 
wonderful idea to examine how the transition from one trading system to 
another (e.g. from quote-driven to order-driven or from public outcry to 
automated trading) affected the degree of informational efficiency. The 
second study (Greene & Watts, 1996) examines market response to 
quarterly earnings announcements made during trading and non-trading 
hours on the NYSE and the NASDAQ. They find that NASDAQ is more 
efficient in impounding information into prices. Given the limited 
number of studies on market design/trading protocols and informational 
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efficiency we think that it is worth examining this issue with reference to a 
highly developed (UK) and less developed market (Greek market). 
Naidu & Rozeff ( 1994) look into the effects of automation on volume, 
volatility and liquidity, which is relevant to our study with reference to the 
Athens Stock Exchange however, they do not investigate the effect of 
automation on informational efficiency, which is exactly the area we 
concentrate on. Despite this, Naidu & Roseff (1994) motivated us to look 
into smaller markets such as the Athens Stock Exchange which introduced 
full automation of the trading process. In addition we are not aware of 
any studies concentrating on spread sensitivity to volatility under a 
dealership and an order driven market. In perspective, we explore price 
discovery/informational efficiency and spread sensitivity to volatility 
between competing trading mechanisms: dealerships, order driven 
markets and hybrid markets for FTSE 1 00 & FTSE250 stocks. We also 
examine the effect of computerisation on informational efficiency for the 
Greek market. 
The last chapter of the thesis is concerned with examining the components 
of the bid-ask spread under different trading protocols. Stoll (1989), 
George, Kaul & Nimaledran (1991) and Kim & Ogden (1996) have 
concentrated on estimating the components of the bid-ask spread 
employing different techniques. 
The London Stock exchange has gone through a number of changes the 
last few years as far the trading regime is concerned. In particular the 
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London stock exchange has changed from a quote driven market to an 
order driven market. The main attributes of quote driven markets are the 
market makers who are obliged to post bid and ask quotes along with the 
number of shares (depth) they are willing to trade at each price 
(affirmative quotation). In an order driven market makers are not obliged 
to post bid-ask quotes therefore the whole trading process depends on 
limit-order submission. As a consequence of the changes in the trading 
process described above, we conjecture that the different cost components 
of the spread and in particular the asymmetric information cost component 
must have been affected. We believe that this is an exploitable 
opportunity to expand the literature and examine the components of the 
bid-ask spread under different trading regimes given that all previous 
work in this area has merely concentrated on decomposing the bid-ask 
spread to its components. We also examine how each of the components 
of the bid-ask spread is affected by volatility, trading volume etc under 
different trading regimes. 
To summarise, this thesis aims i) to investigate the existence of common 
underlying factors in liquidity and how those factors affect returns, ii) 
explore informational efficiency and spread sensitivity to volatility 
between different trading regimes and iii) investigate how the components 
of the bid-ask spread change between different trading regimes and how 
volatility, trading volume etc affects those components. In the process of 
doing so, the following questions are also raised: 
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• Is commonality in liquidity present in other markets as well or does it 
constitute a stylized fact pertinent to the US market only? 
• Is commonality priced? 
• How do changes in the trading regime affect the relationship between 
commonality and expected returns? 
• How does the degree of informational efficiency and spread sensitivity 
to volatility change in response to different trading regimes/closing 
price formation algorithms? 
• How are the components of the spread affected as a result of changes 
in the trading regime? 
The main focus of the thesis is the UK market and in particular FTSEl 00 
and FTSE250 socks. We employ those stocks for our research because 
these are the only stocks for which the trading protocol changed. In 
addition those stocks are frequently traded which helped us avoid 
problems of non-synchronous/thin trading. We undertake the same 
research for the Greek market, a newly developed market which is quite 
different from the UK market in terms of sophistication even though data 
restrictions do not allow us to achieve this to the extent we would like to. 
Therefore direct comparisons are not always possible. 
The thesis contributes to the literature in several ways; the mam 
contributions could be presented as follows: 
• It shows that systematic liquidity is not pertinent only to the US 
market but also other markets. It also shows for the first time that 
commonality in liquidity does affect excess returns and that the 
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trading regime plays an important role on the extent to which 
commonality is priced. In particular we find that the effect of 
commonality on excess returns appears to be considerably reduced 
after the change from quote-driven to order-driven trading. Results 
obtained for FTSE250 show that commonality is not equally strong 
while results for the Greek market show that commonality per se is 
quite reduced. 
• It shows that the extent to which new information is incorporated into 
prices is affected by the trading regime using different methodologies. 
In particular we find that order driven markets respond faster to 
information in comparison to dealerships (FTSE100). With reference 
to the Greek market we find that the computerization of the trading 
process has increased informational efficiency. 
• It shows that spread sensitivity to volatility depends on the trading 
regime and provides explanations for it. We find that the spread is 
more sensitive to volatility in a dealership than in an order driven 
market. Spread sensitivity to volatility remains the same between 
quote driven and hybrid regimes. 
• It estimates the components of the bid ask spread under different 
trading regimes enriching previous work in the area and provides 
explanation for the changes observed for the very first time. In 
particular we find that the asymmetric information component reduces 
when the market changes from quote driven to order driven 
(FTSE 1 00). The reason for this is that market makers do not have to 
provide liquidity any more. However when the market changes from 
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quote driven to hybrid (FTSE250), there is no change in the 
asymmetric information component. We also found that the effect of 
volatility on the asymmetric information component of the spread 
reduces when the market is order driven. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In chapter two the established 
theoretical literature which is relevant to the economics of market making, 
trading, asymmetric information, liquidity and order processing is 
thoroughly reviewed. The purpose of this literature survey is to provide 
the theoretical foundations for the empirical studies that will follow as 
well as to highlight issues investigated or under investigation and pinpoint 
any possible gaps. At this point it is worth mentioning that literature 
presented in chapter two is mainly theoretical in nature. Empirical 
literature specific to each of the issues examined in this thesis is presented 
at the beginning of each empirical chapter. 
Chapter three which is the first empirical of this thesis concentrates on 
systematic liquidity and excess returns under different trading regimes and 
algorithms. The key objective of the chapter is to examine if there are 
common components affecting stock liquidity and the extent to which 
those components can affect pricing. We find that liquidity has a 
common component unidentified yet which remains quite strong even 
after accounting for a number of factors which we know that affect stock 
liquidity (expected trading volume, unexpected trading volume, volatility, 
macro economic variables etc). These findings are valid regardless of 
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trading regime. At a later stage we examine if the common underlying 
component affects excess returns. It appears that the common underlying 
liquidity component is quite strong when the market is quote driven but 
reduces once the market changes to order driven (FTSE100 stocks). We 
are able to identify a common underlying component for FTSE250 stocks 
however it does not seem to affect FTSE250 stock pricing as in the case 
observed for FTSE 1 00 stocks. 
The fourth chapter is a replication of the previous chapter for the Greek 
market. The Greek stock market has recently gone through troughs and 
peaks, achieving record growth by any standards but returning to lower 
levels than it started in the first place. The reason we decided to present 
the case for the Greek market in a different chapter is because we were 
afraid that we might cause confusion to the reader since we capture 
liquidity using a different variable to the ones used in the UK market due 
to lack of data but also because the reasons we examine liquidity in the 
Greek market are different from the reasons we examine liquidity in the 
UK market. There has been no change in the trading regime in the Greek 
market so as to examine how different regimes might affect liquidity 
however each of the periods examined represent a different era for the 
Greek market in terms of trading activity and profits. 
The fifth chapter exammes how informational efficiency and spread 
sensitivity to volatility changes as a result of changes in the trading 
regimes for FTSE100 and FTSE250 stocks. We also look into the effects 
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that the computerization of the trading process can have on informational 
efficiency for the Athens stock Exchange. With reference to the UK 
market we find that an order driven market is more responsive to new 
information when compared to a quote driven market. Secondly we find 
that the spread formed in a quote driven market is more sensitive to 
volatility than in an order driven market because of affirmative quotation. 
Finally we find that computerization has a positive impact on 
informational efficiency with reference to the Greek market. 
The sixth chapter looks into the components of the bid-ask spread and 
their determinants and how they might change over time as a result of 
changes in the trading regime. We find that the asymmetric component 
of the spread is higher under a quote driven regime. This can be 
explained by the fact that market makers are obliged to quote bid and ask 
prices therefore they bear all the risk of a transaction especially if they 
trade with a trader who is in possession of superior information. 
However under an order driven regime market makers are not obliged to 
provide any liquidity therefore the asymmetric information component 
reduces significantly. There are no changes in the asymmetric 
information component of the bid ask spread between a quote driven and a 
hybrid market because market makers are obliged to provide quotes under 
any circumstances. Finally we examine how different variables such as 
number of trades, trading volume and volatility affects the asymmetric 
information and order processing component of the spread. 
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Finally in chapter seven the main results in the thesis are summarized and 
concluding remarks are drawn. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE 
Market microstructure is a relatively old area in finance, which has recently 
attracted a lot of attention. Of course some readers might wonder why it remained 
obscure and it did not attract attention before. Well I believe that the answer to this 
question is two-fold. Most importantly a growing number oftraders, practitioners 
and academics have realised that asset prizes do not reflect expected prices based 
on all available information because of a variety of frictions. Secondly the trading 
processes through which investors' aggregate demand is translated into transactions 
are of greater importance in price formation than it was originally thought and 
therefore worth of further examination. In the words of Madhavan (2000) 
"Interest in market microstructure is most obviously driven 
by the rapid structural, technological and regulatory 
changes affecting the securities industry worldwide. The 
causes of these structural shifts are complex. In the US, 
they include the substantial increase in trading volume, 
competition between exchanges and Electronic 
Communications Networks (ECNs), changes in the 
regulatory environment, new technological innovations, the 
growth of the Internet and the proliferation of financial 
instruments. In other countries, globalisation and 
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intermarket competition are more important m forcing 
change. For example European economic integration 
means the almost certain demise of certain national stock 
exchanges, perhaps to be replaced eventually with a single 
market for the European time zone. These factors are 
transforming the landscape ofthe industry, spurring interest 
in the relative merits of different trading protocols and 
designs." (Madhavan, 2000, page 1) 
2.2.MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: DEFINITIONS AND TENETS 
Market microstructure can be defined as the area of finance that studies the process 
by which investors' latent demands are ultimately translated into prices and 
volumes (Madhavan, 2000). It can also be defined as the study of the process and 
outcomes of exchanging assets under explicit trading rules (O'Hara, 1994). 
Having provided the readers of this review with two short definitions of market 
microstructure, I think that it would be helpful to discuss the sub-domains that 
market microstructure literature expands. Market microstructure theory ts a 
versatile body of knowledge and incorporates many sub-domains such as 
• pnce formation and price discovery; this section looks into the 
determinants of trading costs and the process by which prices come to 
impound information over time 
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• market structure and design issues; this section concentrates on the 
relation between price formation and trading protocols. More specifically 
it focuses on how different market rules can affect trading, liquidity and 
therefore prices. 
• Information and disclosure; this section focuses on the extent to which 
investors have access on information regarding the trading process. 
We shall be concerned with price formation & price discovery and market structure 
& design issues. 
2.3 .PRICE FORMATION 
A basic tenet of the theory of market microstructure is that asset prices need not 
equal full information expectations of value because of a variety of frictions. 
Market microstructure theory is concerned with how various frictions such as 
departures from symmetric information affect the trading process and how prices 
are ultimately defined. A simple mathematical model of price formation and 
frictions is developed below. 
It is assumed that in efficient markets i) all agents posses symmetric information 
and ii) frictions are negligible resulting in prices reflecting expected values 
conditional upon the set of public information available at time t. Symbolically 
this is expressed as p1=)l1 where Pt denotes the price of the risky asset at time t and 
)l1=E[v11Ht] is the conditional expectation of a fundamental value (vt) of a risky 
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asset based on all available information at time t (Ht). Taking into consideration 
that returns are given by changes in prices between two different time periods, then 
where E[v1/H1]-E[v1-I/H1_I] is the innovation in beliefs. Since f.lt follows a 
martingale process, applying the Law of Iterated Expectations, returns are serially 
uncorrelated. Markets are efficient in the sense that prices at all points in time 
reflect expected values. 
2.3.1 TRADING FRICTIONS 
Having introduced a frictionless market model, the next step is to construct a model 
that will incorporate frictions and will take into consideration the fact that market 
agents have different information. The new model is given by the following 
formula p1=J.l1+st where p1 is price, f.lt= E[ VtiH1] and St is an error term with mean 
zero that reflects the effects of frictions. At this point it ~hould be made clear that 
s1 is modelled as s1= sx1 where s1 is a positive constant (representing one half the bid 
ask spread) and x1 represents signed order flow. 
2.3.2 PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Having considered frictions, the next step is to incorporate private information into 
the model. Madhavan (2000) postulates that if some market agents possess private 
information, then revision in beliefs about asset values from t-1 to t given by 
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E1=E[ Vt-IIH1_I] need not reflect new information arrivals. Revision in beliefs will 
depend ori signed order flow denoted by x1 since informed traders will buy when 
prices are below true value and will sell if prices are above true value. Thus 
revision in beliefs is given by E1=A.x1+u1 where x1 is order flow, u1 is pure noise and 
A.>O. 
Price formation and price discovery may be viewed as synonymous to liquidity, 
which may be defined as the bid and ask prices at which market makers (liquidity 
providers) buy and sell assets for themselves or their clients. In the rest of this 
review we seek to answer the question of how prices are formed. 
The answer to pnce formation is given by the standard demand & supply 
framework. In particular the intersection of the demand and supply curves provide 
the equilibrium price at which buyers and sellers are willing to transact. 
Nevertheless this simplistic procedure provides absolutely .no information on how 
this equilibrium price is attained. 
There appear to be two approaches to the mechanics of price formation. The first 
approach, which can be, described as completely agnostic postulates that the 
procedure followed in attaining equilibrium is of no importance because the 
equilibrium price achieved is independent of any procedure. Even if there were 
several procedures, the same equilibrium would arise. Clearly this approach is 
limited to analysing the properties of the equilibrium rather than the pr~cedure of 
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equilibrium attainment. The second approach, which actually looks into the 
mechanics of price formation, is the Walrasian auctioneer. 
2.3.3 TRADITIONAL VIEW 
The Walrasian auctioneer is perceived as the traditional view of price formation. 
The formation process could be easily captured by the general representation of an 
auctioneer who aggregates traders' demands and supplies to find a market-clearing 
price. Specifically the procedure followed is like the one described below. Each 
trader submits his demand schedule to the auctioneer and then he comes up with a 
potential trading price. At this point, traders determine their optimal demand sets 
and submit them to the auctioneer. If no equality is achieved between quantity 
demanded and quantity supplied, then the auctioneer announces a new trading 
pnce. This procedure will be repeated until supply equals demand, achieving an 
equilibrium price. The procedure described above constitutes a very simple way 
of explaining equilibrium attainment. However as we are all aware the above 
frictionless representation is nowhere close to reality at least as far as financial 
markets are concerned. 
2.3.4 THE COST OF TRANSACTING: BID-ASK PRICES 
An alternative view to the archaic Walrasian auctioneer model briefly described 
above is that of Demsetz (1968). Demsetz introduces the notion of 'time 
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dimension' in supply and demand analysis and literally sets the stage for the 
development of market microstructure theory. 
Demsetz based his analysis on the notion that trade may involve some kind of cost 
either explicit or implicit. Explicit costs could be charges levied by a particular 
market while implicit costs would be costs reflecting the price of immediate 
trading. Demsetz argued that demand does not necessarily equal supply at each 
time period, t, therefore there cannot be a single market-clearing price. Demsetz 
postulates that there are two sources of supply and demand at each point in time. 
On both sides there are traders who wish to trade immediately and some others 
who wish to put off trading for the time being. If there is an imbalance between 
demand and supply those who wish to trade now must pay a higher price to induce 
the other side to trade at the same time. If some traders wish to buy now they must 
increase their bid to attract sellers who otherwise would not have traded. On the 
other side if some traders wish to sell now they must lower their ask price to attract 
buyers. Thus two prices emerge a bid and an ask price. Today the difference 
between bid and ask prices is known as the spread and this is exactly where the 
notion of liquidity is based. In the words of Demsetz ( 1968) 
" ... Thus, a specialist who buys at $98 and sells at $100 substitutes two 
transactions for what would be one transaction if the outside traders could 
count on their orders arriving simultaneously and at the same price, say $99." 
(Demsetz, 1968, page 37) 
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Of course Demsetz did not merely provide a theoretical framework in an attempt to 
explain the cost of transacting. Demsetz went even further to investigate the 
relationship between spread and volume in the NYSE. For this reason Demsetz 
runs a couple of regressions in order to formally establish the relationship between 
spread and volume employing a random sample of 192 securities. At this point it 
should be noted that Demsetz employs two different variables in order to identify 
the precise relationship between spread and volume namely i) number of 
transactions per day based on data for two non-adjacent days of trading and ii) the 
number of shareholders being in possession of the securities under consideration. 
Demsetz comments on the results: 
"Both regressions give highly similar fits; although (lA) gtves a slightly 
better fit, the use of number of shareholders does surprisingly well. All 
coefficients take on the expected algebraic signs and all except the M 
coefficient are highly significant. The coefficients of lnT and lnN yield the 
expected second derivatives. The coefficient of M cannot be judged to differ 
significantly from zero in the light of the evidence presented here. The 
reader will note that the significance of the M coefficient increases slightly 
when lnN is used in place of lnT. The reason for this is that M is associated 
slightly with differences in transaction rates that are not explained by 
differences inN". (Demsetz, 1968, page 49) 
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Demsetz's results show that the greater the activity in the stock (as measured by the 
number of trades or the number of shareholders) the lower the spread, clearly 
indicating that the cost of non-synchronization between demand and supply for 
similar assets is a function of the rate at which buying and selling orders arrive. 
2.4. DETERMINANTS OF LIQUIDITY 
All financial literature previous to the seminal work of Demsetz ( 1968) perceived 
security price formation as a macroeconomic phenomenon. Demsetz changed this 
view by diverting attention away from the macroeconomic foundations of security 
price formation towards the micro foundations of security markets. In doing so, he 
showed that security price formation depends on economic agents' optimising 
behaviour meaning that prices in particular the bid-ask spread is set by a specific 
person(s), institution(s) or mechanism worthy of further study. Having indicated 
the 'turn' in financial literature from the macro aspect to the micro aspect of the 
bid-ask spread formation initiated by Demsetz the next step will be to look into 
how the spread is determined. In order to answer this question we should delve 
into the behaviour of market makers and the incentives or the disincentives they 
have to increase or reduce the spread. Inventory risk and the presence of 
asymmetric information determine their behaviour. More specifically we shall be 
concerned with inventory models and adverse selection (asymmetric information) 
models. 
2.4.1 INVENTORY MODELS 
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Inventory models are concerned with changes in inventory risk level and how this 
might affect the setting of bid and ask prices. If one delves into the inventory 
models literature, one can clearly distinguish three research paradigms. The first 
paradigm known as order-based analysis is represented by Garman (1976) and 
Amihud & Mendelson (1980) who focus on the nature of order flows in 
determining security-trading prices. Portfolio risk analysis that constitutes the 
second paradigm is typified by the works of Stoll (1978), Ho & Stoll (1981) and 
O'Hara & Oldfield (1986). Portfolio risk analysis examines bid-ask spread 
formation in relation to the liquidity providers' optimisation problem while the 
third approach 'competitive trade order submission' analyses the effects of multiple 
liquidity providers on spread behaviour. It is represented mainly by Cohen, Maier, 
Schwartz & Whitcomb ( 1981 ). 
2.4.1.1 ORDER-BASED ANALYSIS 
2.4.1.1.1 GARMAN'S MODEL 
The equilibrium price derived from the intersection of the standard demand and 
supply schedules combined in a single diagram constitutes a first approximation to 
a fully balanced market, however this simple intuitively appealing approach 
appears to be severely limited when it comes to studying equilibrium attainment at 
financial markets. The main reason for the limitation observed is the complete 
lack of consideration for the empirically observed non synchronization of buy and 
24 
sell order arrival and subsequent price change as a response to the temporary order 
flow imbalance. All those issues are considered in Garman's model. 
Garman (1976) introduces a model that assumes a stochastic buy and sell order 
arrival process that is a function of the dealer's bid and ask prices. In Garman's 
model there is a single, monopolistic market maker that sets prices, receives all 
orders and clears trades. The dealer's objective is to maximise expected profit per 
unit of time, subject to the avoidance of bankruptcy or failure i.e. running out of 
inventory or running out of cash. The dealer has an infinite horizon but selects bid 
and ask prices only once at the beginning of his trading horizon. The market 
maker's only decision is to set an ask price Pa at which he will fill orders wishing to 
buy the stock and a bid price Pb at which he will fill orders wishing to sell the 
stock. 
Garman's model is constructed in such a way so that the market maker is faced as 
it was stated at the beginning with stochastic order arrival processes. Buy and sell 
orders are assumed to follow a Poisson process with stationary arrival rate 
functions Aa(p) and Ab(p ). In that way the stochastic nature of the buy/sell orders 
can be observed and followed in a consistent way. Nevertheless even if the order 
arrival process is modelled in such a consistent way, this does not ensure 
synchronicity between buy and sell order arrival making inventory and cash reserve 
balance a very delicate issue. This problem emerges and is aggravated by one of 
the assumptions of the model, primarily the inability of the market maker to change 
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pnces after the initial pnces have been set in an attempt to avoid failure and 
secondly the restrictive condition of stock/money borrowing. 
Having explained the objectives of Garman's market maker as well as the 
restrictions imposed on him by assumption, the next step is to view the model in a 
more ngorous way. Garman's market maker is supposed to maintain a level of 
cash and stock inventory to allow him transacting while maximizing profits per 
unit of time. The market maker's cash Ic(t) and stock Is(t) inventory are given by 
where Na(t) is the cumulative number of shares that have been bought from traders 
up to time (t), Nb(t) is the cumulative number of shares that have been sold to 
traders up to time (t), Pais the ask price and Pb is the bid price. 
The two functions above describe cash and stock inventory behaviour. However 
as you can see the level of cash and stock at each time depends on the arrival of 
buy and sell orders governed by a Poisson process that does not ensure buy/sell 
order arrival synchronicity. Therefore we are interested in estimating the time at 
which failure will occur. Nonetheless calculating a 'ruin probability' is 
unattainable due to the existence of multiple stochastic processes. 
Garman goes around the problem identified above in the following way. Assume 
that the variable Qk(t) is the probability that Ic(t)=k meaning that at time (t) the 
market maker's inventory of cash is equal to k units and Rk(t) is the probability that 
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ls(t)=k meaning that at time (t) the market maker's stock inventory is equal to k 
units. The P<?Sition of having exactly k units of cash at time (t) can be achieved in 
the following ways: 
1. the market maker held exactly k-1 units of cash at time t-~t and in the next 
instant an order to sell one unit to him arrives. 
2. the market maker held exactly k+ 1 units of cash at time t-M and in the next 
instant an order to buy from him arrives. 
3. the market maker is holding K units at time t-~t and in the next instant nothing 
happens. 
Before calculating the probability that the market maker has exactly k units of cash 
Garman assumes that a unit of cash arrives with rate A8(p8) and departs at rate 
Ab(pb). Therefore the probabilities are given by 
1. the probability the dealer had k-1 units of cash and in the interval t-~t receives a 
cash flow is Qk-I(t-~t)[Aa(pa)PaLlt][1-Ab(pb)PbLlt] (2.3) 
2. the probability the dealer had k+ 1 units of cash and in the interval t-~t receives 
a cash flow is Qk+I(t-Llt)[A.b(Pb)PbLlt][1-A.aCPa)PaLlt] (2.4) 
3. the probability that the dealer is holding k units of cash at time t-Llt and in the 
next instant nothing happens is Qk(t-~t)[1-Ab(pb)PhLlt][1-A8(p8)p8Llt] (2.5) 
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The probability that the dealer has exactly k units of cash at time t is the sum of 
these probabilities. To calculate the time derivative ofthe probability Qk(t), we take 
the limit as ~t~ 0 of [Qk(t)-Qk(t-~t)]/M. As it was stated at the beginning of the 
model the market maker cannot ameliorate his cash position if he wishes to do so 
by either borrowing cash or changing prices because of the restrictive assumptions 
imposed by the model. Changes in his/her cash position can only be a result of 
trading. 
Based on the standard solution to 'ruin' problems, Garman shows that the failure 
probability for running out of cash yields: 
where pis defined to be the average price, Ic(O) is cash level, Ab(pb) is the rate at 
which cash departs and Aa(pa) is the rate at which cash arrives. Similarly the stock 
failure probability is given by 
The failure probabilities above imply that if the market maker wishes to avoid 
Aa(pa)· In other words he must set a higher price when he sells and a lower price 
when he buys which results in the development of a spread. Having explained the 
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necessity for the existence of the bid-ask spread, the next step is to discuss how this 
spread is determined. 
different cases. 
Garman modifies the assumptions and analyses two 
As it is clear from Garman's model, there will be a positive drift on the market 
maker's inventory and cash positions that will inevitably complicate price 
behaviour. For that reason Garman assumes that the market maker pursues a zero 
drift inventory policy. As a result of the previous assumption prices are set so as 
to maximize the dealer's expected profit. By setting two prices the market maker 
extracts larger rents while still maintain the zero drift inventory requirement. In 
the second case Garman assumes zero price spread. However such an assumption 
leads to imminent failure as it was explained above. 
Garman's model is simple and intuitively appealing since it manages to clearly 
demonstrate the problems that the market maker faces when setting prices. 
Nonetheless the model introduced above is highly abstract out of contact with 
reality and therefore implausible. However this first model spurred further 
research in the area of market microstructure. 
2.4.1.1.2 AMIHUD AND MENDELSON'S MODEL 
A more realistic approach to that of Garman is the one introduced by Amihud & 
Mendelson ( 1980). They consider the problem of a price-setting monopolistic 
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market maker in a dealership market where the stochastic demand and supply are 
depicted by price dependent Poisson processes based on Garman's analysis (1976). 
The new feature that differentiates this particular model is the dependence of the 
bid-ask spread prices on the market maker's inventory position. In this new 
model the market maker has the ability to change quoted prices to influence 
stochastic buy/sell order arrivals in order to maintain his desired inventory position. 
This new feature was not incorporated in Garman's model discussed previously 
even though Garman was well aware of its importance. In the words of Garman 
(1976) 
"The specialists must pursue a policy of relating their pnces to the 
inventories in order to avoid failure". (Garman, 1976, page 32) 
Amihud & Mendelson (1980) derive the optimal policy of the market maker based 
on Garman's dealership market subject to upward and downward inventory 
constraints. They show that the bid-ask prices are monotone decreasing functions 
of the stock at hand and that the resulting bid-ask spread is always positive while 
stress the existence of a preferred inventory position. 
Having briefly described the innovations as well as the directi~n of this new study 
as suggested by Amihud & Mendelson, the next step is to obtain a more rigorous 
view of the model. Amihud & Mendelson based on Garman make a number of 
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assumptions on which they base their model. We will look into those assumptions 
and then we will derive the optimality conditions. They assume 
A) All exchanges are made through a single central market maker, who possesses a 
monopoly on all trading. No direct exchanges between buyers and sellers are 
permitted. 
B) The market maker is a price setter. He sets an ask price, Pa at which he will fill 
a buy order for one unit and a bid price Pb for an one unit sell order. 
C) For a given pair of prices Pa and Pb the next incoming order will be a buy order 
with probability D(P a)/[D(P a)+S(Pb)] or a sell order with probability 
S(Pb)/[D(Pa)+S(Pb)]. The time until the next arriving order has an exceptional 
distribution with mean 1/[D(Pa)+S(Pb)]. 
D) The objective of the market maker is to maximize his expected average profit 
per unit-time. Profit is defined as net cash inflow. 
E) The permissible stock inventory level are {-K, -K+l, -K+2, L-2, L-1, L}. For 
convenience of exposition, we re-number the states as {0,1,2, ... M-1, M}, 
where M=L+K. We assume M>=3. We also adopt the conventional 
terminology of birth and death processes and let A.K denote the birth rate in state 
k and f.!K the corresponding death rate. We also define flo=A.M=O. Since 
A.K=S(Pbk) is a monotone increasing function of Pbk, there is a one to one 
correspondence between AK and Pbk· Similarly, f.!K is a monotone decreasing 
function of P ak with a one to one correspondence. Thus, the transition rates AK 
and f.!K will be used as the decision variables in state k. 
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F) The revenue and cost functions are equal to: 
and the following regularity assumptions hold 
i) R(.) is strictly concave 
ii) C(.) is strictly convex 
iii)R'(O)>C'(O), R'()<C'() 
G) there are no transaction costs to the market maker 
Based on the above assumptions and in particular on the assumption D that the 
objective of the market maker is to maximize his expected average profit per unit 
time we introduce the following function 
M 
g(A.,).l)= I cpkqk (2.9) 
k=O 
where A.=(A-0, •.. AM-I) and ).l=().l,, ... ).lM), qk is the earning rate for a transition from 
state k and it is mathematically expressed as qk= R().lk)-C(A.k). 
Let 
M M 
X= L-1,.¢,. and Ji = LJl k ¢ .. (2.1 o) 
k=O k=O 
be the mean rates of incoming sell and buy orders. Then Akcpk=).lk+lcpk+l implies 
A.=).l, that is, the expected flows in both directions are equal. Relations Ak 
k=O,l, ... M-1 and ).lk>O for k=1,2, ... ,M. 
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Having discussed the assumptions and explained the components of the objective 
function, the next step is to derive the optimality conditions and then study their 
implications on the behaviour of the market maker. The necessary conditions for 
optimality are: 
M M 
Ak: I <J>j[R(J.tj)-C(A.j)]-Ak<J>k C' (Ak)=g(A.,J.t) I <J>j (2.11) 
. J=k+l 
M M 
Ilk: I <J>j[R(J.tj)-C(Aj)]-!lk<J>kR' (!lk)=g(A.,J.t) I <J>j (2.12) 
~k }~ 
By subtracting the (k+ 1 )st equation of the second equation above from the kth 
equation from the first equation and using Ak<pk=!lk+I<j)k+I we obtain 
R' (!lk+I)=C' (A.k) k=0,1, M-1 (2.13) 
which reminds of the ordinary optimality condition of a monopoly, except that here 
it relates to each pair of neighbouring states. Note that since 
a purchase of one unit at state k and its sale at state k+ 1 always yields a profit. It 
follows that a loop of transitions starting from any state k, traversing other states 
and returning to state k yields a positive profit with probability one. Thus, when 
the market maker's initial resources exceed I:~1Pbk , the probability of cash 
failure is zero, even in the worst possible case. Since the probability of default by 
the market maker is zero, initial credit should be available. Subtraction of the first 
condition of optimality from the second give the basic relation between Ak and IlK 
and thus the relation between the bid and ask prices for each inventory position k 
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Having provided readers with a rigorous overview of Amihud & Mendelson's 
model, we should stress those points that make it different from Garman's model. 
The first important difference is that the bid-ask spread in Garman's model arose 
because of the need to reduce failure probabilities given that in Garman's model 
bid-ask prices are set only once at the beginning of the trading period. In Amihud 
& Mendelson model the bid-ask spread is viewed as an element of the monopolistic 
power of the market maker whose efforts concentrate on profit maximization. The 
second difference lies on the dealer's preferred inventory position, which is a 
function of the order arrival process. The value of the shares comprising the 
inventory is not important in determining the preferred inventory position. In 
other words the preferred inventory position is not a function of its value but rather 
of the order arrival process. Those two models constitute the order-based 
approach to price setting and dealer behaviour. The next approach we will look 
into assumes a completely different perspective, which shall be discussed later on. 
2.4.2 PORTFOLIO RISK ANALYSIS 
2.4.2.1 STOLL'S MODEL 
The next model described below assumes a different perspective from that of 
Garman (1976) and Amihud & Mendelson (1980). In particular Stoll's (1978) 
analysis departs from order-based analysis models and focuses on portfolio risk. 
The market maker in Stoll's model is perceived as a market participant who alters 
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his portfolio holdings in order to accommodate the desires of other traders. In 
other words the market maker is perceived as a 'financial needs server' rather than 
a monopolist whose prices reflect largely his market power. In that way the bid-
ask spread is viewed as compensation for the services provided (immediacy 
following Demsetz's terminology) and the risk undertaken when moving away 
from desired portfolio positions. The market maker's compensation for 
immediacy incorporates a number of costs such as holding costs, which arise from 
holding a sub-optimal portfolio; order processing costs such as exchange fees, 
transfer taxes etc and asymmetric information costs which refer to the existence of 
private information and how this piece of information can be manipulated towards 
profit making. Nevertheless at this point it must be stressed that it is holding costs 
that matter mainly because of the dealer's inability to hedge his inventory 
exposure. Obviously Stoll's analysis can be classified as 'risk aversion based 
spread model' coming into sharp contrast with Garman's 'defence against 
bankruptcy/failure' model or Amihud & Mendelsons 'market power' model. 
Stoll introduces a two period model and a risk averse maker who mms at 
maximizing the expected utility of his terminal wealth which is a function of his 
initial level of wealth (W o) and the market making positions he will assume over 
the two date trading period which is actually restricted to one date period only 
because at t=2, assets are liquidated. 
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Stoll's model is based on the following assumptions: i) the market maker buys/sells 
the asset at time t and liquidates it at time t+ 1. ii) the market maker finances his 
inventory by borrowing at the risk free rate Rr and lends excess funds at the same 
rate Rr again. iii) The market maker's probability of going bankrupt is virtually 
limited to zero given that the model under consideration is a two-period model. 
iv) the market maker has some exogenous beliefs about the 'true' value of the 
assets he trades as well as about the 'true' rate of return of those assets. v) These 
values are stable and do not change over time and vi) the market maker will only 
trade if his utility after the trade remains the same or is increased. 
As it was mentioned in the very first paragraph, the market maker aims at 
maximizing the expected utility of his terminal wealth which is equal to the initial 
wealth (W0) times the rate of return (it) on that portfolio plus the rate of return 
( Ri) on the true value of a transaction in stock (i), (Qi), minus the costs of carrying 
the inventory (1 +Rr)(Qi-Ci). In other words, the terminal wealth is equal to the 
initial portfolio position plus any returns from transactions minus the costs of 
getting involved in those transactions. 
Based on assumption (vi) with respect to changes in the market maker's utility 
function, one obtains the following mathematical expression: 
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E{U[Wo(l + R* )]}=E[U( W )] (2.15) 
which simply states that the expected utility of his initial wealth times returns must 
be equal to the expected utility of his terminal wealth. In other words the market 
maker will not trade if he is not guaranteed his initial level of utility. If one 
elaborates on the above expression, expands both sides in a Taylor series 
expansion, drops terms of order higher than two and sets RFO then one obtains 
where Ci/Qi is the percentage cost that is necessary for the dealer to be willing to 
take that position Q in stock (i), z is the dealer's coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, Wo is the initial wealth/portfolio, <Jip is the correlation between the rate of 
return on stock (i) and the rate of return on the optimal efficient portfolio, Qp is the 
true value of stocks held in the dealer's portfolio, cri2 is the variance of stock (i)'s 
return and Qi is the true value of a transaction in stock (i). 
The function derived above shows clearly that the cost of immediacy for every 
stock (i) depends on a number of different factors. As you can see the dealer's 
initial wealth (Wo) enters the function directly as well as the degree of risk 
aversion (z). Greater initial wealth reduces the cost of immediacy while a risk 
averse attitude increases the cost. Qp, which is the value of stock, held in the 
market maker's inventory is also important. It appears that a larger stock position 
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will increase costs since it will make it more difficult for the market maker to 
absorb more inventory. Costs are also affected by Qi which represents the 'true' 
value of stock (i) which a function of the size of every transaction given that the 
value of each asset is exogenously fixed . Therefore the size of each transaction is 
important in determining final costs. Finally the acquisition of new stocks and 
their correlation to the optimal efficient portfolio in terms of rate of return (<Yip) as 
well as the variance of the rate of return ( cr?) for each newly acquired stock also 
appear to affect the market maker's costs. The resultant spread is equal to 
and clearly indicates that the spread is not a function of the inventory as one would 
normally expect since it does not appear in the spread function. However it seems 
that the spread depends on trades size due to the linearity between percentage costs 
(Ci) and trade size. At this point it should be made clear that the dealer's inventory 
affects the bid and ask price but not the difference, which constitutes the spread. 
A large inventory increases new inventory absorption costs therefore the market 
maker sets lower bid and ask prices. A depleted inventory will force the market 
maker to charge higher prices. 
Up to the moment we have considered only holding costs, however Stoll extends 
his analysis to incorporate order-processing costs, which are assumed to be a fixed 
fee for each transaction. Therefore he concludes that the market maker's total cost 
function must assume a U shape due to the decreasing nature of processing costs as 
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a function of order/trade size and the increasing nature of holding costs as a 
function of order/trade size. This of course implies an optimal level of trade 
size/transactions at which the total cost function assumes its lowest value. 
Stoll's model assumes a different perspective and it appears to be more realistic in 
comparison to the other two models. Nonetheless it suffers from a great 
drawback, the complete absence of intertemporal characteristics. As it was clearly 
explained at the beginning this model was designed as a two period model, in 
which at t=2 the stock is liquidated; therefore uncertainty is virtually non-existent 
when it comes to deciding for how long the market maker will hold the stock, let 
alone showing consideration for the order flow process which may constitute a 
very important parameter when setting prices. In addition to those simplifications 
the exogenous nature of the stock's true price and the portfolio's return further 
enhance the feeling of safety for the market rendering the mode too unrealistic. Of 
course Stoll considers order-processing costs, which are also important and were 
not considered in any of the models above. 
incorporates all those 'missing' attributes. 
The model that follows below 
2.4.2.2 MULTIPERIOD PORTFOLIO RISK ANALYSIS: HO & STOLL 
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Having introduced Stoll's model ( 1978), the next step is to discuss a more 
elaborate model in particular that of Ho & Stoll ( 1981) which extends the intuition 
of the Stoll analysis to a multiperiod framework in which both order flow and 
portfolio returns are stochastic. Stoll's initial model was an one trade-one period 
model. The dealer faces no uncertainty as to the time extent he has to hold his 
inventory position since stock is liquidated at time t+ 1. 
This new model can be described as a multiperiod finite horizon (T period) 
dynamic programming approach to characterise the dealer's optimal pricing policy. 
Ho & Stoll demonstrate a number of important properties of the dealer's optimal 
pricing behaviour. First the spread depends on the time horizon of the dealer. As 
the dealer nears the end of trading, the spread reduces because the 
inventory/portfolio risk involved is less pronounced. As the time horizon 
lengthens however portfolio risk increases and the spread increases as well. 
Another property of the model under consideration is that transaction uncertainty 
per se does not affect the spread. Ho & Stoll argue that transactions variability has 
no direct effect on the dealer but rather works indirectly through its effect on his 
overall portfolio position. The third property of this optimal pricing policy is that 
the spread is independent of the inventory level. Of course bid and ask prices are 
affected but the spread itself remains unaffected. 
Having provided a brief description of the Ho & Stoll model the next step is to 
have a more inquisitive look concentrating on the technical aspect of the model and 
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how the authors reach all those conclusions briefly mentioned above. First we will 
concentrate on the assumptions of that particular model as we did for all previous 
models and then we will concern ourselves with the computational and derivational 
aspect of the model. 
Firstly transactions are assumed to evolve as a stationary continuous time 
stochastic jump process as in Garman (1976) where Q is the jump size (number of 
trades in a transaction) 'Au and 'A~ represent the average number of public 
purchase/sale transactions respectively per unit time and 'Aadt and 'A~dt are 
interpreted as the probabilities of a dealer sale/purchase over the next instant. 
Secondly Ho & Stoll assume that he 'true' value of the stock is fixed at some value 
p, similar to the assumptions made in Stoll (1978). The bid and ask prices that the 
market maker sets have an effect on the arrival of the buy/sell orders influencing 
the probability of the next transaction being either a buy or a sell order. 
Unfortunately however bid and ask prices cannot guarantee the existence of a buy 
or sell order introducing uncertainty over the order flow and the time length that 
the market maker under consideration will have to carry the same inventory 
position. 
In addition to the order flow uncertainty introduced above, there is also uncertainty 
about the return on the market maker's existing portfolio. In the absence of a 
transaction, portfolio growth ( dX) is represented by a stochastic differential 
equation of the following form 
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dX=rxXdr+XdZx (2.18) 
where rx is the mean return per unit time, dZx is a non-standard Wiener process 
with mean zero and instantaneous variance a;. Of course Ho & Stoll's market 
maker is assumed to have some wealth that is made up of three different 
components namely cash, inventory and base wealth. Each of those components is 
described below: 
Cash is accumulated when the dealer sells securities and paid out when the dealer 
buys securities. Any balance in the cash account earns or pays the risk free rate of 
interest, r. The change in the value of the cash account, F, is 
dF=rFdt-(p-b)dqb+(p+a)dqu (2.19) 
Uncertainty in the cash account is due to uncertainty about transactions and not to 
any uncertainty about the interest to be earned. 
Inventory 
The dealer's inventory consists of shares of the one stock in which he makes a 
market. The change in the value of the inventory account, I is 
di=r1Idt+pdqb-pdqu+IdZ1 (2.20) 
where r1 is return on inventory, dqa and dqb are transactions at the bid/ask prices, 
dZ1 is the Wiener process and pis exogenous share price. Uncertainty arises both 
from transactions uncertainty reflected in dqa and dqb and from uncertainty about 
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return on the stock which is reflected in the instantaneous variance (j i of the 
Wiener process, dZ1. 
Base wealth 
The dealer has base wealthY. On the day he starts as a dealer F0=0 and 10=0 and 
base wealth is his wealth. The change in base wealth is given by 
dY=rvYdt+YdZv (2.21) 
where ry is mean return and dZv is a Wiener process. 
Having described the assumption on which Ho & Stoll construct their model as 
well as the components of the dealer's wealth, the next step is to discuss the 
objectives of the dealer. The objective of the dealer is to maximize the expected 
utility of his total wealth, E[U(Wr)], at timeT, where 
Wr=Fr+Ir+Yr (2.22) 
The optimal strategy is complicated by the multiperiod framework which permits 
the dealer to adjust a and b as he moves through time usually in response to 
inventory changes. Although these inventory changes may be stochastic, they are 
in tum influenced by bid and ask prices. This is known as a closed loop control 
problem because the optimal values of a and b depend on the observed state 
variables (F,I,Y) as well as on time, t. In other words the optimal dealer strategy 
we seek is a function that specifies the choice of a. and b for any position (described 
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by t, F, I, Y) in which the dealer finds himself. The appropriate procedure for such 
a problem is dynamic programming. Mathematically this can be expressed as 
J(t,F,I,Y)=max{E[U(WT)]it,F,I,Y} (2.23) 
The solution to the market maker's wealth can be found by maximizing function 
J(.) for an optimal bid and ask strategy spanning from To to T which is the end of 
the trading period. Based on the assumption that there is no consumption prior to 
T, the fundamental recurrence relation implied by the principle of optimality of 
dynamic programming is simply that 
max dJ(t,F,I,Y)=O and J(T,F,I,Y)=U(WT) (2.24) 
a,b 
In other words J must meet the condition that the maximized increments to J are 
always zero; for if they were not, one could increase derived utility by an 
.alternative bid-ask strategy. Also at timeT, J must give the same level of utility as 
the elementary utility function, U. More important to the dealer and to our problem 
lS 
max {A.a[J(F+pQ+aQ,I-pQ,Y)-J(F,I,Y)]+A.p[J(F-pQ+bQ,I-pQ,Y)-J(F,I,Y)}=O (2.25) 
a,b 
which represents the maximized increments to J( ) resulting from transactions, the 
value of which are pQ and which occur with probability Aadt in the case of dealer 
sales or A.bdt in the case of the dealer purchase. The dealer also adds his fee aQ or 
bQ, to his cash account. These increments do depend on a and b. The 
independence of the processes, dqa and dqb, allows us to write effect as the sum of 
the two increments. 
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While the two equations above determine the solution, finding the actual solution 
requires solving explicitly for the J( ) function. This is not straightforward and Ho 
& Stoll do not solve the general problem. Instead they introduce some 
transformations and simplifications into the problem in order to solve it. First they 
consider the problem only at endpoint. Thus when t=O, it follows that 
J(O,F,I,Y)=U(W). Second, since it would be useful if the cash and inventory 
effects on utility could be handled explicitly, Ho & Stoll take a first order 
approximation of the Taylor's senes expansiOn of the max term 
J(t,F,I,Y)=max{E[U(W1)]1t,F,I,Y}. Also, Ho & Stoll now assume symmetric linear 
demand and supply to the dealer, so that 
A.u=A.(a)=a-pa (2.26) 
A.b=A.(b )=a-Ph (2.27) 
Finally they define the sell operator, S, as 
SJ=S[J(F,I,Y)]+J(F+Q,I-Q,Y) (2.28) 
and the buy operator, B, as 
BJ=B[J(F,I,Y)]=J(F-Q,I+Q,Y) (2.29) 
The sell operator acting on J describes the dealer's derived utility after a sale by the 
dealer but before including the selling fee. Utility will decrease if the sale drives 
the dealer further away from his desired portfolio by increasing a short inventory 
position. Utility will increase if the sale reduces a long inventory position. With 
these simplifications and substitutions and suppressing the time argument, the 
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dealer's problem can be restated as follows. The change with respect to time 
remaining of derived utility depends on the return and risk of the dealer's current 
wealth (LJ) over which he has no direct control and the maximized value of two 
terms that reflect the net contribution to the dealer's derived utility from dealer 
sales and purchases respectively over which he has no control. The first order 
conditions to this problem can be solved for the dealer's optimal prices, which in 
the case ofthe bid is simply 
b *=~ + J(.)- BJ(.) (2.30) 
2{3 2BQJF 
The ask is given by 
a·=~+ J(.)-SJ(.) (2.31) 
2{3 2SQJF 
where a and p are parameters of the linear supply and demand functions. From the 
bid and ask equations derived above one ca obtain the spread which is equal to 
s=a!p+ J(.)- SJ(.) + J(.)- BJ(.) (2.32) 
2SQJF 2BQJF 
the first term is the spread which maximizes expected revenues per share from sale 
and purchase transactions from the symmetric linear demand functions. The 
remaining terms are 'risk premiums' for a sale and purchase transaction, which 
assume optimal dealer behaviour in the future. the optimal dealer spread is given 
by: 
s=a!p-Ji Z(Q/W) a~ t+ 7i Z(Q/W) a~ [(ri-r+GI)+Z(rw+2IT/W)]t2 (2.33) 
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where Z= U" WI U' is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and G1=r1+ 112 a~ is 
the instantaneous growth in the variance of I, (r1-r) is the risk premium, rw is the 
expected return on total portfolio and 2TIIW is expected dealer profits expressed as 
a function of his wealth. The spread equation actually omits certain small second 
order terms. 
Having obtained the spread function above, it is high time we had a better look at 
the factors that affect the spread. However before doing so, the time horizon of 
the dealer must be taken into consideration. When t=O and the dealer is just about 
to liquidate all his assets, he is only interested in the fee he can collect from a last 
purchase or a last sale, therefore the relevant term is alp. If however the time 
horizon of the market maker is elongated then the first order risk adjustment 
becomes relevant. Observing closely this term, one can clearly see that the spread 
does not depend on the market maker's inventory as one would expect but on a 
number of factors which are considered to be relatively stable over time such as the 
market maker's attitude towards risk reflected by Z, the relative value of the 
transaction given by Q and finally the risk of the stock as measured by its 
instantaneous variance reflected in a~ . Extending the market maker's horizon 
even further makes the second term relevant. Again the market maker's spread 
depends on the factors mentioned above as well as on i) the risk premium which is 
equal to (r1-r), ii) the growth in the variance of I given by G~, iii) the relative risk 
aversion given by Z, iv) expected returns on the market maker's total portfolio (rw) 
47 
--------~--
and v) expected dealer profits as a fraction of his wealth (2Il/W). Since the 
expected returns and growth in variance of I are likely to be small relative to the 
market maker's horizon, the principal effect comes from (2IT/W). The larger the 
monopoly profits today the more the dealer stands to lose tomorrow and therefore 
the larger the second-order risk adjustment. The findings of Ho & Stoll render 
support to the one period model of Stoll (1978). The dealer's inventory position 
will not affect the spread itself, however it can have a significant effect on bid and 
ask prices. The market maker will increase both bid and ask prices if his inventory 
is depleted and vice versa. 
Despite the interesting findings of Ho & Stoll model, there are a number of 
underlying restrictions in the model that need to be considered. The model just 
described employs just a finite horizon, implying that inventory is liquidated at 
timeT introducing deterministic patterns in the dealer's prices. Spreads are bigger 
if horizon is infinite and shorter if horizon is predetermined. Indeed traders would 
be worse off dealing with a specialist who had a long time horizon as opposed to a 
market maker with shorter horizon. A second restriction is that the model assumes 
a fixed true price for the stock, which can be realistic, if there is a short horizon 
only. Thirdly the model assumes that the order flow follows a Poisson process 
effectively precluding informed trading. All those restrictions allow only for 
market orders to be considered. The model that follows incorporates limit orders 
as well. 
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2.4.2.3 OHARA & OLDFIELD' MODEL 
The restrictions described above are incorporated as features of the O'Hara & 
Oldfield (1986) model. In their model the market maker is described as risk 
averse, receives both limit and market orders and faces order flow and inventory 
value uncertainty. The trading period is assumed to contain n trading intervals and 
the dealer's utility s maximised over an infinite number of trading days. In 
addition to the above characteristics, it is also presumed that the dealer operates 
with an infinite horizon implying that there is no pre-determined date at which 
inventory is liquidated and therefore no deterministic trading patterns can emerge. 
Also the value of the stock may vary in contrast to the previous model where value 
is fixed dictating that the value of the dealer's inventory is also not fixed. The 
market maker sets bid and ask prices at the beginning of every period at which all 
market orders and any limit orders must be cleared. However the above model 
presents a drawback and this is that limit orders are implicitly assumed to last only 
for a period. 
The dealer trade models considered in this section illustrate the complexities of the 
pricing problem faced by the dealer. In each model inventory introduces risk for 
the trader and his pricing strategy reflects at least partially his efforts to minimise 
those risks. 
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Having provided an overview of the characteristics of the model, the next step is to 
further elaborate on it. 
The dealer's problem is to set bid and ask prices, b1 and a1 to solve 
"" ll 
max E[l: .cpjU(L 7tj1)] (2.34) 
j=O 1=1 
where <p is the discount rate, j is the index for trading days, U is a strictly concave 
utility function, t is the index of trading periods in each day and 1tjt is the trading 
profit in period t of day j. In other words the dealer is trying to maximise expected 
utility that is based on the total profit he makes over the trading period. 
The market maker's order flow in any period is potentially composed of buy/sell 
limit orders and buy/sell market orders. The limit orders are assumed to be linear 
functions of the price and they are represented by cumulative order functions 
defined as integrals of the incremental orders. 
The limit orders to buy from the dealer in period t, denoted A L are given by 
a 
A{'= aL- a1yL= J qa(at) dat (2.35) 
at 
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and the limit orders to sell to the dealer b1 are given by 
L L L f 1 B, = P- aT<p =! Qs(BT) DBT (2.36) 
where the l superscripted variables refer to the limit order book, a, p, y, <p are 
parameters of the limit order flow, the q functions are the incremental orders at 
each price and the limits of integration a and p are the highest ask and lowest bid 
price, respectively at which traders will submit orders. 
A period's market maker order flow is composed of both price-dependent and 
liquidity-based orders. The market maker uses the information from his limit 
orders to form his expectation about the market order flow. Thus the market order 
flow is represented as functions 
where the ro 1 and E 1 are random variables incorporating both deviations from the 
market maker's expected price- dependent orders and the liquidity-based orders. 
A characteristic particular in this model which was not explicitly mentioned above 
is that of the overnight market where the market maker under consideration has the 
ability to borrow or lend according to this wish but most importantly according to 
this portfolio position. If the market maker is short inventory then he will borrow 
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in the overnight market so as to assume his desired position if on the other hand he 
is long then he will lend to other traders. These borrowing and lending activities 
overnight will contribute towards the emergence of a price (p) at which shares are 
bought and sold and an interest rate (r). If the dealer is short, he pays rpln and ifhe 
is long he receives the same amount. 
These overnight activities described above attribute a special meaning to inventory 
since it appears to have a major effect on current cash flow and the dealer's future 
operations. As a result of that inventory is treated as the state variable of the 
system and the market maker's dynamic program for any trading day can be 
expressed as 
n 
max E[UL 7t1+V(In)] (2.39) 
/=] 
where V is the market maker's derived value function which depends on inventory 
and incorporates the effect of current actions on future expected utility given that 
future actions are chosen optimally. As a consequence of that the dealer's 
expectation of the future value of the inventory affects his optimal strategy. The 
dealer's profit in period n, 1tn is captured by 
where an( a-any +ron) and bnCP-bn <p +En) are direct cash flow effects and 
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rpCin-I+~+ bn <p -E n-a+an y -ron) gives the cash flow cost of financing or lending the 
resulting inventory. The problem is a constrained maximisation problem because 
the limit orders must be positive. 
The first order conditions can be solved for the optimal bid and ask prices for 
period n. Assuming interior solutions, these are given by 
an=a/2y+E( U' ron)IE( U' )2y+rE( U' p )/2E( U' )+E( V' )/2E( U') (2.41) 
bn=-~/2<p-E( U' En)/E( U' )2<p+rE( U' p )/2E( U' )+E( V' )/2E( U') (2.42) 
These expressions are not explicit solutions for an and bn because they contain U' 
and V' ,both of which depend on an and bn however they provide us with useful 
information with respect to the determinants of the bid and ask spread. The first 
terms on both expressions reflect the slope of the order flow, the second terms 
reflect market order flow while the third and fourth terms reflect inventory effects. 
In particular the third term captures the overnight effects of borrowing or lending at 
rp while the fourth term captures the value of carrying the market maker's current 
position into the future. An interesting point to be made at this stage is that the 
third and fourth terms that capture the inventory effects on the bid and ask prices 
appear to affect those prices in exactly the same way in accordance to all previous 
models. Therefore increases or decreases in inventory will shift both bid and ask 
prices in the same direction leaving the actual spread unaffected. These trading 
prices can be solved for the spread given by 
au.bn=(a~+j3y)/2~y+[~E(ron)+yE(En)]/2~y+[~cov( U' ,ro0 )+y( U' ,E0)]/2~yE( U') (2.43) 
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The mathematical expressiOn just presented clearly indicates that the spread 
depends on the market maker's expected order flow as it becomes apparent from 
the first two terms while the third term indicates that market order uncertainty also 
plays an important role in spread determination. The last term, which is related to 
market order uncertainty, may assume different values. If the market maker is risk 
neutral this term equals zero however if the market maker is risk averse then this 
term may assume both positive and negative values depending on the covariance. 
As it appears from the mathematical expression above, inventory and the value 
function have absolutely no role in determining the spread rendering full support to 
the Ho & Stoll arguments with respect to the inventory-spread independence. 
Nonetheless closer observation of the mathematical expression above will reveal 
that the spread depends on the marginal utility term ( U' ), which incorporates the 
inventory variables, therefore inventory enters the bid-ask spread function 
implicitly. 
Having shown that inventory affects the bid-ask spread through marginal utility, 
the next step is to look into the degree to which this happens. This can be 
achieved by assuming that the dealer is risk averse, which can be represented by a 
negative exponential utility function. However if this assumption is made, there 
arises a problem with respect to the value function that does not appear to be 
negatively exponential. Nevertheless this kind of problem is overcome by taking 
into account Hakasson's work (1970) who has shown that under some fairly 
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general conditions, exponential preferences lead to an indirect utility function that 
is exponential in wealth. Taking into account the work of Hakasson, O'Hara & 
Oldfield show that the spread is equal to 
(a~+py)/2~y+[~E(ro0)+yE(En)]/2~y+[ ~cov( U' ,ro0)+y( U' ,E0)]/2~yE( U') (2.44) 
if only order variability is taken into consideration incorporatjng a risk adjustment 
term (the last term) while the level of inventory does not seem to be an argument in 
the whole expression at least explicitly. Based on the above results one can safely 
conclude that faced with either order uncertainty or price uncertainty alone, the 
market maker moves his prices symmetrically and his spread remains invariant 
with respect to his inventory. 
It is very well known that at each time (t) the market maker faces both order and 
inventory value variability and therefore any conclusions drawn from this model 
must take into consideration this dual complexity. When both order and value 
variability is considered it appears that the spread is inventory dependent. These 
results relate to the dealer's period n problem. Given these optimal prices, the 
dealer's n-1 period problem can be solved. Moreover solving for earlier problems 
rapidly becomes intractable, illustrating the practical difficulties with applying a 
discrete time multiperiod model to analyse the dealer's problem. Interestingly the 
same difficulty arose in the continuous time framework of Ho & Stoll (1981) 
described above. 
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As it is customary, after having provided readers with a technical treatment of the 
issue, the next step is to look into the drawbacks and identify the limitations of the 
model. Despite the innovative characteristics of overnight trading and the 
introduction of limit orders, the trading process is modelled as a series of call 
markets rather than a continuous trading process, which characterises most 
markets. Nevertheless this kind of problem can be overcome by shortening the 
time period of each trading session. A second drawback is identified on the 
duration of limit orders, which are assumed to last only for a period. After the 
passing of that time period, limit orders are cancelled. 
2.4.3 COMPETITIVE TRADE ORDER SUBMISSION 
In the models considered thus far, the main act~vity of the specialist is the provision 
of immediacy to traders. In the model considered below, the presence of a 
specialist is not essential. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb (1981) examine 
the order strategies of traders who can choose between submitting a market order 
for immediate execution or a limit order that specifies a specific price for 
execution. In this model market prices evolve as a result of orders crossing 
between traders. What is an important feature of this model, however, is the 
existence of exogenous transaction costs. These transaction costs influence the 
order decisions of traders and hence determine the trading process of the 
underlying asset. CMSW assume a particular cost structure such that the trader 
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pays a cost for submitting a limit order and an additional one if the order executes. 
Alternatively if the trader submits a market order then he faces a single transaction 
cost. The trader's optimal order strategy is shown to depend on factors such as 
transaction costs, the parameters of his utility function and the existing market 
spread. 
Having provided readers with an overview of the new model, we should 
concentrate on the investor's maximization problem. As in all models the investor 
under consideration is supposed to maximize the expected utility of his terminal 
wealth by allocating funds between a risky asset and a risk free asset. 
Nevertheless the existence of transaction costs as it was stated above hinders the 
continuous change of the investor's portfolio. Actually the investor can trade only 
at discrete points in time and these time points are exogenously dictated. However 
if the investor decides to trade can choose between a market order and a limit 
order. 
Given the alternatives available the investor will make a decision on whether to 
submit a limit order or a market according to the properties that those two kind of 
orders exhibit. CMSW assume that the market ask/bid price depends only on the 
last previous market ask/bid and hence is a Markov process. Assume an investor 
submits a bid limit order close to a counterpart ask limit order in an attempt to 
achieve a better trading price what is the probability that this limit order will 
execute? One would expect that the closer he submits his bid/ask limit order to the 
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counterpart bid/ask limit order the more likely it is that his order will execute. 
Nevertheless CMSW show that the probability of the limit order executing is 
always less than one. This is because there will be a jump in the probability of a 
limit order executing since a market order always executes. This 'jump' attribute 
however depends heavily on the existence of transaction costs. CMSW show that 
without transaction costs the underlying process becomes a Wiener process and the 
'jump' property disappears. This probability jump can also be explained by the 
'gravitational pull' that market orders exercise. Intuitively stated, as a trader 
contemplates placing a bid limit closer and closer to an ask order already 
established on the market, he is increasingly attracted by this counterpart offer. 
There will be a point that the 'gravitational pull' exerted by the established ask will 
dominate. Eventually the investor will choose to 'jump' his price and execute with 
certainty via a market order. 
Having described the attributes peculiar to each kind of order, the next step is to 
look into the strategy that each investor will follow. For this reason CMSW 
introduce a number of assumptions. Firstly all orders are for the same quantity 
and secondly limit orders are assumed to last only for one trading period and are 
cancelled in the next trading period if they are not executed. 
( 
If the spread 
pertinent in the market is quite wide, investors will opt to submit limit orders. In 
case those limit orders execute, those traders will have achieved better trading 
prices in comparison to the other traders and this will bring about a shift from 
market orders to limit orders, decreasing the spread. A narrower spread will 
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induce a surge of market orders, which are absolutely certain to execute in 
comparison to limit orders. Any limit orders outstanding will be immediately 
filled and the spread will start widening again. 
There are two important properties that should be noted as a result of the process 
just described. The gravitational pull described above is one of the main reasons 
for the existence of the spread. The existence of transaction costs and in particular 
the double charge peculiar to the submission of limit orders as well as execution 
uncertainty constitutes constant trading non optimal. In that way investors will 
submit market orders rather than limit orders. Increased submission of market 
orders implies reduced liquidity and if this occurs in a neighbourhood of market 
prices then the spread does not collapse to zero. Second the size of the spread 
depends on the movement of traders between limit orders and market orders and 
this in turn partially depends on the execution probability of the limit order. In the 
absence of transaction costs, all orders would be limit orders because the continuity 
of the price process would guarantee execution but with transaction costs this 
probability falls with trading intensity. In thin markets, limit order execution is 
low and hence even with a large spread traders may prefer to enter marker orders 
rather than limit orders. This trading strategy dictates that larger spreads will be 
an equilibrium property of thinner markets. 
In this model, inventory does not play an explicit role in determining the bid-ask 
spread and this is because the model is designed to concentrate on competitive 
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traders essentially endeavouring to minimize transaction costs in meeting their own 
needs. If those competitive traders acted as dealers then inventory would play an 
important role. 
The models examined in this chapter present a varied view of the behaviour of 
market prices and spreads. However despite the differences between the different 
models discussed, there is an underlying similarity to the inventory based approach 
to market making and this is the balancing problem that the specialist or market 
maker faces when it comes to equilibrating deviations in outflows and inflows. 
Those deviations of course are irrelevant in determining the long run future value 
of the stocks but quite relevant in determining the short run value of those shares. 
The dealer's effect on prices is temporary with prices ultimately revering to 'true' 
levels that prevail when order flows are balanced. 
2.5 ADVERSE SELECTION MODELS 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION TO ADVERSE SELECTION MODELS 
All previous models were concerned with examining the impact of inventory on 
price formation. In this part we will analyse major information based models in an 
attempt to understand how those models explain price behaviour. Information 
based models allow for examination of market dynamics and hence provide 
insights into the adjustment process of prices. 
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2.5.2 THE EMERGENCE OF INFORMATION MODELS 
The ongm of information models can be traced back to Bagehot ( 1971) who 
suggested that liquidity providers are confronted with the potential of trading with 
counter parties that have informational advantage. The market maker knows that 
when he is trading with an informed trader he always losses. To remain in 
business, the market maker must offset those losses by making gains from 
uninformed traders. These gains arise from the bid-ask spread. Therefore in the 
rest of this paper we will attempt to explain bid-ask spreads without relying on 
exogenous technological specifications of transaction costs. 
Bagehot (1971) based his paper on the distribution between 'market agents' and 
'trading gains'. The term 'market gains' refers to gains achieved as a result of a 
general increase in the price of stocks. In that way all investors make money 
without engaging in any kind of sophisticated trading strategy. Of course it is 
equally likely that stocks prices go down and every single trader incurs losses. 
Assuming an equal number of general price increases and general price decreases, 
all investors achieve a neutral market rate of return. On the other hand, the term 
'trading gains' incorporates the notion of information costs. These costs arise as a 
result of information asymmetry between traders. As a result of this information 
asymmetry, investors who are at an informational disadvantage make losses in 
relation to the normal market rate return while investors who are in possession of 
superior information achieve a higher rate of return in relation to the normal market 
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rate. Distinction between those two groups of traders from the point of view of the 
market maker is almost impossible and the market maker will end up incurring 
losses when engaging into trading with informed traders. As a consequence of 
that, the setting of bid and ask prices (quotes) are deemed necessary. Information 
asymmetry and the costs that arise for the market maker give rise to the spread, 
which is perceived as compensation for the losses incurred mentioned above at the 
expense of the uninformed (liquidity) traders who engage in trading just to satisfy 
their current financial needs. 
2.5.3 FORMALIZATION OF INFORMATION COSTS: COPELAND & GALAI 
(1983) 
The first attempt to formalize the notion of information costs, as a factor besides 
inventory costs capable of having an effect on the bid-ask spread was made by 
Copeland & Galai, hereafter C&G. They constructed a one period model with a 
single monopolistic neutral dealer along with a number of informed and 
uninformed traders. C&G approach the problem of price setting in two different 
ways: the first approach assumes the existence of a risk neutral dealer who sets bid 
& ask prices to maximize expected profit while the second approach views the bid 
& ask prices as call & put options provided by the dealer under consideration to the 
traders. 
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C&G construct a model with a single monopolistic neutral dealer and a number of 
traders who are indistinguishable information wise from the market maker's point 
of view. The stock price (P) is drawn from some known density f(P) which is 
exogenous to the market, however there are some traders who are aware of that 
density f(P) and the actual value of the stock. In addition traders arrive at the 
market according to some exogenous probabilistic framework independent of 
prices and are allowed to have price elastic demand functions so that they can 
choose whether to trade or not. At this point, it must be made clear that the above 
assumption is of particular convenience profit wise to liquidity traders who are 
given the possibility to defer trading if they perceive themselves at an exceptional 
information disadvantage. C&G also assume that all trades are of the same fixed 
size, an assumption not quite realistic since trade size has the ability to signal 
information content i.e. degree of importance attached to every single piece of 
information. Another assumption considered to be quite important is the 
recognition that the dealer's order flow may include information based trades. In 
particular while individuals traders are anonymous to the dealer, the market maker 
knows that any given trade comes from an informed trader with probability I11 and 
from an uninformed trader with probability 1-I11• This probabilistic structure is an 
important contribution of the model. C&G also assume that a liquidity trader will 
buy with probability (IlsL), sell with probability (IIsL) and engage in no trading 
with probability (IINL). The informed trader is assumed to buy or sell so as to 
achieve profit maximisation. 
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In the instantaneous quote framework assumed in the model under consideration, 
the market maker sets his quotes and trading occurs with no intervening time 
passmg. In this way the market maker can calculate his gain or loss. If the 
market maker trades with an informed trader then he knows he is going to incur a 
loss. On the contrary if the market maker trades with a liquidity trader then he 
knows he will make profits. The dealer's objective function is given by 
oo PA 
{DI[ JCP- PA )f(P)dP + J(P8 - P)f(P)dP ]+(1-DI)[DsL(PA-P)+DsL(P-Ps)+DNL(O)]} 2.45) 
PA 0 
The optimal bid and ask prices emerge as the solutions to the dealer's 
maximization problem, provided these prices are positive. 
Having described the model and shown how the market maker will set his bid and 
ask prices, the next step is to evaluate hoe the model under consideration 
contributed to the general literature. Specifically the model showed that the bid-
ask spread depends on the calculation of the market maker's expected gains and 
losses which makes it a similar model to the inventory control models discussed in 
the previous section. However this model showed that the market spread will exist 
without either risk aversion or market power on behalf of the market maker since 
the market maker in this model is risk neutral and by imposing a zero profit 
restriction the market maker under consideration turns from a monopolistic one to a 
competitive one without any alteration to the predictions of the model described 
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already. The only disadvantage of the model is identified on the static one-trade 
framework. The models to follow take this point into consideration and assume a 
more sophisticated structure. 
2.5.4 SEQUENTIAL TRADING MODELS 
2.5.4.1 GLOSTEN & MILGROM (1985): A DICHOTOMIZATION OF 
INFORMATION & INVENTORY EFFECTS 
In the one period-one trade model of Copeland & Galai considered previously 
market spread emerged as a result of the need to balance the various risks from 
trading indistinctively with both informed and uninformed trades. The bid-ask 
spread depended on a number of factors such as: i) the probability of trade by the 
informed ii) the stochastic process of the stock and iii) the elasticities of demand. 
It follows that if those factors remained unchanged, then the bid-ask spread would 
remain unchanged. In a world of multiple trading the market maker's total loss 
would equal constant loss (loss for a single trade) times the number of trades since 
the bid-ask spread would remain unaffected as a consequence of zero changes on 
the factors mentioned above which is not true because frequency and volume of 
trading has the ability to convey information, therefore the above mode is rendered 
obsolete. 
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In a multiple trading world, the market maker observes trading activity and then 
sets prices. If he observes traders selling a specific stock then he suspects that thee 
is bad news for the stock under consideration and he adjusts prices accordingly. 
However it may very well be the case that the traders observed by the market 
maker are just liquidity traders and their trading decisions do not incorporate any 
kind of information. Nevertheless if further selling occurs then the market maker 
will adjust prices downwards showing that the has received their 'hidden message' 
of bad news. In other words the market maker conditions his beliefs about the 
unobserved value of each stock on the trades he observes for the stock under 
consideration. Over time the imbalance observed between buys and sales for a 
specific stock will lead the market maker to learn all information and his prices will 
converge to the expected value of the asset given this information. 
Similar to the spirit described above Glosten & Milgrom (1985) introduce a 
sequential trade model similar to that of Copeland & Galai. Specifically they 
assume that all participants are risk neutral and act competitively, the asset value is 
given by random variable V, market maker's capital is unlimited and bankruptcy is 
non existent but most important of all there are no transaction or holding inventory 
costs which preclude the consideration of any inventory effects bringing about an 
absolute dichotomization between inventory and information effects. 
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As it was explained above, informed traders use the information they possess to 
make money at the expense of the uninformed and the market maker. Any piece 
of information available to the informed traders would lead to increased trading 
activity on their behalf inducing imminent readjustment of prices. In order to 
avoid a situation like that which may pose a problem to the development ofrational 
expectations models, the assumption made is that investors trade probabilistically 
and if they are chosen to trade, they are allowed to trade only one unit of the asset 
(stock) under consideration. If any trader wishes to engage in further training 
because he believed that the quotes provided by the market maker do not reflect the 
actual value of the asset (stock) as it is implied by the information available to him 
then he must 'join the queue' and wait to be selected again. 
Having explained the rationale behind this kind of models as well as discussed the 
assumptions, the next step is to concentrate on price formation. In the model 
under consideration, the specialist sets prices such that the expected profit on any 
trade is zero. This is because of the assumptions of risk neutrality and competition 
made above. In other words each market maker sets his prices by considering the 
trading strategy to be followed by other market participants. In effect each market 
maker selects an expected profit maximising supply and demand schedule given his 
competitor's supply and demand schedules, playing a kind of game against each 
other. Considering the fact that each one of them has the same prior belief 
regarding the value of an asset and observing the same kind oftrading activity, then 
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it s natural for then to quote the same bid and ask prices. If any of them quoted 
different prices, competition would completely eliminate any deviations. 
The mechanism implied by the model works in the following way. Each market 
maker has a perception about the value of an asset. This can be either V or V . 
Based on this preconception he estimates P[V=V /BI] & P[V=V /Bt] ifhe observes 
a buy order or P[V=V /SI] & P[V=V /S 1] if he observes a sale. Having done that 
he estimates the expected value of the asset under consideration depending on the 
trade observed i.e. E[V/BI] and E[V/S 1]. Of course every time another trade, he 
revises his expectations with his posterior belief becoming his prior. 
Having explained the workings of the model, the next step is to evaluate its 
contribution. In this model the spread arises as a result of the revisions in the 
asset's value conditioned on observed trades while in the model of Copeland & 
Galai the spread arises as a result of balancing expected gains and losses. 
Undoubtedly the incorporation of asymmetric information combined with learning 
on behalf of the market maker represent an important advancement in the market 
microstructure literature. In addition to this, the transaction prices obtained from 
this model form a Martingale meaning that an observer cannot do better in 
predicting the future price than by simply using the current price. Finally this 
model predicts that a high degree of asymmetric information can lead to market 
failure since the spread can get so wide precluding any trading. Although this 
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model will be employed as the basis for studying the impact of asymmetric 
information on prices and looking into the usefulness of trading halts or circuit 
breakers, it suffers from order size restrictions since only one unit of each asset ca 
be traded each time completely disregarding the effect of block trading on prices. 
The models to be considered incorporate this new characteristic. 
2.5.4.2 EASLEY & O'HARA: INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY AND THE 
IMP ACT OF TRADE SIZE ON PRICES. 
Another sequential model similar to the one described right above is that of Easley 
& O'Hara, hereafter E&O. Although the model under examination is similar in 
nature in the following points i) investors trade an asset with competitive, risk 
neutral market makers ii) inventory effects do not matter allowing full examination 
of information effects iii) trading takes place sequentially according to a 
probabilistic structure and iv) bid & ask prices are conditioned on the trades 
observed, there are two characteristics that make this model unique. Those 
innovative characteristics are primarily the ability of investors to transact at 
different sizes in sharp contrast to the Glosten & Milgrom model where trading is 
restricted only to one unit per trade allowing us to address the effect of different 
trade sizes on security prices. The second innovative characteristic is information 
uncertainty, which means that the market maker must decide about the existence of 
new information and then evaluate its content and possible effects on prices. 
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Those two innovative characteristics affect the way the market maker sets bid and 
ask prices. This process of price setting will be explained right below. 
Informed traders as in previous models always make money at the expense of the 
uninformed or the market makers. However the trading behaviour of the informed 
in this model assumes a completely different dimension and this is a direct result of 
the characteristics of the mode, which allows variable trade sizes. In this model 
the informed trader will increase the amount of shares traded per single trade so as 
to take advantage of the superior information he possesses. Of course this kind of 
behaviour is peculiar to the informed trader only. This increased share dealing per 
single trade induces some kind of adverse selection problem and the market maker 
will perceive this behaviour as a sign of superior information upon which the 
market maker will condition his beliefs to set bid and ask prices. It becomes 
evident that the bid & ask prices obtained in the Copeland & Galai (1983) or 
Glosten & Milgrom (1985) are irrelevant when variable trade size is taken into 
consideration. 
In the Easley & O'Hara model, the equilibrium achieved depends on the choices of 
the informed traders regarding their preferable trading size. If the informed traders 
choose to trade only large quantities then they will be separated from the 
uninformed traders who will trade small quantities and a 'separating' equilibrium 
will be relevant. If on the other hand the informed traders choose to trade both 
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large and small quantities then a 'pooling' equilibrium will be relevant. In order 
for the market maker to decide which equilibrium will be relevant, it is necessary 
that we determine which of the two alternatives is more profitable to the trader, 
therefore both equilibria must be obtained. At this point it must be stressed that 
trying to obtain either of the two equilibria involves the same general approach to 
Bayesian learning as it was shown in the previous model with the specific trade 
probabilities adjusted to reflect the market maker's conjecture as to where the 
informed are trading. The equilibrium prices are given by the following formulae: 
az a" 
a*=V*+ v ( r (2.47) 
v- v x; (1- a,u) + a,u(l- o) 
where v* is the expected value of V with V E [V, V], X is the fraction of 
uninformed traders who trade the large quantity, o is the probability that V is equal 
to V, a; is the variance ofV and a~ is the probability of informed trading. 
If the informed traders are trading large quantities only then the market maker sets 
bid and ask prices for large quantities only and forgoes setting a spread by 
equalizing bid and ask prices for the small trades since informed investors trade 
only large quantities. Given the above decision of the market maker regarding 
spreads, the informed traders must decide whether it is in their interests to keep 
trading large quantities. Obviously there is a trade off involved between large 
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quantities-worse prices due to the existence of the spread and smaller quantities-
better prices due to the non-existence of a spread. In order for the informed traders 
to keep trading large quantities the following conditions must hold 
S2/S 1<l+aJl(l-&)/ x; (l-aJl) (2.48) 
B2/B 1<1 +aJl(l-&)/ X~ (1-a~-t) (2.49) 
If this is not the case the market must be in a separating equilibrium. 
Two important implications arise as a result of the two separate equilibria. First 
there is no such thing as a single market price. The price will be a direct result of 
trade size and the type of equilibrium prevailing each time. Secondly spreads do 
not constitute an appropriate measure of 'market goodness' simply because the 
spreads employed to measure 'market goodness' are usually small trade. spreads 
which do not constitute good proxies of the presence of asymmetric information or 
of the costs of trading. 
This revolutionary concept of the two separate equilibria has also provided an 
explanation for the severe drop observed when block trades occur and the 
subsequent weird price behaviour of prices of small trades. However before we 
provide an explanation for this kind of behaviour I strongly believe that it would be 
wise to remind readers of one of the innovative assumptions of this model namely 
the uncertainty regarding the existence of new information, which plays' a crucial 
role in explaining the puzzling behaviour, mentioned above. 
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It is well known that block trades transact at worst prices than small trades and any 
subsequent small trades occur at improved prices. This can be explained 
according to the following rationale. If the market is in a separating equilibrium 
which means that informed investors trade only large quantities then two 
subsequent block sales will make the market maker think that those trades 
incorporate bad news and as a consequence will revise prices downwards for all 
subsequent buys or sales. However as it was explained above there is no spread in 
a separating for small trades implying the complete lack of asymmetric 
information, therefore small trades carried out by any type of investor implies that 
there is no new information in the market. If there was any kind of information 
then the market maker would observe a block trade. Since this is not the case 
given the occurrence of a small trade, the market maker will revise his expectations 
setting a higher price. Obviously the 'information uncertainty' characteristic of 
this model has ensured the market of the non-existence of any type of information 
and thus he chose to revise his prices. If on the other hand this 'information 
uncertainty' characteristic is not present then a small size sale following a block 
sale will appear as incorporating bad information and the price will remain at the 
block sale level in contrast to the previous case where some kind of recovery is 
present. This is because the market maker is always certain that even small trades 
contain some kind of bad information. The above rationale has been found to be 
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consistent with observed empirical behaviour. Kraus & Stoll (1972), Dann, Myers 
& Raab (1977). 
This 'information uncertainty' characteristic has introduced a new dimension on 
the analysis of asymmetric information simply because it appears that price 
formation does not depend solely on the previous period trade but it extends 
backwards many periods (small trade, block trade, small trade). In other words 
prices are Martingales but do not follow a Markov process. 
2.5.5 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SEQUENTIAL TRADE 
MODELS 
Having described and explained the peculiarities of each of the two models, the 
next step is to delve into the advantages and disadvantages of sequential models. 
Sequential trade models allow the learning problem of the market maker and the 
uninformed trader to be analysed explicitly employing the Bayesian learning rule 
while at the same time look into the dynamic linkages between trades and price 
formation. 
There are two main advantages, which must be outlined as far as the nature of 
those models is concerned. Sequential model are the first models in the 
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asymmetric information category, which allow the full characterization of the bid-
ask spread. Specifically the Easley & O'Hara model (1987) allows us to view 
price formation as i) a function of the trade size and ii) the ratio of large to small 
trades. This is considered to be a novelty in the market microstructure literature 
since we all know that trade size and direction can convey important information 
about the true value of an asset. In addition the Bayesian learning technique on 
which those models are based upon have the ability to demonstrate that prices 
converge to full time information values in the limit even though the specific time 
period required for this outcome to be achieved is not clear. This specific 
characteristic of those models is of tremendous importance to the notion of market 
efficiency and market organisation & design issues. Those models therefore can 
be considered as the basis for a number of different areas in market microstructure 
(such as institutional market design) worth of further investigation. 
Even though the models presented above appear to have a number of virtues over 
older models, they however suffer from a number of structural problems with 
particular emphasis on the mechanics of the trading process. Both models Glosten 
& Milgram (1985) and Easley & O'Hara (1987) assume that traders are chosen 
from a pool of traders according to the population probabilities. This means that if 
there are x percent informed traders in the population then the probability that a 
market maker is trading with an informed trader is x percent again. Each trader in 
those models is supposed to be able to train only once if he is picked in the first 
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place of course and then after he completes his trading, he must return to the queue 
and wait to be chosen again. Of course this particular process of trading does not 
appear to be very realistic since an informed trader would prefer to trade constantly 
so as to take full advantage of the information he possesses leading to an 
immediate price change on behalf of the market maker who realises that the trading 
activity observed contains important information. A second assumption, which is 
rendered obsolete, by the most fundamental tenets of both models i.e. the sheer 
existence of asymmetric information and competition is that the percentage of both 
informed and uninformed traders remains constant. If uninformed traders 
observed increased trading behaviour then they would decide to forego trading for 
a certain period of time because it is almost certain that if they kept trading they 
would incur significant losses. The uninformed traders reaction is believed to be 
entirely rational considering the observed trading activity. 
Another point that was criticized in both models is the sheer lack of informed 
traders' strategic behaviour, which can be considered a direct result of the 
assumptions on which both models were built. One would normally expect that 
informed traders would collude in a way so as to hide their trading intentions 
perhaps by splitting big orders to smaller ones taking advantage of their superior 
information for a longer period of time. However the assumption of competition 
and full-information price convergence does not allow any of the behaviour 
described above. In addition actual profits cannot be readily estimated because the 
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price path depends on a number of variables, therefore an estimate of the profits 
achieved as a result of possession of superior information is impossible. This 
particular shortcoming inherent in sequential models is overcome in the next 
category of models to be reviewed namely batch models. However because of the 
nature of batch models that allow trades to be cleared at a single price we cannot 
clearly see the effects of trading on price formation as in this model. Obviously no 
single model can combine peculiar characteristics inherent in the two different 
groups of models. Nevertheless the models to be reviewed next provide an 
excellent treatment of the issue of strategic behaviour. 
2.5.6 STRATEGIC TRADING MODELS 
2.5.6.1 INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC TRADING MODELS 
The previous chapter was concerned with sequential models and the effect of 
particular trades on prices. Although the previous models vividly illustrated the 
effects that trade size and trade direction can have on prices, they exhibited a 
complete disregard for the strategic use of asymmetric information and how 
informed traders who are in possession of such information can employ it for their 
own benefit. Obviously such a disregard appears to be the result of the 
fundamentals of the model and in particular of the trading process, which disallows 
the use of superior information, unless it is extremely long lived. In this type of 
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models our attention concentrates on the strategic use of superior information to the 
benefit of the informed trader. 
Strategic trading models are very closely linked t rational expectation models. In 
rational expectation models all agents make conjectures about the information that 
any other agents may have and thus decide on their actions. In a market 
microstructure context the following analogy would be relevant. Informed traders 
condition their trading policy on the pricing policy of the market maker and the 
market maker in his turn observes trades before deciding on the prices. Obviously 
pricing and trading are inter-related and it is on this basis that we will consider how 
a single informed trader could best exploit his informational advantage to maximise 
his profits. The model to be considered soon, is a batch trading model meaning 
that all trades clear at a single price disallowing idiosyncratic effects of single 
trades but allowing profit estimation made on superior information. 
2.5.6.2 THE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR OF AN INFORMED TRADER 
2.5 .6.2.1 ONE-SHOT TRADING MODEL 
In the previous models discussed any informed trader would just submit order(s) at 
any trading opportunity that might arise until prices would converge to their 
information value. However the stance of strategic trading models is entirely 
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different. The informed trader is perceived as an information monopolist who 
aims at taking full advantage of the information he possesses. Kyle (1985) 
adopting the above stance introduces a model with a single risk neutral informed 
trader along with a number of uninformed traders who submit orders to a risk 
neutral market maker. 
Kyle's (1985) informed trader receives exclusive information about the liquidation 
value (v) of an asset, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean p0 and 
variance I:0. In addition there are liquidity traders who submit their orders and 
their aggregate trade quantity (!l) is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance a~. This random variable (!l) is assumed to be independent of the 
distribution of the asset value (v). The market maker in the model under 
consideration observes the aggregate order flow i.e. the order flow from both 
informed and uniformed traders but can not distinguish between the two flows. As 
a consequence of this inability to distinguish order flow, the learning process 
differs in the sense that it is the aggregate trade quantity that affects price 
behaviour rather than informed trading only. The informed trader faces a similar 
problem to that of the market maker. In particular the informed trader cannot 
conjecture the uninformed traders' actual demands so as to hide his trades even 
though he is aware of the distribution of the uninformed traders' order flow. 
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Having explained the positions of the three agents involved in this model, the next 
step is to look into the trading process. The trading process in the model under 
consideration evolves in two different stages. In he first stage the informed trader 
obtains exclusive information about the liquidation value of the asset (v), learns 
about the distribution of the uninformed traders' order quantity (j..t) and decides 
about his trade quantity (X). In the second stage, the market maker observes the 
aggregate net order quantity (x+j..t) and decides on a single clearing price, (p). At 
this point it must be stressed that the single clearing price, (p) set by the market 
maker is 'regret free' and the market maker earns zero expected profit. 
If the market maker's pricing strategy is represented by a function p=P(x+j..t), then 
the following condition must hold P(x+j..t)=E[v/x+j..t] which means that the price the 
market maker sets is equal to the expected value of the asset conditioned on the 
aggregate order flow. 
As we explained above the informed trader's order strategy depends on the pricing 
rule illustrated above and the order flow of the uninformed traders. However as it 
was explained before the informed trader is not aware of the actual order flow but 
is familiar only with the parameters of the distribution. The strategy of the 
informed trader is: X(v)=B(v-p0) where B=( a~ 11:0) 112 and the strategy of the 
market maker P(x+j..t)=p0+A.(x+j..t) where A.=l/2( a~ t1:oY112 • Observing the informed 
trader's optimal trading policy, one ca clearly see that his optimal order quantity 
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depends directly on the variance of the uninformed traders' order flow. As it was 
stressed above the informed trader is unaware of the uninformed traders' actual 
order flow but is familiar with parameters of the distribution f.!~N(O, a~) and he 
decides to hide his trades. Now as far as the market maker's trading price is 
concerned, it appears that it is linearly connected to the aggregate order flow (x+f.!). 
However since informed and uninformed trades are indistinguishable to the eyes of 
the market maker,. he decides to adjust prices according to the ratio of the amount 
of noise trading a~ to the amount of private information Lo. O'Hara comments 
on the above equilibrium conditions: 
"What makes this equilibrium so easy to characterize is its linear structure. 
This linearity in order strategy is important because it means that the informed 
trader will not pursue a more complex mixed strategy or submit orders that are 
linked to the underlying signal value in a non-linear manner. Consequently, 
given this strategic behaviour by the informed trader, the market maker knows 
that the relationship between the aggregate order flow and the underlying signal 
value must also be linear. Since in equilibrium the market efficiency condition 
requires the market maker to set prices equal to the conditional expected value, 
this, in tum means that market prices will also be linear in volume". (O'Hara, 
1995, page 96) 
2.5.6.2.2 MULTIPLE TRADING PERIOD 
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Up to the moment, we concentrated on one-shot trading models. Now we will 
look into a multi-period trading model. Specifically we will delve into the nature 
of a sequential auction model in which N rounds of trade occur in a trading day. 
Of course the same model ca be expanded to approximate a continuous auction as 
the number of periods becomes large. 
In the previous model described the market maker had to consider the impact of 
trading only on that period. Now however he will have to consider the impact of 
his trading on other periods as well. This is because his trading decisions in each 
period are linked because of their effect on the informativeness of prices. Thus if 
the informed trader decides to trade heavily in the early periods then he will be 
penalised at later periods with worst prices. Obviously his trading strategy is much 
more complex than it was in a single trading period and a number of factors must 
be considered. 
Kyle assumes that as the number of periods becomes large, the uninformed trades 
U(t) follow a Brownian motion so that 11 Un is normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance cr ~ !'1t0 , implying that the quantity traded at one auction is independent 
of the uninformed quantity traded at the other auctions. Nevertheless this not true 
for the informed trader. 
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The informed investor's trading strategy and the market maker's trading clearing 
price are given by the following formulae 
-
Mn(v) = Bn(v- ~-1)/ltn (2.50) 
~ = An(LU:'"n + df-in) 
And as it becomes apparent the market-clearing price is linearly related to the total 
order flow and optimal order strategy is also linearly related to the true asset value, 
similar to the one-shot trading model. In addition the informed trader's expected 
profit is given by 
Obviously the sequential auction equilibrium is much more complex than the 
sequential auction equilibrium described previously. A key property of this model 
that should be stressed is that information is gradually incorporated into prices 
across time. In the long run prices will reflect all superior information implying 
efficiency. Statistically speaking prices follow a martingale meaning that an 
uninformed observer's expectation of the future price is today's price. 
Kyle's model (1985) and its extension (sequential batch trading) have provided an 
excellent treatment of the issue of asymmetric information and strategic trading. 
However as all models considered up to now, it is liable to certain shortcomings. 
In particular there is no consideration for price contingent order submission and 
informed trading is restricted simply to a single trader. Since this single informed 
trader makes positive profits, then it is quite natural that this will induce other 
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traders to obtain superior information and trade in a similar way in pursuit of 
positive profits. Such behaviour is examined below. Another issue that is worth 
looking into is the possibility that superior information is disseminated not through 
private channels but rather through public channels. In other words looking into a 
situation where the informed trader described above ceases to be a monopolist and 
enters a competitive mode as described below. 
2.5.6.2.3. MULTIPLE INFORMED TRADERS: KYLE (1984) 
The previous model was concerned with a single informed trader who traded in a 
sequential auction model. This model will be concerned with multiple informed 
traders and market makers trading over a finite period of time. In particular Kyle 
(1984) introduces a three-date framework involving N speculators (informed 
traders) and M market makers. The model under consideration (Kyle, 1984) 
shares a number of similar characteristics to Kyle (1985). Specifically both 
models assume the same batch trading approach and informed traders must submit 
their orders without being aware of the price they will trade at. However the 
model to be discussed differs in a very important way to Kyle (1985) and this is to 
be found in the trading structure since all assets are assumed to liquidate at the end 
of time 2. As a consequence of this trading peculiarity price adjustment cannot be 
observed. In order to be more revealing regarding the peculiarities of this model I 
should say that price behaviour in this model is viewed in relation to the following 
84 
triptych namely multiple informed traders, information revelation and increased 
noise trading. 
Starting with 'multiple informed traders', one can easily conjecture that informed 
trader endogeneity (i.e. the number of informed traders is determined within the 
model) could have a number of effects as far as individual trader profits and 
individual trading behaviour are concerned. Needless to say the above changes 
will induce a kind of 'chain reaction' with stock prices being the ultimate recipient 
of all those changes. 
An increase in the number of informed traders is expected to have a decrease in 
individual profits since a certain amount of profits generated by making use of 
superior information needs now to be shared with more informed traders. Besides 
individual profit shrinkage, informed trader endogeneity is also expected to affect 
individual trading behaviour. This is because each informed trader will have to 
consider his fellow traders behaviour before making any decision regarding trading 
SIZe. 
Having indicated that there will be changes in optimal trading size and individual 
profits as a consequence of informed trader endogeneity, the next step is to delve 
into those changes in relation to increased noise trading and increases in the 
amount of publicly available information. 
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The first stimulus (change) employed in studying the effects of informed traders 
endogeneity on prices is an increase in the amount of noise trading (]"~ . If the 
number of informed traders is exogenously determined (X is fixed), then an 
increase in noise trading will induce current informed traders to increase their 
individual trading orders so as to keep aggregate relative trading in the same level 
as before given the increase in noise trading. Of course no change is expected in 
the price level. If however the number of informed traders is determined 
endogenously then an increase in noise trading will bring about an increase in 
potential profits to be made by current informed traders. However given the 
possibility of increased profit potentiality, more informed traders will enter. 
Increased informed trading will have as a consequence prices to impound superior 
information much faster than before. At the same time this increased informed 
trading activity will reduce the total amount of rents to be shared. 
The second stimulus employed in studying the effects of informed traders 
endogeneity-exogeneity on prices is an increase in the amount of publicly available 
information. Again if the number of informed traders is given endogenously then 
an increase in the amount of publicly available information will result in an 
immediate decrease in future profits since their corporate advantage (superior 
information) has now been dissipated. Needless to say, the market under 
consideration is much more efficient now. If on the other hand the number of 
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informed traders is endogenous then some of them will leave the market since they 
believe that it is not worth trading any more, leading to a kind of market 
inefficiency since their information is no longer impounded on prices. Of course 
Kyle shows that the market will appear more efficient since the increased public 
information inflow will offset any private information not impounded in current 
prices due to the informed traders' reluctance to transact. 
The model just described was developed under the assumption that all market 
makers are risk neutral, which greatly simplified the whole process. If the risk 
neutrality is dropped, then the results obtained may be entirely different. 
This last chapter concluded the description of Kyle models and their extensions. 
As it was stressed at the introduction of batch trading models, these models are not 
concerned with how specific trades will affect prices as it was the case with 
previous models but rather they are concerned with strategic behaviour of informed 
traders. I hope that the analysis above provided readers of this dissertation a good 
insight in strategic trading. 
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CHAPTER 3: SYSTEMATIC LIQUIDITY AND EXCESS RETURNS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Market microstructure has traditionally concentrated on the characteristics 
of single assets exhibiting absolute disregard for attribute(s) that can have 
an effect on multiple assets simultaneously. 'Transaction costs' studies 
and in particular 'liquidity' studies concentrate on the repeated trading of 
a single homogenous asset or assets and any patterns that may emerge 
during trading. No research has been undertaken in 'transaction costs' or 
'liquidity' concentrating on systematic variations and how this affects 
stocks. This study aspires to enhance the limited research in the area of 
systematic liquidity for the UK market employing FTSE 1 00 and FTSE250 
as its sample. 
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First we look for evidence of 
commonality (common underlying factors) in liquidity and secondly we 
examine the effect of systematic liquidity on asset pricing in a market that 
changes form quote-driven trading to order-driven trading for FTSE 100 
stocks and from quote driven to hybrid for FTSE250. Commonality 
refers to the proposition that an individual firm's liquidity is determined 
by market-wide factors (unidentified yet) besides well-documented 
idiosyncratic factors such as volatility, trading volume, number of trades 
etc. Research has also shown that predictable differences in liquidity lead 
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to cross-sectional differences in excess returns. Traditionally empirical 
work in the area of market microstructure has concentrated exclusively on 
trading patterns of individual assets, seasonal patterns and market crashes. 
The very first studies to look into the relation of liquidity and asset returns 
were those of Amihud & Mendelson (1986), Eleswarapu & Reinganum 
( 1993 ), Brennan & Subrahmanyam (1996) and Datar et al. (1998). Quite 
recently research interest has shifted to the common components of 
liquidity (Chordia et al. 2000; Huberman & Halka 2001; Hasbrouck & 
Seppi 2001 ). Generally speaking there are a number of studies that have 
investigated the relation of liquidity and returns and documented the 
presence of commonality in liquidity but no study has looked into 
common factors in liquidity (commonality) and returns. This study 
combines those two lines of research and examines if and to what extent 
commonality(common underlying factors) affects excess returns when the 
trading regime changes from quote driven to order driven for FTSEJ 00 
stocks and from quote driven to hybrid for FTSE250 stocks. 
It is well known that each security has its own liquidity dictated by a 
number of factors such as order flow, number of trades, trading volume, 
volatility, number of institutional investors holding the stock, the number 
of market makers assigned to each stock and the number of different 
markets a specific stock is traded etc as discussed in Tinic ( 1972) and 
Menyal & Paudyal (1996). The nature of the factors identified above is 
clearly idiosyncratic and we would expect each security to have its own 
liquidity. Alternatively we would expect to find correlation in liquidity 
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across securities if there is a common component to the cost of providing 
liquidity or if securities are substitutes as Huberman & Halka (200 1) 
postulate. Plausible reasons for the existence of common factors 
affecting liquidity are increased trading activity/order flow taking the form 
of either increased buying or selling which may signify the existence of 
superior information making market makers to re-evaluate the optimal 
level of their inventory, inducing a co-movement of spread. Covariation 
in liquidity can have interesting implications for markets. With reference 
to equity markets Chordia et al (2000) note that a higher return would 
surely be required for stocks with higher average liquidity costs. In other 
words if a stock is illiquid, then investors would require higher returns for 
this stock. In addition there might be extra compensation demanded of 
stocks with higher sensitivities to broad liquidity shocks. For example if 
a market becomes highly illiquid due to a shock then investors would 
demand an even higher return for stocks with low liquidity following he 
market wide shock. Roll (1988) commenting on the international market 
crash of October 1987 identifies no noteworthy event that would be 
capable of bringing about such turbulence. However he stresses the 
existence of a temporary severe reduction in liquidity and puts forward as 
the most prevalent reason for the crash, mistaken expectations regarding 
the current level of liquidity. Therefore the real question that arises is 
whether liquidity shocks constitute a source of non-diversifiable priced 
risk. We test for the effect of market wide unidentified factors 
controlling for well known spread determining variables on excess returns 
over different trading regimes namely when the market is quote 
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driven/order driven for FTSElOO stocks and when the market is quote 
driven/hybrid for FTSE250 stocks. However for FTSElOO when the 
market is order-driven, closing prices are estimated under different 
protocols therefore we need to make a further distinction. Under order-
driven trading closing prices are estimated based on i) the last automated 
transaction ii) average volume weighting and iii) closing auction. 
The last few years a shift in trading regimes has been observed from quote 
driven to order-driven and the London stock exchange has followed this 
trend (for FTSElOO stocks only). In a quote-driven regime, market 
makers are obliged to provide liquidity under any circumstances. In a 
hybrid market and with special reference to FTSE250 market makers are 
obliged to provide liquidity as well but in an order-driven regime market 
makers are not obliged to do so. Brockman & Chung (2002) term this the 
'free-exit' aspect of order-driven trading. We wish to test how those two 
different trading regimes respond to market-wide liquidity changes 
(commonality) and what is the effect on asset pricing. There is a high 
chance that in an order-driven regime the common component of liquidity 
affecting all stocks indistinguishably will be less pronounced because of 
the non-mandatory nature of market making (free-exit aspect). Market 
makers even if present do not have to provide liquidity. Alternatively 
there is also a high chance that higher spreads will invite more investors to 
provide liquidity given the higher profit margins. Brockman & Chung 
term this the 'free-entry' aspect of order-driven-trading. We do not know 
which effect is going to dominate; therefore the common component of 
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liquidity and its subsequent effect on asset pricing under different trading 
regimes is an open issue. In other words we seek to address the following 
questions: 
• Q 1) Is commonality in liquidity present in the UK market as well or it 
constitutes a stylized fact pertinent to the US market only? 
• Q2) Is commonality priced? 
• Q3) How do changes in the trading regime affect the relationship 
between commonality and excess returns? 
The results obtained in this study contribute to the commonality literature 
in the following ways. First we show that commonality in liquidity is not 
just a US characteristic but it is also pertinent in other markets namely the 
UK market, secondly we find that commonality does affect excess returns 
and thirdly the trading regime plays an important role on the extent to 
which commonality is priced for FTSE100 stocks only. In particular the 
effect of commonality on excess returns appears to be considerably 
reduced after the change of the trading regime from quote-driven to order-
driven. Results obtained for FTSE250 show that commonality is not 
equally strong and it is not priced. 
3.2.EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN1 
Huberman & Halka (200 1) postulate that liquidity can be defined as the 
ability of an investor or market maker to trade any quantity of shares after 
1The first part of the experimental design pertinent to the identification of commonality presented here has been adopted from Hubennan & Halka 
(2001) 
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the desire to trade arises at a price, which is close to price and depth 
quoted prior to the specific trade and after it. Liquidity for the ith stock is 
comprised of an idiosyncratic and a systematic component. This is 
similar to the total risk of a stock, which includes both idiosyncratic 
relating to firm specific factors, and systematic i.e affected by market-
wide factors. Symbolically this is expressed as: 
Where Lit represents total liquidity for the ith stock, ai is a constant, ft is a 
common liquidity shock, Eit is an idiosyncratic shock and llit is a rounding 
error designed to equate the stock specific liquidity measure to the nearest 
acceptable integer multiple. These three random variables are assumed to 
be independent of each other. Moreover the E' s and the 11 's are cross-
sectionally independent. 
We assume that both the common liquidity shock (ft) and the idiosyncratic 
term (Eit) follow AR(l) processes2. Symbolically this is expressed as3: 
"' /, = p/,_1 +u1 = Ip'ut-r (3.2) 
r=O 
1 We could have assumed any other AR process but an AR(l) process greatly simplifies mathematical operations 
'The final form of both equations (2) and (3) is obtained in the following way: 
(, = p(,_l + U, = i>'U,-T 
T.O 
r;+l = pft + Ut+l ~ r;.l = p(fft-1 +u,)+ Ut+l = p 2 ft-1 + pu, + u,.1 
(,.2 = p(,.1 +u,. 2 ~ (,.2 = p~2 (,_ 1 + pu, +u,.1} u,.2 = P3 (,_1 + p2u, + pu,.1 + u,.2 
(,.3 = p(,+z + u,.3 ~ (,.3 = p~3 (,_1 + p2u, + pu,+1 +u,. 2)= p4 (,_ 1 + p3u, + p 2u,.1 + pu,+z + u,.3 
"" 
T "' T (, = P ft-1 + L.., p Ut-T 
T:O 
"" 
Since P\<1, as T ~ 00, it reduces to t; = L P T U 1_ T, because lim P T f;_1 = 0 . 
T=Q T-->00 
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"' 
&u = Pi&it-1 +Vu = Lp,'vu-r (3.3) 
r=O 
Next consider L1to the average liquidity of a subset of stocks, I, which has 
L members 
00 
Lit =ai +~J; +[L(LPi'vit-r)+'lu]IIII (3.4) 
iel r=O 
where a1 is the average aj and b1 is the average bj. The term b1!, 
represents the common liquidity shock while the term inside the square 
brackets represents idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The variance of the 
term in the square brackets converges to zero as III approaches infinity4, 
which by Chebychev's inequality5 implies this term converges to zero in 
probability as III approaches infinity. Therefore if indeed the common 
liquidity shock is present, it will dominate fluctuations in the average 
liquidity and render approximately AR(l) processes. Moreover the 
residuals from the approximately AR( 1) processes describing the average 
liquidity fluctuations of mutually exclusive sets of stocks will be 
correlated. To see this note that 
"' 00 
Lit = a 1 + b1 L p' ut-r + [L (LPt vit-r) + 'lu JIIII (3.5) 
r=O iel r=O 
"' 
Lit =a1 +~ LP'u~-r +;1 (3.6) 
r=O 
Now if we re-write equation (3.6) at time (t-1), multiply by p and add to 
itselfwe obtain: 
•An analogy is that of a portfolio. Idiosyncratic risk cancels out as the number of stocks increases. 
' Chebychev's inequality states that ifx0 is a random variable and C0 and e are constants then Prob(l Xr.-cr-1 >e) :5" E[(x0 -c0 ) 2Ve2. 
94 
where the last two terms are small and shows that average liquidity for a 
subset of stocks I is dominated by the systematic component. However 
our focus is on the residuals from the approximately autoregressive 
process (eq.3.7) namely 
In particular note that if the sets I and J are mutually exclusive then 
the correlation is positive if there is a common liquidity component and 
- -
the stocks' average exposures to it b1 and b1 are positive. 
In order to show the presence of common components in liquidity we are 
going to make use of equations (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9). For this reason 
equation (3.7) needs to be written in a regression form for different 
portfolios (I,J,K) to facilitate understanding of this study: 
Spread1,1,Kt=c+ AI spreadi,J,Kt-1 + 'Azspreadi,J,Kt-z+ .. + AvspreadJ,J,Kt-
v+<I>IidiosynctatiCJ,J,Kt+ .. +<j>vidiosynctatiCJ,J,Kt +UI,J,Kt (3.1 0) 
Where spread represents daily absolute spread and daily proportional 
spread. It is used as a proxy for average liquidity (LI,J,Kt) and is regressed 
on past values of itself. The AR process used each time depends on the 
stock group under consideration. The subscript (I,J,K) refers to the 
particular group of stocks under examination. Equation (3 .1 0) also 
incorporates terms for idiosyncratic variables pertinent to groups (I,J ,K). 
Remember that we are interested in the residuals (uit), (uJ1), (uK1), obtained 
from regression (3 .1 0) and the correlations between them. Correlations 
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are examined by making use of formula (3.9). If correlations tum out to 
be positive we proceed with the extraction of the common component 
from the residuals obtained from eq (3.10) for mutually exclusive 
portfolios (I,J,K) which IS achieved by principal component 
analysis/principal axis factoring. Singular value decomposition (SVD) 
operations on the correlation matrices provide the relevant eigenvalues 
and component scores, which are then used to explain excess returns. 
The regressions estimated to test the effect of common component of 
liquidity on excess returns are of the following form: 
EXCESS RETURNSI,J,Kt=CFI,J,Kt+CF I,J,Kt-1 +CF I,J,Kt-2+CF l,J,Kt-3+CFI,J,Kt-
4+et(3.11) 
Where excess returns are estimated as the difference between returns and 
the risk free rate, CF stands for common factor and is estimated by 
principal component analysis/principal axis factoring and the subscript 
(I,J ,K) represents different portfolios. 
SVD is an operation according to which any matrix M is expressed as the 
product of three matrices: M=P~U. If we performed such an operation 
on X, so that X= P~U' then P would be equal to the matrix of 
eigenvectors of XX' and U would be equal to the matrix of eigenvectors 
of X'X . Matrix ~ contains the square roots of the eigenvalues of XX' . 
Other simplifications can be made. We know that X'X /(n-1) is equal to 
the correlation matrix R. Hence we might as well examine the 
eigenstructure of R, for the eigenvalues of R are simply the eigenvalues of 
X'X divided by n-1. Moreover R is a square symmetric matrix. In such 
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a case the SVD operation is greatly simplified because in the product 
PI1U' it holds for symmetric matrices that P=U. It follows that 
R = UDU' in which U is the matrix of eigenvectors of R, D is the matrix 
of eigenvalues of R or the matrix of eigenvalues of X'X /(n-1) or the 
matrix of squares of eigenvalues of X divided by (n-1 ). It becomes clear 
that finding the eigenstructure of X amounts to the same as finding the 
eigenstructure of R. Standardised values are used for all of the above 
operations. 
In order to investigate whether common liquidity components are present 
in the UK market and the extent to which they affect excess returns under 
different trading regimes we formulate the following hypotheses: 
• HI) the residuals obtained by modelling innovations in spread and 
also controlling for idiosyncratic factors for mutually exclusive group 
of stocks are significantly positively correlated which indicates the 
presence of a common component. 
If average liquidity proxies for mutually exclusive group of stocks are 
modelled as shown above and the residuals (Uit. UJt, UKt) obtained from 
these regressions are significantly positively correlated, then this indicates 
the presence of a common liquidity component. 
• H2) the common component extracted from the residuals obtained by 
modelling innovations in spread and also controlling for idiosyncratic 
factors for mutually exclusive groups of stocks explains excess r~tums 
for that combined group. 
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The rationale for this particular hypothesis is explained in the following 
way. Assume that a particular group namely GROUPI is split in two 
mutually exclusive sub groups namely lA and lB. If a common 
component is extracted from the residuals UJA and um for those two groups 
and explains excess returns for GROUPI, then it means that the common 
liquidity factor is priced 
• H3) changes in the trading regime (from quote driven to order driven 
or from quote driven to hybrid) reduce the extent to which 
commonality impacts excess returns. 
In an order driven regime, provision of liquidity is not dependent on 
market makers but every single investor, therefore commonality will be 
less pronounced and it will not be priced as much. In addition investors 
by placing limit orders have the ability to achieve better execution prices, 
dampening the effect of commonality on excess returns. In a hybrid 
market where market makers still have to provide liquidity, there should 
not be any changes on the degree to which commonality is priced if it is 
priced at all. 
3.3.DATASET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Daily price data for the FTSE 1 00 compantes was obtained from 
DATASTREAM. The data set under consideration ranges from 
18/1011996 to 18/5/2001. The choice of the data set reflects a quote-
driven trading regime and an order-driven trading regime, which is further 
sub-divided into three different periods. This allows us to test if 
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commonality is present under different trading regimes, which relates to 
the first research question and the extent to which it is priced under those 
regimes which relates to the second and third research questions. Each 
subset represents a different price reporting period/trading regime and 
incorporates the following time period: the first subset ranges from 
1811 0/1996 to 17/1011997 and reflects a dealership, the second subset 
ranges from 20/10/1997 to 13/12/1998 during which period the closing 
prices were based on the last automated transaction (order book), the third 
subset ranges from 14112/1998 to 26/05/00 during which period the 
closing prices were based on weighted trading volume (order book) and 
finally the fourth subset ranges from 30/05/2000 to 18/05/2001 during 
which period the closing prices were formed by a closing auction. Daily 
price data for FTSE250 was obtained from DATASTREAM. It ranges 
from 0110112003 to 12/08/2004 and it is split in two subsets. The first 
subset represents a quote driven regime and the second subset represents a 
hybrid market. The data obtained includes the following variables: 
closing bid price, closing ask price, closing price and closing trading 
volume for each stock. These variables were further processed to obtain 
other variables such as: absolute spread, proportional spread, returns, 
returns volatility using GARCH( 1,1 ), excess and unexpected trading 
volume employing the Box-Jenkins methodology. We use two liquidity 
proxies namely: i) absolute spread which is the difference between bid and 
ask prices and ii) proportional spread, which is estimated as: absolute 
spread/mid-quote where mid-quote is equal to (bid-price+ask-price)/2. 
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Descriptive statistics (TABLE3.1: Panel A and B) with reference to the 
whole sample over the four periods examined show that absolute spread 
has increased from 2.67 up to 6.48 and proportional spread from 0.18% up 
to 0.9%. When testing for mean (in)equality, the ANOV A F statistic 
obtained for absolute spread is equal to 329.70 with (3,984)df and p=O.OO 
rejecting H0:mean equality while the value for proportional spread is equal 
to 593.5413 with (3,888)df and p=O.OO rejecting H0 agam. Cross 
sectional correlations between the lowest and the highest market 
capitalization groups show that there is some difference for the first, 
second and third period. There appear to be no differences between the 
two extremes for the fourth period. Panel C presents results for FTSE250 
which show that the spread has changed between the two periods. The 
ANOVA F statistic obtained is equal to 7.47 and p=O.OO. Proportional 
spread for FTSE250 is non-stationary and is excluded from the analysis 
altogether. 
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TABLE 3.1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE TWO LIQUIDITY PROXIES FOR EQUALLY WEIGHTED PORTFOLIOS OF THE WHOLE SAMPLE 
AND THREE SIZE-BASED GROUPS FOR ALL PERIODS 
PANEL A FTSEIOO DAlLY ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
WHOLE MRKT CAPITI MRKTCAPIT2 MRKT 
SAMPLE £665.85- £3954.96- CAPIT3 
£3920.82 £9228.13 £9236-
£140684.3 
MEAN PERIOD! 2.67 3.32 2.48 2.21 
PERIOD2 4.15 5.61 3.73 3.46 
PERIOD3 4.28 5.29 4.06 3.49 
PERIOD4 6.48 7.13 5.00 7.31 
MEDIAN PERIOD! 2.66 3.34 2.49 2.19 
PERIOD2 4.04 5.34 3.52 3.24 
PERIOD3 3.98 5.02 3.57 3.21 
PERIOD4 5.75 6.20 4.24 6.67 
MAX PERIOD! 4.17 5.07 3.56 4.19 
PERIOD2 15.7 17.8 16.5 17.4 
PERIOD3 22.3 30.8 16.9 19.6 
PERIOD4 18.9 24.1 16.6 19.1 
MIN PERIOD! 1.79 2.23 1.69 1.19 
PERIOD2 1.68 2.37 1.42 1.06 
PERIOD3 2.06 2.40 1.13 1.57 
PERIOD4 3.14 2.65 2.0I 3.94 
SE PERIOD! 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.41 
PERIOD2 1.18 1.70 1.61 1.54 
PERIOD3 1.68 2.24 1.96 1.53 
PERIOD4 2.38 3.36 2.60 2.35 
PANEL B:FTSE 100 DAILY PROPORTIONAL SPREAD(% OF MID-PRICE) 
WHOLE MRKT MRKT MRKT 
SAMPLE CAP ITI CAPIT2 CAPIT3 
£665.85- £3954.96- £9236-
£3920.82 £9228.13 £140684.3 
MEAN PERIOD! 0.18% 0.26% 0.15% 0.13% 
PERIOD2 N/S N/S N/S N/S 
PERIOD3 0.7% 1% 0.7% 0.42% 
PERIOD4 0.9% 1% 0.8% 0.9% 
MEDIAN PERIOD! 0.18% 0.26% 0.15% 0.13% 
PERIOD2 N/S N/S N/S N/S 
PERIOD3 0.7% 1% 0.6% 0.3% 
PERIOD4 0.8% 1% 0.7% 0.8% 
MAX PERIOD! 0.23% 0.35% 0.19% 0.23% 
PERIOD2 N/S N/S N/S N/S 
PERIOD3 3.6% 5.1% 3% 3% 
PERIOD4 2% 4% 2% 2% 
MIN PERIOD! 0.13% 0.18% 0.10% 0.73% 
PERIOD2 N/S N/S N/S N/S 
PERIOD3 0.3% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 
PERIOD4 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 
SE PERIOD! 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 
PERIOD2 N/S N/S N/S N/S 
PERIOD3 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
PERIOD4 0.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 
PANEL C'FTSE250 DAILY ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
WHOLE MRKTCAPITI MRKTCAPIT2 MRKTCAPIT3 
SAMPLE 
MEAN SEAQ 6.85 8.43 6.33 5.90 
SETSMM 6.14 7.33 5.65 5.42 
MEDIAN SEAQ 6.54 7.46 6.30 5.82 
SETSMM 6.09 7.42 5.51 5.16 
MAX SEAQ 10.2 17.1 8.68 10 
SETSMM 10.7 10.8 12.9 17.6 
MIN SEAQ 5.4 5.7 4.75 4.36 
SETSMM 3.9 4.13 3.40 2.94 
SE SEAQ 0.95 2.68 0.53 0.57 
SETSMM 0.98 1.24 1.26 1.71 
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3.4.METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
In order to examine the above hypotheses and with special reference to the 
first hypothesis we need to i) describe the splitting technique ii) determine 
the optimal lag structure for each group of stocks (remember that in the 
experimental design we assume an AR(1) process just for convenience), 
iii) decide on the idiosyncratic variables to include in our regressions and 
iv) test if the residuals obtained for mutually exclusive groups of stocks 
are significantly positively correlated6. 
With reference to the second hypothesis we need to i) extract the common 
factor between mutually exclusive groups of stocks employing principal 
axis factoring/singular value decomposition and ii) regress the common 
factor (commonality) on excess returns for that group. 
For the third hypothesis we need to test for the (in)significance of 
coefficients of the common factor over the different trading regimes. 
H1.1.SAMPLE SPLITTING TECHNIQUE 
6 The significance of the correlation coefficients is evaluated by the t statistic given in parenthesis. If the true p=O, the sampling distribution of r is 
symmetric: 
r-N(O,a,= ~(1- r 2 ) I ~(n- 2) ) 
and we can apply the Student's t test for establishing the significance or non.significance oftJ1e sample estimate r. The value of the t statistic is 
estimated from the sample correlation coefficient r, by the expression 
t'=rta,= r.Jn- 2 I~ 
and is compared with the theoretical value oftooH (for a two tailed test at the 5% level of significance) with n-2 degrees of freedom. The critical 
value at 5% is equal to 1.960. 
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Initially we obtain the bid-ask spread for each stock in our sample and 
then we split the original sample into three size-based groups namely: 
MK 1, MK2 and MK3 7• We further split the three size-based groups each 
into smaller subgroups (A & B). At this point we ensure that random 
splitting occurs so that group A (GA) does not end up with the lowest 
market capitalization stocks in its category and group B (GB) with the 
highest market capitalization stocks. Then all type A subgroups are 
placed in a single portfolio and all type B subgroups in another portfolio, 
forming two randomly constructed, equally weighted portfolios. 8 Finally 
we obtain average values for all subgroups and the two portfolios. All 
testing to follow uses these portfolios and subgroups as the basis for 
drawing conclusions. 
Hl.2.0PTIMAL LAG STRUCTURE DETERMINATION AND 
PRELIMINARY RESIDUAL CORRELATIONS 
In this part we will define the optimal lag structure for each of the two-
liquidity proxies namely daily average absolute spread (DABSP) and 
daily average proportional spread (DPRSP) by running the following 
regressiOns: 
DABSPit=C+DABSPit-t +DABSPit-2+DABSPit-v+ ... +eit (3 .12) 
DPRSPit=C+DPRSPit-t+DPRSPit-v+ ... + eit (3.13) 
for a different number of lags each time. We run those regressions for all 
portfolios and all subgroups and decide on the optimal lag structure based 
7 MK stands for market capitalization. MKI consists of the lowest MK stocks in the sample. 
1 In that way portfolio I is made up of: PIMKIGA, PIMK2GA and PIMK3GA while portfolio 2 is made up of: P2MKIGB, P2MK2GB and 
P2MK3GB. 
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on both the Box-Jenkins methodology and the Akaike and Schwarz 
information criteria. TABLE3.2 (PANELS A AND B) sm-.-•marise the 
results obtained for each of the four periods at subgroup level and whole 
sample level. In the case under examination absolute and proportional 
spread for the third and the fourth period are best modelled as AR(5) 
while for the first and the second period are best modelled as AR( 4) and 
AR(3) respectively. PANEL C presents results for FTSE250. Those 
results were reached by obtaining the autocorrelations futictions and 
graphs for each of the groups and portfolios under consideration. The 
optimal autoregressive structure for FTSE250 portfolios and subgroups 
varies considerably when compared to FTSE100. FTSE250 portfolios 1 
and 2 are modeled as AR(6) and AR(7) while there is greater variation for 
MK2 and MK3 over the two periods. If residuals between the two 
portfolios constructed randomly or between market capitalisation 
subgroups are positively correlated, then we have a first indication of the 
existence of a common factor9. 
H 1.3 .IDIOSYNCRATIC VARIABLES 
A number of studies over the. years have shown that the competitiveness 
of the environment in which stocks are traded, trading characteristics, risk 
and share price are important in determining spreads. In particular Tinic 
(1972) identifies a number of 'classic spread-determining factors' such as: 
stock price, average number of shares traded daily (trading volume), 
9 In order to claim the presence of a common factor, it is necessary that spread determining factors alsobe included in the regressions estimated here 
to obtain residuals. Of course this will be done at a later stage. 
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average number of transactions per day (number of trades), trading 
continuity (number of days a stock is traded/number of days sampled) and 
standard deviation of price while he goes even further to test whether i) 
the number of different markets a specific stock is traded, ii) the number 
of institutional investors holding the stock iii) the total number of stocks 
carried by the market agent registered in the ith stock and iv) the 
purchasing capacity of the market agent under consideration are 
significant spread-determining factors. Tinic ( 1972) finds that all of the 
above are significant except the standard deviation of price and total 
purchasing capacity of the unit market agent. 
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TABLE 3.2 
OPTIMAL LAG STRUCTURE DETERMINATION 
PANEL A: FTSE I 00 LAG DETERMINATION FOR ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
WHOLE SAMPLE MKI MK2 MK3 
PORTFOLIO! PORTFOLI02 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
PERIOD! AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) 
PERIOD2 AR(3) AR(3) AR(3) AR(3) AR(3) AR(3) AR(3) AR(3) 
PERIOD3 AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) 
PERIOD4 AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) 
PANEL B: FTSEIOO LAG DETERMINATION FOR PROPORTIONAL SPREAD 
WHOLE SAMPLE MKI MK2 MK3 
PORTFOLIO! PORTFOLI02 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
PERIOD! AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) AR(4) 
PERIOD2 N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S 
PERIOD3 AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) 
PERIOD4 AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) AR(5) 
PANEL C: FTSE250 LAG DETERMINATION FOR ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
WHOLE SAMPLE MKI MK2 MK3 
PORTFOLIO! PORTFOLI02 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
SEAQ AR(7) AR(6) AR(6) AR(6) AR(5) AR(2) AR(4) AR(4) 
SETSmm AR(6) AR(7) AR(6) AR(7) AR(IO) AR(9) AR(IO) AR(2) 
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The insignificance of the standard deviation of price is a very strange 
finding given that all studies to follow find that the standard deviation of 
price, which measures risk, is a very important factor. 
Menyah & Paudyal (1996) test for the significance of all the 'classic 
spread-determining factors' mentioned above and they also include a new 
factor (number of market makers) representing the competitiveness of the 
environment each stock is traded. Menyah & Paudyal (1996) perceive 
'risk' to be quite important in determining spreads. For this reason they 
use three variables to approach 'risk' in a wholistic way namely: i) 
standard deviation of returns to capture total risk, ii) standard market 
model betas to capture systematic risk and iii) residual errors to capture 
unsystematic risk. They find that the bid-ask spread is affected by the 
unit price of the security, variability in security returns (risk), trading 
volume and competition among market makers. 
Another study concentrating on common factors in liquidity by Chordia, 
Roll & Subrahmanyam (2000) employs i) average dollar size of a 
transaction in stock j, ii) aggregate dollar trading volume for the entire 
market excluding the stock j and iii) dollar volume in stock j's industry 
besides the 'classic spread-determining factors' mentioned above. 
Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam (2000) find evidence of commonality 
even after considering all those factors. 
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Finally Huberman & Halka (2001) testing for common factors in liquidity, 
use dummy variables for daily returns to assess the effect of positive and 
negative returns on the spread, decompose daily trading volume into its 
expected and unexpected components while they also incorporate i) two 
day volatility of yields on the one year treasury note ii) daily spread 
changes between the Baa corporate bond yield & the one year treasury 
note yield and iii) daily spread changes between yields on ten year & one 
year treasury bonds. In addition they estimate volatility by fitting returns 
into GARCH(1,1). Most variables appear to be significant in explaining 
spreads except daily spread changes between the Baa corporate bond yield 
& the one-year treasury note yield, expected and unexpected volume. 
They find evidence of co-movement even after incorporating all those 
spread-determining variables in their regressions. 
Having considered all of the above studies and subject to data availability 
constraints, we decided to include the following variables namely: i) daily 
return on the portfolio or group when that return is positive and zero 
otherwise, ii) daily return on the portfolio or group when that return is 
negative or zero and zero otherwise, iii) returns volatility modelled as 
GARCH(1,1), iv) expected volume which is obtained by subtracting 
unexpected volume from actual volume v) unexpected volume which is 
obtained by modelling actual trading volume and obtaining innovations, 
vi) default premium which is estimated as the change in the spread 
between the corporate bond yield and the two year government bond yield 
and vii) term structure which is estimated as the change in the spread 
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between the ten-year government bond yield and the three month treasury 
bill yield. The first two variables are included in the regression because 
we wish to examine how the spread is affected by positive and negative 
returns, volatility and trading volumes are included in order to capture risk 
while default premium and term structure are included in order to capture 
the macroeconomic environment and alternative opportunities of 
investment for market makers/investors but are not always used together 
due to the presence of high correlations with other variables. Most of the 
time they are used interchangeably to avoid inducing multicollinearity. 
Omission of those variables in the final regressions did not change the 
residuals correlation in any way. All variables are stationary 10• 
H1.4 FINAL RESIDUALS CORRELATION 
Residuals obtained from modelling innovations in the spread controlling 
for other well known spread determining variables for mutually exclusive 
group of stocks are devoid of any idiosyncratic or macroeconomics 
factors. Therefore they should be uncorrelated. If it turns out that they 
are significantly positively correlated then it means that there is a common 
factor that drives liquidity for all stocks. 
H2.1 COMMON FACTOR AND EXCESS RETURNS 
Extraction takes place at i) the portfolio level where a single factor is 
extracted from the two portfolios that together make up 
1BA11 variables to be included in the regressions are tested for stationarity using the Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. 
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FTSE 1 OO/FTSE250 and regressed on returns for the whole sample 
(FTSE1 OO/FTSE250) and ii) at the market capitalisation groups level 
where a single factor is extracted from each sub-group (group A and 
group B) comprising the relevant market capitalisation group (MK1, MK2 
and MK3) and regressed on returns for that particular market 
capitalisation group. In other words, a single factor is extracted from 
MK1GA and MK1GB and regressed on returns for MKl. According to 
the Kaiser criterion only common factors with eigen-values higher than 
1.00 are retained for analysis as it is usually the practice. 
3.5.EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The statistical analysis aims at i) detecting the presence of a common 
component ii) extracting a common factor from the two sub-groups within 
each market capitalisation group or the two portfolios that comprise the 
whole sample and regress it on returns for those groups or the whole 
sample respectively over the periods examined and iii) observing the 
extent to which commonality is priced under different trading regimes. 
The sections that follow present results for each of those objectives. 
3.5.1 MODELLING LIQUIDITY: PRELIMINARY CORRELATION 
TESTS 
In order to detect the presence of a cqmmon factor, we need to model 
liquidity and obtain innovations. TABLE3.3 (PANELS A and B) and 
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T ABLE3 .4 present results for absolute and proportional spread for all 
portfolios and subgroups. Having run those regressions, the next step is 
to obtain residuals and test the extent to which they are correlated. 
Results are represented in TABLE3.5 and TABLE3.6. The null 
hypothesis states that correlations between portfolios and subgroups 
should have an arbitrary sign and be insignificant. Results obtained in 
TABLE3.5 (PANELS A and B) and TABLE3.6 (PANELS A and B) 
indicate towards the existence of a common component given that most 
correlations are positive and significant. At this point it is worth 
mentioning that correlations are stronger for FTSE 1 00 stocks. 
Correlations for FTSE250 stocks appear to be weak in most cases and 
insignificant for both periods (SEAQ/SETSmm) under consideration. 
Nevertheless it is still too early to draw conclusions for FTSElOO stocks 
bearing in mind that a number of spread determining factors have not been 
considered yet. After all, such positive correlations may be capturing 
those 'missing' variables. This possibility is considered next. 
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TABLE3.3 
AUTOREGRESSIVE ESTIMATES FOR ABSOLUTE SPREAD (p value in parentheses) 
PANEL~: FTSEIOO UNDER FOUR DIFFERENT PERIODS 
WHOLE SAMPLE 
c 
-1 
-2 
-3 
-4 
-5 
The estimated model is 
DABSPk+DABSP\.1+DABSP;,_2+DABSP\.,.+ .. +e\ 
DPRSP;,=C+DPRsP;1_1+DPRSP\.,.+ ... + ei, 
~: 
PORTFI 
1.89(0.03) 
6.05(0.00) 
7.04(0.00) 
2.02(0.00) 
0.44(0.00) 
0.08(0.00) 
0.21(0.00) 
0.29(0.000 
0.09(0.25) 
0.23(0.15) 
0.19(0.05) 
0.11(0.01) 
0.11(0.06) 
0.19(0.05) 
0.08(0.40) 
0.00(0.97) 
0.13(0.04) 
--------
0.06(0.15) 
0.18(0.02) 
-------------
------------
-0.00(0.9) 
0.07(0.26) 
PORTF2 
0.64(0.57) 
3.04(0.04) 
2.65(0.00) 
1.60(0.00) 
0.38(0.00) 
0.15(0.00) 
0.17(0.07) 
0.20(0.00) 
0.08(0.27) 
0.17(0.37) 
0.31(0.00) 
0.24(0.00) 
0.25(005) 
0.38(0.03) 
0.13(0.20) 
0.09(0.30) 
0.18(0.02) 
--------
0.06(0.27) 
0.06(0.38) 
...................................... 
---------
0.04(0.30) 
0.11(0.11) 
MRKTCAPITI MRKTCAPIT2 MRKTCAPIT3 
GROUP A GROUPS GROUP A GROUPS. GROUP A GROUPS 
1.13(0.00) 0.52(0.27) 0.17(0.66) 0.74(0.02) 0.16(0.79) 0.31(0.22) 
4.02(0.00) 1.51(0.00) 1.55(0.01) 2.01(0.00) 1.93(0.00) 1.56(0.00) 
5.12(0.00) 0.94(0.00) 1.76(0.00) 1.33(0.00) 1.45(0.00) 1.26(0.00) 
3.94(0.00) 1.63(0.00) 1.31(0.00) 0.24(0.00) 3.38(0.00) 2.30(0.00) 
0.42(0.00) 0.32(0.00) 0.37(0.00) 0.35(0.00) 0.49(0.00) 0.31(0.00) 
0.23(0.00) 0.23(0.00) 0.19(0.00) 0.10(0.00) 0.06(0.10) 0.12(0.01) 
0.27(0.00) 0.23(0.00) 0.12(0.07) 0.14(0.09) 0.11(0.03) 0.06(0.31) 
0.33(0.00) 0.07(0.30) 0.10(0.18) 0.17(0.02) 0.05(0.23) 0.26(0.00) 
0.21(0.00) 0.21(0.04) 0.22(0.01) 0.03(0.65) 0.08(0.35) 0.08(0.27) 
0.21(0.07) 0.14(0.29) 0.23(0.20) 0.12(0.45) 0.16(0.02) 0.13(0.29) 
0.03(0.67) 0.28(0.00) 0.20(0.05) 0.17(0.01) 0.19(0.00) 0.23(0.00) 
0.13(0.05) 0.25(0.00) 0.18(0.07) 0.05(0.51) 0.01(0.76) 0.10(0.00) 
-0.05(0.39) 0.09(0.25) 0.20(0.00) 0.15(0.01) 0.23(0.09) 0.21(0.10) 
0.06(0.37) 0.15(0.21) 0.17(0.24) 0.21(0.00) 0.24(0.08) 0.26(0.08) 
0.00(0.98) 0.04(0.61) 0.09(0.29) 0.15(0.04) 0.22(0.13) 0.10(0.10) 
0.01(0.871 0.19(0.00) 0.28(0.06) 0.05(0.42) 0.01(0.73) 0.07(0.15) 
0.18(0.02) 0.15(0.01) 0.12(0.10) 0.15(0.02) 0.27(0.03) 0.24(0.00) 
------------- ----------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------
0.08(0.01) 0.06(0.26) 0.05(0.44) 0.02(0.59) 0.00(0.93) 0.18(0.01) 
0.00(0.98) 0.05(0.25) 0.09(0.05) 0.04(0.53) 0.09(0.03) 0.16(0.07) 
... .................................... 
------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
----------- ----------- ------------ ------------ --------- -------------
-0.08(0.06 0.16(0.06) 0.16(0.00) 0.12(0.04) 0.05(0.37) 0.02(0.63) 
0.09(0.11) 0.04(0.44) 0.06(0.37) 0.10(0.10) 0.09(0.01) 0.13(0.01) 
where s; is the d~read of portfolio (i) or each of the subgroups on day t. Portfolios I & 2 are mutually exclusive and make up the whole sample while subgroups make up the whole market capitalization group. The 
number in parenth~,sis is the probability of at-statistic being at least as extreme as the observed p value under Ho:p=O 
112 
v· 
PANELS: FTSE250 UNDER SEAQ AND HYSRID/SETSMM 
WHOLE SAMPLE 
PORTFI PORTF2 
' 
c 8.07(0.00) 0.56(0.00) 
5.99(0.00) 6.40(0.00) 
-I O.I6(0.0I) 0.25(0.00) 
O.I5(0.09) 0.33(0.02) 
-2 0.12(0.10) 0.07(0.II) 
O.I8(0.00) -0.08(0.5) 
-3 O.IO(O.l2) -0.00(0.9) 
0.07(0.22) 0.12(0.02) 
-4 0.02(0.72) 0.06(0.I7) 
0.16(0.02) -0.04(0.3) 
-5 0.08(0.36) 0.03(0.56) 
0.07(0.I7) -0.01(0.8) 
-6 -0.15(0.07) 0.10(0.03) 
0.15(0.02) O.I2(0.15) 
-7 O.I5(0.04) 
-----------
-------------- O.I8(0.06) 
-8 
-9 
-10 
RL 0.13 0.12 
ADJ 0.29 Q.lL_L_ 
The estimated model is 
DASSPit=C+DASSPi1_1+DASSPi,_2+DABSP\.v + ... +e\ 
MARKET CAP IT ALIZA TION 
I 
GROUP A GROUPS 
I0.4(0.00) 6.I4(0.00) 
IO. 1(0.00) 7.79(0.00) 
0.11(0.10) O.I0(0.20) 
0.23(0.00) 0.25(0.00) 
0.1I(0.12) 0.12(0.03) 
0.34(0.00) 0.14(0.0I) 
0.12(0.08) 0.08(0.05) 
0.09(0.15) 0.07(0.20) 
O.OI(0.89) 0.07(0.09) 
0.07(0.24) -0.09(0.2) 
0.09(0.34) 0.06(0.21) 
0.00(0.99) 0.14(0.00) 
-O.I4(0.07) O.I2(0.03) 
O.I9(0.04) 0.08(0.29) 
------------
O.I2(0.07) 
0.08 O.IO 
0.54 0.28 
MARKET CAP IT ALISA TION MARKEY CAPITALISATION 
2 3 
GROUP A GROUPS GROUP A GROUPS 
7.45(0.00) 4.9I(O.OO) 6.2I(O.OO) 5.63(0.00) 
3.37(0.00) 5.35(0.00) 5.64(0.00) 5.88(0.00) 
0.39(0.00) 0.36(0.00) 0.28(0.0I) O.I9(0.02) 
-0.01(0.6) 0.07(0.25) 0.17(0.01) 0.32(0.03) 
0.20(0.00) 
--------·---- 0.04(0.40) 0.04(0.28) 
0.08(0.03) O.I3(0.04) -0.03(0.6) .......................... 
0.04(0.61) 
-------------
-0.11 (0.06) -0.11(0.10) 
0.00(0.79) 0.22(0.00) -0.04(0.5) -------------
O.I0(0.25) ------------- --------------
0.01(0.78) -0.00(0.9) 0.09(0.21) 
0.11(0.08) ------------- --------------
O.I0(0.24) -0.00(0.9) 0.09(0.20) 
------------ ------------- --------------
0.00(0.65) -0.03(0.5) 0.03(0.56) 
------------ ------------- --------------
O.OI(0.58) 0.00(0.96) 0.08(0.34) 
------------ ------------- --------------
-O.OI(0.6) 0.03(0.66) 0.07(0.23) 
------------ ------------- --------------
0.09(0.03) 0.14(0.04) -0.06(0.4) 
---·---------
.............................. 
0.0.8(0.00) 0.20(0.02) 
0.53 0.13 0.09 0.05 
0.04 O.li 0.14 0.10 
-··· -~ -
where s; is the spread of portfolio (i) or each of the subgroups on day t. Portfolios I & 2 are mutually exclusive and make up the whole sample while subgroups make up the whole market 
capitalization gr~up. The number in parenthesis is the probability of at-statistic being at least as extreme as the observed p value under H0:p=O 
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TABLE 3.4 
AUTOREGRESSIVE ESTIMATES FOR PROPORTIONAL SPREAD (p values in parentheses) 
WHOLE SAMPLE 
PORTF1 
c 0.00(0.00) 
II 
-------------
0.08(0.00) 
0.00(0.00) 
-1 0.46(0.00) 
-------------
-0.02(0.6) 
0.29(0.00) 
-2 0.07(0.30) 
-------------
0.01(0.64) 
0.11(0.01) 
-3 0.07(0.30) 
-------------
0.00(0.98) 
-0.01(0.8) 
-4 0.12(0.12) 
-------------
0.06(0.10) 
0.22(0.01) 
-5 --------------
-------------
0.04(0.41) 
0.05(0.37) 
The estimated·model is 
DABSPir-:C+I)ABSP;,_1+DABSP;1_2+DABSP;1_v + ... +e;, 
DPRSpi,=C+I)pRSP;1_1+DPRSP;t-v+· .. + e;, 
PORTF2 
0.00(0.05) 
------·------
0.00(0.00) 
0.00(0.00) 
0.31(0.00) 
-------------
0.21(0.00) 
0.14(0.02) 
0.04(0.56) 
-------------
0.27(0.00) 
0.26(0.00) 
0.15(0.12) 
-------------
0.04(0.65) 
0.14(0.03) 
0.11(0.14) 
------------
0.02(0.52) 
0.04(0.50) 
-------------
-------------
0.09(0.03) 
0.05(0.34) 
MRK.T CAPITl 
GROUP A GROUPB 
0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
------------ -------------
0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
0.00(0.00) 0.05(0.00) 
0.51(0.00) 0.26(0.00) 
------------- ------------
0.24(0.00) 0.23(0.00) 
0.33(0.00) 0.01(0.78) 
0.14(0.01) 0.19(0.01) 
-------------
............................ 
003(0.68) 0.20(0.00) 
0.12(0.09) 0.19(0.00) 
-0.03(0.58) 0.12(0.07) 
------------ -------------
-0.03(0.5) -0.02(0.6) 
0.00(0.92) 0.15(0.01) 
0.14(0.03) 0.15(0.01) 
------------- -------------
0.06(0.10) 0.05(0.21) 
0.05(0.39) 0.05(0.20) 
------------- -------------
------------- -------------
-0.08(0.06 0.07(0.11) 
0.09(0.03) 0.01(0.73) 
MRK.T CAPIT2 MRKTCAPIT3 
GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.14) 0.00(0.00) 
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.06(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
0.23(0.00) 0.23(0.00) 0.33(0.00) 0.26(0.01) 
------------ ------------- ------------- ------------
0.18(0.00) 0.20(0.02) -0.01(0.6) 0.06(0.17) 
0.19(0.02) 0.27(0.00) 0.03(0.57) 0.25(0.00) 
-0.04(0.50) -0.04(0.50) 0.17(0.20) -0.01(0.81) 
------------- ------------- ------------ ------------
0.23(0.04) 0.21(0.00) 0.01(0.63) 0.18(0.00) 
0.12(0.21) 0.02(0.75) 0.05(0.27) 0.09(0.03) 
0.15(0.00) 0.15(0.00) 0.16(0.04) 0.05(0.57) 
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
0.02(0.79) 0.13(0.15) 0.00(0.95) 0.06(0.25) 
0.12(0.34) 0.16(0.02) 0.07(0.24) 0.00(0.87) 
0.08(0.27) 0.08(0.27) 0.02(0.77) 0.10(0.17) 
------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
0.02(0.70) -0.02(0.6) 0.06(0.08) 0.10(0.10) 
0.16(0.00) -0.01(0.8) 0.11(0.01) 0.11(0.10) 
------------ ------------- ------------- ---------·---
------------ ------------- ------------- -------------
0.11(0.02) 0.16(0.01) 0.05(0.31) 0.01(0.79) 
0.02(0.73) 0.19(0.02) 0.14{0.00) 0.09(0.17) 
where s; is t~~ spread of portfolio (i) or each· of the subgroups on day t. Portfolios I & 2 are mutually exclusive and make up the whole sample while subgroups make up the whole market 
capitalization gi:pup. The number in parenthesis is the probability of at-statistic being at least as extreme as the observed p value under H0:p=O 
11 proportional spread for;the second period is not stationary therefore it is excluded from the study. 
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TABLE 3.5 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN PORTFOLIOS EXCLUDING SPREAD DETERMINING 
VARIABLES 
PANEL A: FTSEJOO (all correlations above 0.10 are significant) 
PORTFOLIO I 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD PROPORTIONAL 
SPREAD 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 0.71 
N 0.73 
0 0.60 
::l 0.47 0 
""" 
PROPORTIONAL 0.45 ~ SPREAD non stationary 0 
0. insignificant 
0.47 
PANEL 8: FTSE250 (all correlations above 0.13 are significant) 
PORTFOLIO! 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
PORTFOLI02 0.20 
0.23 
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TABLE 3.6 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX EXCLUDING SPREAD-DETERMINING VARIABLES BETWEEN 
SUBGROUPS 
PANEL A: FTSEIOO UNDER FOUR DIFFERENT PERIODS (all correlations above 0.10 are significant) 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
MKIGA MK1GB MK2GA MK2GB MK3GA MK3GB 
MK1GA 1 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.15 0.19 
1 0.51 0.48 0.34 0.41 0.46 
1 0.49 0.34 0.37 0.54 0.24 
1 0.22 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.29 
MK1GB 0.04 1 0.47 0.42 0.45 0.40 
0 ------------ 1 0.70 0.43 0.61 0.56 
<( 0.50 1 0.40 0.50 0.59 0.32 
w 0.18 1 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.35 0::: 
0.. MK2GA 0.14 0.34 1 0.36 0.46 0.48 (/) 
....J ------------- ------------ 1 0.50 0.65 0.61 
<( 0.43 0.45 1 0.23 0.39 0.20 z 
0 0.20 0.21 1 0.16 0.23 0.30 
i= MK2GB -0.02 0.26 0.25 1 0.32 0.32 0::: 
0 ------------- -------------- ------------- 1 0.48 0.53 0.. 0.41 0.54 0.41 1 0.50 0.27 0 
0::: 0.34 0.24 0.31 1 0.16 0.24 0.. 
MK3GA 0.15 0.40 0.41 0.28 1 0.52 
------------ ------------- ------------ -------------- 1 0.60 
0.03 -0.0 -0.05 0.01 1 0.39 
0.29 0.20 0.39 0.30 1 0.38 
MK3GB 0.12 0.28 0.38 . 0.28 0.43 1 
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- 1 
0.37 0.46 0.36 0.43 -0.01 1 
0.32 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.50 1 
PANEL B:FTSE250 UNDER SEAQ AND SETSMM (all correlations above 0.13 are significant) 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
MKIGA MK1GB MK2GA MK2GB MK3GA MK3GB 
MK1GA 1 0.11 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.04 
1 0.15 0.28 0.05 0.02 0.04 
MK1GB 1 0.08 0.05 0.20 0.15 
1 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.10 
MK2GA 1 0.14 0.31 0.34 
1 0.13 0.17 0.11 
MK2GB 1 0.22 0.17 
1 0.28 0.04 
MK3GA 1 0.55 
1 0.13 
MK3GB 1 
1 
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3.5.2.MODELLING LIQUIDITY: FINAL CORRELATION TESTS 
In order to detect the presence of a common component we need to model 
the time series properties of the average liquidity proxies controlling for 
serial correlation and incorporating well-known liquidity determining 
variables. For this reason regressions of the following type are estimated: 
I I I I I SP' DABSP 1=C+DABSP t-I+DABSP t-2+DABSP t-3+DABSP t-4+DAB t-
v+NEGA TIVERETURNS\+POSITIVERETURNS\+ VOLA TILITY\+E 
XPECTEDVOLUME11+ UNEXPECTEDVOLUME\+ DEFAULT 
YIELD\+ TERM PREMIUM11+e1 (3.14) 
Where DABSP\ represents daily average absolute spread, POSITIVE 
RETURNS represent daily return on the portfolio or group when that 
return is positive and zero otherwise, NEGATIVE RETURNS represent 
daily return on the portfolio or group when that return is negative or zero 
and zero otherwise, volatility is modelled as GARCH(1,1), expected 
trading volume is obtained by subtracting unexpected volume from actual 
volume, unexpected trading volume is obtained by modelling actual 
trading volume and obtaining innovations, default premium is estimated 
as the change in the spread between the corporate bond yield and the two 
year government bond yield and term structure is estimated as the change 
in the spread between the ten-year government bond yield and the three 
month treasury bill yield. The above regression is pertll1ent to daily 
average absolute spread however similar regressions are estimated for 
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both liquidity proxies, all portfolios and subgroups over different trading 
periods. Results are presented in T ABLE3. 7 (PANELS A, B AND C) 
and TABLE3.8 for absolute and proportional spread respectively. Each 
line within each box in the table represents results for a specific time 
period. When a variable is missing either because it is non-stationary or 
it is highly correlated with some other variable it is substituted by a line of 
dashes(-). 
Now as far as the significance of the variables is concerned, it seems that 
that the first and the second lags are almost always significant for both 
absolute and proportional spread. The significance of higher order lags 
appears reduced. The sign of negative returns is positive which means 
that negative returns increase the spread even though its significance is 
considerably reduced for FTSE250 stocks and in the proportional spread 
table for FTSE 100 stocks. The positive returns variable bears a negative 
sign, which means that spread is reduced if a stock performs well even 
though its significance is considerably reduced in the proportional spread 
table (FTSE 1 00) and for FTSE250 stocks. 
Returns volatility appears to have a positive effect on spreads, which 
means that more volatile stocks have higher spreads. This finding is 
consistent with Huberman & Halka (200 1) but inconsistent with Tinic 
(1972) who finds that the standard deviation of returns in insignificant. 
Expected and unexpected voh.une variables appear to play some role in 
explaining absolute spread but their importance is diminished when it 
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comes to explaining proportional spread or FTSE250 stocks spread. 
Some would anticipate unexpected volume to play a very important role 
in explaining spread since this variable is supposed to capture asymmetric 
information effects. Of course trading volume would play a significant 
role if depth variables were examined. Finally macroeconomic variables 
do not appear to have a significant explanatory power bearing mixed 
signs. Residuals correlations for FTSE 100 stocks between portfolio 1 
and portfolio 2 which are equally weighted range from 0.47 to 0.59 for 
absolute spread and from 0.37 to 0.47 for proportional spread 
respectively. All correlations are highly significant with the exception of 
residuals obtained from proportional spread regressions for the third 
period. Residual correlations for FTSE250 portfolios 1 and 2 are equal to 
0.19 and 0.22 for SEAQ and SETSmm respectively. Results are 
presented in TABLE3.9 (PANELS A and B). Correlations between 
subgroups for FTSE100 are presented in TABLE3.10 (PANEL A) and all 
of them are significant with the exception of two or three cases meaning 
that there is a common liquidity component present not captured by any of 
the know classic spread determining variables. Correlations between 
subgroups for FTSE250 are presented in TABLE3.10 (PANEL B) and 
most of them are insignificant. 
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TABLE 3.7 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ABSOLUTE SPREAD INCORPORATING SPREAD DETERMING VARIABLES (p values in brackets) 
PANEL A: FTSEIOO UNDER FOUR DIFFERENT PERIODS 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAP IT ALIZA TION I CAPITALIZATION 2 CAP IT ALIZA TION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 2.82(0.00) 0.00(0.99) 1.01(0.00) 0.77(0.10) 0.61(0.08) 0.95(0.01) 0.34(0.48) 0.56(0.07) 
9.99(0.00) 6.25(0.00) 5.66(0.00) 2.83(0.00) 6.77(0.00) 3.30(0.00) 2.94(0.00) 2.88(0.02) 
6.09(0.00) l.J 7(0.45) 5.15(0.00) 0.41(0.56) 1.01(0.40) 2.19(0.02) 1.66(0.00) 0.26(0.54) 
11.47(0.00) 14.03(0.00) 3.04(0.20) 5.71(0.00) 1.90(0.09) 4.35(0.00) 4.75(0.00) 7.28(0.00) 
-I 0.42(0.00) 0.35(0.00) 0.42(0.00) 0.32(0.00) 0.37(0.00) 0.30(0.00) 0.39(0.00) 0.25(0.00) 
0.17(0.06) 0.09(0.09) 0.21(0.00) 0.16(0.00) 0.06(0.40) 0.06(0.22) 0.03(0.36) 0.12(0.04) 
0.20(0.00) 0.14(0.17) 0.26(0.00) 0.16(0.05) 0.11(0.09) 0.09(0.31) 0.09(0.04) 0.03(0.71) 
0.26(0.00) 0.19(0.00) 0.31(0.00) 0.03(0.63) 0.09(0.23) 0.15(0.01) 0.03(0.44) 0.23(0.00) 
-2 0.05(0.47) 0.06(0.37) 0.22(0.00) 0.20(0.06) 0.22(0.01) 0.03(0.69) 0.07(0.46) 0.02(0.78) 
0.25(0.19) 0.12(0.46) 0.20(0.13) 0.11(0.38) 0.16(0.25) 0.06(0.64) 0.12(0.02) '0.11(0.34) 
0.18(0.09) 0.29(0.00) 0.01(0.88) 0.21(0.00) 0.17(0.09) 0.12(0.09) 0.17(0.01) 0.19(0.00) 
0.09(0.05) 0.20(0.00) 0.15(0.03) 0.22(0.00) 0.18(0.07) 0.04(055) -0.00(0.98) 0.05(0.22) 
-3 0.09(0.12) 0.23(0.06) -0.06(0.30 0.07(0.36) 0.19(0.01) 0.13(0.02) 0.21(0.03) 0.13(0.32) 
0.30(0.16) 0.38(0.02) 0.05(0.49) 0.13(0.26) 0.14(0.25) 0.16(0.00) 0.21(0.12) 0.24(0.09) 
0.07(0.42) 0.12(0.16) -0.01(0.80 0.00(0.98) 0.08(0.27) 0.12(0.07) 0.20(0.16) 0.07(0.19) 
-0.01(0.77) 0.08(0.36) 0.00(0.93) 0.20(0.00) 0.27(0.07) 0.04(0.53) 0.00(0.96) 0.05(0.31) 
-4 0.10(0.12) 0.16(0.05) 0.13(0.04) 0.14(0.04) 0.10(0.18) 0.12(0.05) 0.06(0.33) 0.18(0.04) 
------------ ------------- ------------ ------------ ---------·-- --·--------- ------------ ------------
0.05(0.20) 0.05(0.29) 0.07(0.07) 0.01(0.78) 0.05(0.40) 0.00(0.91) -0.00(0.92) 0.15(0.03) 
0.17(0.03) 0.05(0.44) -0.01(0.84 0.01(0.73) 0.09(0.06) 0.02(0.64) 0.07(0.09) 0.14(0.11) 
-5 ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ........................ ------------ .. .................... -----------
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ -----------· ------------
-0.01(0.75) 0.01(0.78) -0.1 0(0.02) 0.04(0.40) 0.16(0.00) 0.09(0.08) 0.04(0.48) -0.01 (0.77) 
0.06(0.32) 0.08(0.23) 0.09(0.14) 0.00(0.99) 0.05(0.40) 0.10(0.11) 0.09(0.01) 0.12(0.04) 
R(-) -0.03(0.47) -0.14(0.19) 0.12(0.31) -0.08(0.35) -0.1 0(0.29) -0.01(0.87) 0.12(0.15) -0.00(0.98) 
1.46(0.08) -0.21(0.57) 0.67(0.08) -0.09(0.50) -0.08(0.67) 0.13(0.52) 0.28(0.15) -0.27(0.14) 
-0.11 (0.90) -0.27(052) -0.05(0.88) -0.06(0. 77) -0.50(0.42) -0.02(0.91) -0.24(0.25) 0.10(0.58) 
0.61(0.55) 1.07(0.25) -0.05(0.94) 0.93(0.04) 0.03(0.92) -0.18(0.60) 0.20(053) -0.30(0.37) 
R(+) 0.00(0.99) . 0.43(0.15) 0.02(0.61) -0.03(057) -0.05(0.33) -0 07(0.14) -0.04(0.53) -0.02(0.64) 
-0.3 7(0.66) -1.48(0.01) -0.25(0.43) -0.38(0.0 I) -0.60(0.0 I) -0.50(0.02) -0.18(0.34) -0.55(0.01) 
0.09(0.93) -0.36(0.45) -0.49(0.23) 0.18(0.20) 0.21(0.44) -0.09(0.63) -0.03(0.84) 0.00(0.97) 
-0. 79(0.44) -0.04(0.96) 0.09(0.91) 0.13(0.75) -0.27(0.35) -0. 73(0. 09) 0.09(0.78) -0.24(0.44) 
RVOL 0.1 1(0.01) 0.15(0.03) 0.35(0.09) 0.23(0.13) 0.04(0.57) 1.39(0.00) 0.28(0.06) 0.40(0.00) 
-0.32(0.93) 0.11(0.78) 0.14(0.35) 0.62(0.52) 0.55(0.71) 0.25(0.17) 0.84(0.46) 0.35(0.69) 
0.71(0.45) 0.93(0.03) 0.57(0.04) 0.51(0.01) 0.55(0.12) 0.36(0.01) 0.28(0.88) 0.31(0.04) 
0.40(0.89) 0.38(0.43) 0.42(0.09) 0.11(0.50) 0.67(0.52) 0.95(0.21) 0.19(0.23) 0.27(0.01) 
VEXP 0.00(0.40) 0.00(0.17) -0.0(0.50) -0.0(0.35) -0.0(0.25) -0.00(0.00 -0.0(0.64) -0.0(0.95) 
-0.00(0.03) -0.00(0.13) -0.00(0.20) -0.00(0.20 -0.0(0.01) -0.00(0. I 0) -0.00(0.13) -0.0(0.47) 
0.00(0.23) 0.00(0.38) -0.0(0.84) 0.00(0.53) 0.00(0.74) -0.00(0.39) 0.0(0.17) 0.0(0.10) 
-0.00(0.02) -0.00(0.0 I) 0.00(0.38) -0.0(0.00) -0.0(0.83) -0.00(0.01 -0.0(0.01) -0.00(0.00) 
VUNX 0.0(0.28) -0.0(0.24) -0.0(0.19) -0.0(0.11) -0.0(0.40) -0.0(0.26) -0.0(0.25) -0.0(0.20) 
-0.00(0 16) 0.00(0.04) -0.00(0.20) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.01) -0.00(0.11) -0.0(0.14) -0.0(0.98) 
-0.0(0.71) -0.0(0.58) -0.0(0.78) -0.0(0.60) -0.00(0.1 0) -0.0(0.30) 0.0(0.73) 0.0(0. 73) 
-0.0(0.20) 0.0(0.26) 0.00(0.05) 0.0(0.55) -0.0(0.57) -0.0(0.60) -0.0(0.54) 0.0(0.12) 
DEF ------------ ------------- ------------ ......................... ------------ ------------ ----------- -----------
1.40(0.14) 1.37(0.11) -0.13(0.80) 0.27(0.24) 0.85(0.02) 0.57(0.05) 0.47(0.03) 0.23(0.36) 
-0.68(0.40) -0.65(0.12) 0.21(0.63) -0.28(0.18) -0.59(0.08) -0.27(0.21) -0.35(0.08) -0.30(0.07) 
............................. 
-------------- -------------
........................... ............................... 
------------- --------------
.. .............................. 
TERM ------------ -------·----- ------------ ........................ ------------ .......................... ........................ ....................... 
-1.79(0.09) -0.86(0.17) -0.44(0.49) -0.02(0.91) -1.01(0.03) -0.42(0.11) -0.31(0.27) -0.14(0.57) 
-------·---- ------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
............................ 
------------ ------------
-0.98(0.65) 1.24(0.48) -1.11(0.36) 0.67(0.37) -0.12(0.80) 0.05(0.94) 0.44(0.77) 0.66(0.36) 
RADJ 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.34 0.33 
0.25 0.24 0.15 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.10 0.11 
0.16 0.33 0.08 0.32 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.18 
0.33 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.07 0.01 0.35 
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v 
PANEL B: FTSE250 UNDER SEAQ 
' 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET CAPITALISATION MARKET CAPITALISATION MARKET CAP IT ALI SA TION 
I 2 3 
PORTF1 PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 5.39 6.46 8.92 6.22 5.60 6.69 4.76 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
-1 0.15 0.22 0.05 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.14 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
-2 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.01 
(0.21) (0.49) (0.34) (0.01) (0.40) (0.70) 
-3 0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.12 
(0.23) (0.30) rJJ (0.62) (0.52) (0.06) (0.80) z 
-4 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.08 
(0.73) (0.50) f:: (0.69) (0.38) 
-< 
-5 0.06 -0.01 ....J -0.00 0.10 
(0.48) (0.80) ~ (0.9) (0.09) ~6 
-0.17 O.o7 0 0.00 
(0.00) (0.11) u (0.25) E-
R(+) 0.61 0.32 ~ -0.37 -0.11 -0.43 0.85 1.32 (0.86) (0.63) u (0.90) (0.10) (0.50) (0.90) (0.85) 
~(-) 0.21 0.30 ti:: 0.23 0.24 0.33. 0.20 1.15 
(0.57) (0.18) z (0.95) (0.89) _(0.53) (0.94) (0.85) 0 VOL 0.35 0.26 C/5 0.20 0.15 0.32 0.74 0.21 
(0.8) (0.20) 15 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.60) (0.14) 
EXP 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.57) (0.50) (0.80) (0.50) (0.17) (0.01) 
UN -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.30) (0.50) (0.48) (0.60) (0.40) (0.31) (0.70) 
DEF 0.23 -0.79 -0.17 0.13 -0.50 0.53 0.50 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.80) (0.92) 
R"ADJ 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.54 0.16 0.10 0.07 
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PANEL C:FTSE250:HYBRID/SETSMM 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET CAP IT ALI SA TION MARKET CAP IT ALI SA TION MARKET C~IT ALI SA TION I 
I 2 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 6.83 4.23 11.1 1.29 -0.25 3.14 11.1 
(0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.46) (0.83) (0.01) (0.08) 
-I 0.13 0.31 0.19 0.18 -0.04 0.13 0.30 
(0.19) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.26) (0.07) (0.03) 
-2 0.18 -0.07 0.33 0.11 0.06 -0.05 
(0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.52) 
-3 0.07 0.09 0.14 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 
(0.26) (0.08) (0.04) (0.91) (0.38) (0.45) 
-4 0.15 -0.03 O.o7 -0.09 -0.03 0.05 
(0.04) (0.46) (0.30) (0.26) (0.29) z (0.43) 
-5 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.05 0 0.10 
(0.09) (0.73) (0.87) (0.13) (0.45) E= (0.17} <t: 
-6 0.15 0.08 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 .....l 0.03 
(0.01) (0.43) (0.06) (0.82) (0.34) ~ (0.58) 
-7 0.10 0.07 -0.01 0 0.07 
(0.06) (0.41) (0.60) u (0.42) 
.....l 
-8 -0.03 <t: 0.06 
(0.18) E= (0.30) 
-9 0.06 ~ -0.06 
(0.17) E- (0.36) z 
-10 0.02 <t: 0.20 
(0.45) u (0.02) r:;: 
R(+) -0.14 0.30 -0.18 -0.45 -0.11 z 0.19 0.60 (0.28) (0.50) (0.32) (0.08) (0.35) c:; (0.29) (0.56) 
R(-) 0.72 0.10 0.16 0.39 0.50 r.n 0.78 0.28 
(0.15) (0.56) (0.28) (0.11) (0.35) 25 (0.29) (0.56) 
VOL -0.30 0.15 0.49 0.99 0.62 0.13 0.20 
(0.93) (0.47) (0.84) (0.20) (0.53) (0.69) (0.60) 
EXP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.46) (0.73) (0.13) (0.60) (0.08) (0.64) (0.11) 
UN -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.32) (0.64) (0.92) (0.78) (0.86) (0.16) (0.86)_ 
DEF -0.98 0.33 -0.35 0.10 0.44 0.46 -0.82 
(0.77) (0.57) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.45) 
R'ADJ 0.25 0.10 0.53 0.28 0.08 0.10 0.12 
122 
TABLE3.8 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PROPORTIONAL SPREAD 12 INCORPORATING SPREAD DETERMING VARIABLES (p 
values in brackets) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION I CAP IT ALIZA TION 2 CAPITALIZATION 3 
PORTFl 3 PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.04) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.17) 0.00(0.01) 
................................... 
-------------- ----------·---
.. ............................. 
-------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- -------·------ 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.38) 0.00(0.03) 0.10(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
0.01(0.00) 0.02(0.00) 0.00(0.27) 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.04) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
-I 0.44(0.00) 0.27(0.00) 0.50(0.00) 0.25(0.00) 0.29(0.00) 0.20(0.00) 0.29(0.00) 0.27(0.01) 
-------------- -------------- ------------- ------------ ------------· ------------- ------------- ------------
........................................ 
-------------- -0.00(0.61) 0.17(0.0 I) 0.16(0.00) 0.14(0.11) -0.03(0.46 -0.00(0.50) 
0.27(0.00) 0.13(0.13) 0.32(0.00) -0.01(0.85) 0.19(0.02) 0.25(0.00) 0.01(0.73) 0.25(0.00) 
-2 0.02(0.66) 0.02(0.78) 0.15(0.01) 0.16(0.04) 0.19(0.04) -0.04(0.54) 0.15(0.25) -0.01(0.82) 
-------------- --------------
........................................ 
------------- -----------·--
................................... 
------------- ------------
-------------- -------------- -0.03(0.17) 0.14(0.04) 0.21(0.07) 0.17(0.01) 0.00(0.95) -0.00(0.34) 
0.10(0.03) 0.23(0.00) 0.13(0.07) 0.16(0.02) 0.12(0.23) 0.00(0.88) 0.04(0.39) 0.06(0.20) 
-3 0.03(0.55) 0.13(0.14) -0.04(0.52) 0.09(0.18) 0.1 0(0.12) 0.15(0.00) 0.17(0.03) 0.05(0.59) 
-------------- ------------- -------------- -------------
......................................... 
-------------- ------------- ------------
------------- ------------- 0.01(0.43) -0.06(0.34 0.01(0.84) 0.10(0.23) -0.0 I (0. 76) 0.01(0.14) 
-0.02(0.73) 0.13(0.05) 0.00(0.97) 0,15(0.00) 0.11(0.38) 0.16(0.02) 0.07(0.29) -0.00(0.89) 
-4 0.08(0.29) 0.08(0.31) 0.14(0.02) 0.13(0.06) 0.11(0.05) 0.06(0.35) 0.03(0.69) 0.12(0.15) 
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------- ------------
--------------
.............................. 
-0.04(0.21) 0.00(0.92) 0.01(0.74) -0.04(0.32) 0.05(0.17) -0.00(0.90) 
0.21(0.02) 0.04(0.37) 0.04(0.46) 0.03(0.27) 0.15(0.00) -0.02(0.65) 0.10(0.02) 0.10(0.14) 
-5 -------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- ------·------- -------------- ------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- -------------- 0.023(0.22) 0.02(0.64) 0.10(0.05) 0.13(0.04) 0.03(0.45) -0.00(0.63) 
0.04(0.44) 0.03(0.56) 0.09(0.04) -0.02(0.65) 0.01(0.81) 0.20(0.02) 0.13(0.00) 0.09(0.20) 
R(-) -0.00(0.92) -0.00(0.14) 0.00(0.20) -0.00(0. 70) -2.6E5(0.6) 1.6E5(0.13) 8.6E5(0.04) 52E5(0.2) 
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
------·------- -------------- 0.00(0.91) -0.00(0.84) -0.00(0.79) 0.00(0.74) -0.00(0.48) -5E5(0.81) 
0.00(0.47) 0.00(0.02) 0.00(0.86) 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.60) -0.00(0.22) 0.00(0.55) -0.00(0.64) 
R(+) -0.00(0.92) 0.00(0.17) -0.00(0.56) -0.00(0.90) -5.6E5(0.09) -4.1E5(0.13) -3E5(0.38) -4E5(0.22) 
-------------- -----·-------- -------------- ------------ -------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- -------------
-0.00(0.1 0) 0.00(0.30) -2.3E5(0.94) -0.00(0.66) -0.00(0.31) -0.00(0.47) 
-0.00(0.25) -0.00(0.44) -0.00(0.93) 0.00(0.45) -0.00(0.11) -0.00(0.00) 3.9E5(0.89) -0.06(0.21) 
RVOL 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.02) 0.00(0.03) 8. 7E5(0.16) 0.00(0.48) 8.4E8(0.18) 4E5(0.50) 
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- --------------
9.20(0.04) I 0.75(0.03) 11.47(0.03) 7.43(0.00) -54.5(0.36) 8.83(0.00) 
1.04(0.76) 0.71(0.91) -3.03(0.28) 3.81 (0.38)_ 1.08(039) 0.76(0.32) 0.95(0.50) -152(0.09) 
VEXP -0.00(0.48) 0.00(0.81) -0.00(0.34) 0.00(0.94) -2.1 E9(0.32) -8.6E8(0.00) -IE8(0.40) -3.9E8(0.7) 
-------------- -------------- --------------
........................... 
--------------
............................. 
------------- ------------
................................ .. ............................ 
-0.00(0.16) 0.00(0.67) 4.9E8(0.82) -1.4E7(0.58) -2E7(0.47) 7.6E8(0.12) 
-0.00(0.07) -0.00(0.19) 0.00(0.34) -0.00(0.0 I) -1.2E7(0.34 -2.8E7(0.0S) -3.6E8(0.04) -IE7(0.04) 
VUNX -0.00(0.48) -0.00(0.18) -0.00(0.24) -0.00(0.03) -7 .8E9(0.38) -1.3E8(0.22) -7E9(0.18) -3.6E9(0.3) 
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- --------------
............................ 
------------
-------------- --------------
-0.00(0.20) -0.00(0.52) -2.9E7(0.1) -1.5E7(0.37) 1.4E8(0.95) -8E10(0.98) 
-0.00(0.25) 0.0.0(0.19) -0.00(0.17) 1.9E7(0.38) -6.7E8(0.24 -6. 7E8(0.24) -IE8(0.28) 5.9E8(0.11) 
DEF -------------- ............................... .. .............................. ------------- ............................. ............................ ............................ ------------
............................. ............................ 
---·------- ------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- -------------- 0.00(0.71) 0.00(0.82) -0.00(0.09) -0.00(0.06) 0.01(0.11) -0.00(0.00) 
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------
TERM -------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------
-------------- -------------- ------·------- -------------- -------------- --------·-----
........................... 
-------------
-0.00(0.54) 0.00(0.68) -0.00(0.31) 0.00(0.49) -0.00(0.76) 0.00(0.70) -9.9E5(0.92) 0.00(0.89) 
RADJ 0.31 0.18 0.44 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.22 0.07 
-------------- -------------- -------------- ------------- -------------- ------------- ------------ ------------
............................ 
-------------- 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.27 0.02 0.04 
0.39 0.27 0.25 0.09 0.27 0.29 0.10 0.10 
12 Proportional spread is not stationary in the second period therefore it is excluded. 
13 Portfolios 1 & 2 are not significantJy correlated in the third period and as a. consequence there is no reason to run regressions for those two portfolios incorporating well~ 
known spread determining variables. Correlation results for proportional spread between portfolios 1 & 2 were presented back in tableS. 
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TABLE 3.9 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN PORTFOLIOS INCLUDING SPREAD 
DETERMINING VARIABLES (all correlations above 0.10 are significant) 
PANEL A:FTSEIOO 
PORTFOLIO I 
ABSOLUTE PROPORTIONAL 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 0.55 
0.59 
N 
0 0.59 
::i 0.47 
0 PROPORTIONAL SPREAD ...Q,37 t..t... 
~ non 
0 stationary 0.. 
insignificant 
0.47 
PANEL B: FTSE250 
PORTFOLIO! 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
PORTFOLI02 0.19 
0.22 
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TABLE 3.10 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN SUBGROUPS INCLUDING SPREAD-DETERMINING 
VARIABLES 
PANEL A:FTSEIOO(all correlations above 0.10 are significant) 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
MKIGA MK1GB MK2GA MK2GB MK3GA MK3GB 
MK1GA 1 0.12 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.15 
1 0.49 0.43 0.31 0.37 0.42 
1 0.49 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.24 
1 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.29 
MK1GB 0.02 1 0.47 0.41 0.45 0.38 
0 ----·----- 1 0.62 0.39 0.58 0.50 
<( 0.50 1 0.40 0.48 0.58 0.31 
w 0.16 1 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.30 ~ 
a.. MK2GA 0.14 0.33 1 0.34 0.45 0.47 (/) 
_J 
---------- ---------- 1 0.44 0.59 0.52 
<( 0.40 0.45 1 0.21 0.37 0.18 z 
0 0.18 0.18 1 0.15 0.23 0.30 
i= MK2GB -0.01 0.27 0.24 1 0.30 0.29 ~ 
0 ---------- ---------- ---------- 1 0.45 0.49 
a.. 0.34 0.52 0.40 1 0.48 0.26 0 
~ 0.32 0.18 0.29 1 0.16 0.23 a.. 
MK3GA 0.40 0.14 0.38 0.27 1 0.52 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 1 0.56 
0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.01 1 0.39 
0.28 0.17 0.38 0.29 1 0.38 
MK3GB 0.10 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.43 1 
---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
..................... 1 
0.40 0.46 0.36 0.43 -0.00 1 
0.31 0.20 0.32 0.35 0.49 1 
PANEL B: FTSE250 UNDER SEAQ AND SETSMM (all correlations above 0.13 are significant) 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
MKIGA MK1GB MK2GA MK2GB MK3GA MK3GB 
MK1GA 1 0.11 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.04 
1 0.12 0.28 0.05 0.02 0.04 
MK1GB 1 0.08 0.05 0.20 0.15 
1 0.13 0.07 0.17 0.10 
MK2GA 1 0.14 0.31 0.32 
1 0.13 0.11 0.11 
MK2GB 1 0.22 0.15 
1 0.22 0.04 
MK3GA 1 0.55 
1 0.13 
MK3GB 1 
1 
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3.5.3.EXTRACTION OF COMMON FACTORS AND PRICING OF 
COMMONALITY 
Having established the presence of commonality in liquidity, the next step 
is to extract that factor. Extraction takes place at i) the portfolio level and 
ii) at the market capitalisation groups level. The decision on how many 
factors to include was based on the Kaiser criterion14. The variance 
captured each time by the common factor is presented in T ABLE3 .11 
(PANELS A and B) and TABLE3.12 along with the relevant eigenvalues 
for absolute and proportional spread respectively. The lowest variance 
extracted for FTSE 1 00 stocks by the first factor is 50% and the highest 
83% further fortifying the results obtained previously regarding the 
presence of commonality. The variance extracted for FTSE250 is much 
lower. In some cases there is no commonality and this is indicated by a 
dashed line At this point we must stress once again that common factors 
are extracted from residuals obtained from spread regressions after having 
considered all kriown variables, which can have an effect on spread 
formation. Such high commonality between stocks with different 
characteristics is very unusual and unaccounted by market microstructure 
theory however it provides us with an excellent opportunity to test the 
effect of commonality on asset pricing under different trading regimes. 
The form of the regression employed is presented right below: 
EXCESS RETURNSt=CFt+CFt-I+CFt-2+CFt-3+CFt-4+ et (3.15) 
where CF stands for common factor .. FOur lags are used so as to capture 
the activity of a whole week. Regression results of returns against 
14 
only common facton 1\-ilb eigen·nlueJ highu than 1.00 1bould be retained for analysis 
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common factors are presented in TABLE3.13 (PANELS A and B) and 
TABLE3.14 for absolute and proportional spread respectively. Goodness 
of fit (R2) for FTSE100 stocks ranges from 0.01 to 0.14, which shows that 
common factors explain a very small percentage of asset prices. At this 
point we must stress once again that the explanatory variables (common 
factors) are devoid of any spread determining effects and R2 should have 
been absolutely zero if commonality is supposed to play no role is asset 
pricing. Results presented in TABLE3.13 (PANEL A) and TABLE3.14 
clearly indicate that the effect of systematic liquidity is quite pronounced 
in the quote-driven trading period for FTSE1 00 (R2=0.13) and reduces 
after the introduction of SETS (order-driven stock exchange electronic 
trading service) but it still appears to play some role in asset pricing. The 
role of systematic liquidity has proven to be exceptionally important in 
turbulent periods and misconceptions of its level can lead even to market 
crashes according to Roll (1988). The reduction observed in the pricing 
of commonality right after the introduction of SETS (order-driven trading) 
may be attributed to the 'free entry' and 'free exit' aspect of order-driven 
trading employing the terminology used by Brockman & Chung (2002). 
Higher liquidity costs, which assume the form of wider spreads and 
provide the opportunity for higher profit margin per trade, invite more 
investors in to the market that act as liquidity providers. Thus 
commonality becomes less pervasive and is priced to a lesser extent. On 
the contrary in a quote driven market, specialists are obliged to provide 
liquidity under any circumstances. A negative liquidity shock leading to 
subsequent inventory imbalances is born by the specialists themselves 
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exclusively, can accentuate the extent to which commonality is priced. 
Results obtained for FTSE250 show that commonality is very weak and it 
is not priced. As it is ,shown in TABLE3.13 (PANEL B), R2 is not higher 
than 0.03 for those cases where a common factor can be extracted. 
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TABLE 3.II 
PERCENT AGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY PRINCIPAL FACTOR AND EIGEN VALUES FOR 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD 
PANEL A:FTSEIOO 
PORTFOLIO I MKIGB MK2GB MK3GB 
%OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN 
VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
57.48 I.48 
N 74.70 1.67 
f- 74.90 1.59 0:: 
0 6I.OO 1.47 0... 
57.48 l.l4 
--< 74.70 1.49 0 74.92 1.49 
-::.:: 61.02 1.22 
:::E 
69.34 1.38 
--< 72.05 1.44 0 60.5 1.2I N 
::.:: 57.92 l.l5 
:::E 
75.87 1.5I 
Ill 78.43 1.56 
0 69.62 1.39 M 
::.:: 69.47 1.39 
:::E 
PANEL B FTSE250 
PORTFOLIO I MKIGB MK2GB MK3GB 
%OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN 
VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
P2 25.22 l.OI 
24.I8 l.OI 
MKI ..................... --------
GA .................. .. ............. 
MK2 20.66 1.04 
GA ........................ ....................... 
MK3 I9.89 1.00 
GA ----------- ---------
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N 
f-
c:.:: 
0 
0... 
< 0 
~ 
~ 
< 0 
N 
~ 
~ 
< 0 
..., 
~ 
~ 
TABLE 3.12 
PERCENT AGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY PRINCIPAL FACTOR AND EIGEN VALUES FOR 
PROPORTIONAL SPREAD FOR ALL FOUR PERIODS 
PORTFOLI02 MKIGB MK2GB MK3GB 
%OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN 
VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
63.04 1.26 
-----------
........................ 
............................. 
----------
73.92 1.47 
53.75 1.07 
----------- -------
75.04 1.50 
58.14 1.16 
64.08 1.28 
........................ ............... 
70.03 1.40 
64.52 1.29 
70.75 1.41 
----------- -------
50.20 1.00 
74.84 1.49 
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TABLE3.13 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF COMMON COMPONENT ON EXCESS RETURNS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE AND MARKET CAP IT ALI SA TION SUBGROUPS (p values in 
parentheses) 
PANEL A: FTSE I 00 
.. 
QUOTE DRIVEN 
EXCESS RETURNS 
ws MKI 
CONS -0.08 -0.08 
(0.55) (0.54) 
T -0.18 -0.08 
0::: (0.1 0) (0.31)_ 
0 T-1 -0.18 -0.19 f-
u (0.02) (0.04) <t: 
l:.t.. T-2 -0.32 -0.19 
:z (0.00) (0.08) 0 
::E T-3 -0.20 -0.10 
::E (0.01) (0.28) 0 
u 
. T-4 -0.25 -0.15 
~~ (0.00) (0.10) 
R" 0.13 0.06 
- -
WS stands for whole sarnple(FTSE100) 
I. CONS stands for constant 
MK2 MK3 
0.05 0.12 
(0.64) (0.48) 
-0.11 ' -0.17 
(0.21) (0.38) 
-0.14 0.00 
(0.13) (0.96) 
-0.23 -0.11 
(0.01) (0.36) 
-0.19 -0.14 
(0.01) (0.31) 
-0.20 -0.05 
(0.03) (0.63) 
0.05 0.03 
T,T-1 represents·(current and lag values of the common factor. 
LAST AUTOMATED ORDER 
EXCESS RETURNS 
ws MK1 MK2 MK3 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.99) (0.98) (0.96) ' (0.95) 
-0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 
(0.91) (0.83) (0.55) (0.90) 
0.05 0.05 0.11 0.04 
(0.66) (0.65) (0.27) (0.71) 
-0.01 0.00 0.03 '0.05 
(0.92) (0.93) (0.68) (0.60) 
-0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 
(0.15) (0.37) (0.40) (0.62) 
-0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 
(0.51) (0.22) (0.66) (0.72) 
0.01 0.00 0.00 0,00 
VOLUME WEIGHTED CLOSING AUCTION 
EXCESS RETURNS EXCESS RETURNS 
ws MK1 MK2 MK3 ws MK1 MK2 KM3 
0.01 0.02 o.oz 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
(0.88) (0.85) (0.86) (0.87) (0.77) (0.87) (0.79) (0.80) 
-0.10 -0.04 -0.09 -0.14 -0.05 -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 
(0.17) (0.44) (0.15) (0.03) (0.41) (0.10) (0.25) (0.53) 
-0.11 o.oz -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05 0.10 
(0.07) (0.75) (0.00) (0.02) (0.42) (0.12) (0.47) (0.45) 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 
(0.44) (0.51) (0.29) (0.71) (0.53) (0.54) (0.52) (0.73) 
-0.15 -0.04 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.08 -0.21 -0.03 
(0.00) (0.51) (0.06) (0.00) (0.73) (0.24) (0.00) ' (0.80) 
-0.15 -0.15 -0.08 -0.16 -0.01 -0.18 -0.13 0.08 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.28) (0.02) (0.81) (0.00) (0.08) (0.53) 
0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 O.ot 0.04 0.04 O.QJ 
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PANEL B: FTSE250 
CONS 
0:: 
0 
f-. 
u 
<t: 
"'"' z 
0 
:E 
:E 
0 
u 
WS stands for whole sample(FTSE250) 
CONS stands for constant 
T 
T-1 
T-2 
T-3 
T-4 
Rz 
ws 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.31) 
0.00 
(0.86) 
0.00 
(0.74) 
-0.00 
(0.53) 
-0.00 
(0.67) 
0.00 
T,T-1 representS;,current and lag values of the common factor. 
SEAQ 
EXCESS RETURNS 
MK1 MK2 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0:: -0.00 
0 (0.56) 
f-. 
u -0.00 
<t: (0.45) 
"'"' z 
-0.00 0 (0.33) :E 
:E -0.00 
0 (0.87) u 
0 -0.00 
I Z (0.62) 
0.00 
SETSmm 
EXCESS RETURNS 
MK3 ws MK1 MK2 MK3 
-0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
0.00 -0.00 0:: 0:: 0:: (0.27) (0.13) 0 0 0 
f-. f-. f-. 0.00 -0.00 u u u 
(0.81} (0.06) <t: <t: <t: 
"'"' "'"' "'"' 0.00 0.00 z z z 
(0.04) (0.20) 0 0 0 :E :E :E 
0.00 -0.00 :E :E :E 
(0.70) (0.63) 0 0 0 u u u 
0.00 -0.00 0 0 0 
(0.89) (0.18) z z z 
0.01 0.03 
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TABLE 3.14 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF COMMON COMPONENT ON EXCESS RETURNS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE AND MARKET CAP IT ALI SA TION SUBGROUPS OVER THREE 
" DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS (p values in parentheses) 
QUOTE DRIVEN VOLUME WEIGHTED CLOSING AUCTION 
RETURNS RETURNS RETURNS 
ws MK1 MK2 MK3 ws MK1 MK2 MK3 ws MK1 MK2 
CONS -0.06 -0.07 0.08 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
(0.64) (0.61) (0.50) (0.43) (0.84) (0.85) (0.87) (0.77) (0.87) (0.78) 
' 
T -0.06 -0.07 0.01 -0.20 >- -0.04 -0.12 0.15 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 
(0.57) (0.36) (0.62) (0.28) ..::: (0.48) (0.14) (0.03) (0.57) (0.08) (0.06) ..::: 
-< 0 T-1 -0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.01 z 0.09 -0.12 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 E- 0 u (0.37) (0.21) (0.43) (0.90) (0.23) (0.01) (0.08) (0.52) (0.24) _(0.58) 
-< f: 
""' 
T-2 -0.20 -0.12 -0.01 -0.13 -< -0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
z (0.07) (0.31) (0.91) (0.39) E- (0.96) (0.21) (0.80) (0.68) (0.96) (0.69) 0 C/l 
~ T-3 -0.14 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 ;z: -0.02 -0.10 0.16 -0.00 -0.02 -0.14 0 ~ (0.1 0) (0.57) (0.68) (0.26) ;z: (0.70) (0.10) (0.02) (0.90) (0.68) (0.06) 0 
'u T-4 -0.12 -0.15 -0.00 -0.00 -0.12 -0.07 0.09 -0.00 -0.14 -0.13 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.95) (0.98) (0.14) (0.25) (0.16) (0.92) (0.05) (0.09) 
L__ R" 0.04 0.03 0.00 
-----
0.04 0.01. 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 
Only three tim~ .. periods/regimes are presented in this table and this is because proportional spread is not stationary in the second period/trading regime. 
WS stands for whole sample(FTSE 1 00) 
CONS stands for constant 
T,T-1 representS current and lag values of the common factor. 
MK3 
0.03 
(0.80) 
-0.07 
(0.46) 
0.12 
(0.34) 
0.03 
(0.73) 
-0.02 
(0.86) 
0.03 
(0.76) 
0.01 
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3.6.ROBUSTNESS 
After having reached the above conclusions, we decided to perform 
robustness tests as is usually done in studies of this kind to see if our results 
are sample specific. We did so by extending the sample in each period (45 
daily observations) so as to ensure that news about changes in the 
trading/reporting regime known before the actual change and any consequent 
changes in the trading behaviour of investors and market makers are fully 
considered. Our results remain unchanged for all subgroups and portfolios 
over the periods considered. 
3.7.CONCLUSION 
Amihud & Mendelson (1986), Eleswarapu & Reinganum (1993), Brennan & 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Datar et al (1998) and Amihud(2002) have argued 
that predictable differences in liquidity lead to cross-sectional differences in 
excess returns. We instead concentrate on systematic liquidity, a new 
phenomenon in market microstructure. This study tested for i) the presence 
of a common liquidity factor in FTSE I 00 stocks under four different 
trading/reporting regimes and FTSE250 stocks under two regimes, ii) the 
effect of commonality on asset pricing and iii) the extent to which it is priced. 
The results obtained from this study clearly show that i) there is a common 
factor affecting FTSE 100 stocks simultaneously as it is c~ptqr~cl cby high sub-
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group residuals correlations and the variance explained each time by common 
factors ii) commonality in liquidity appears to play an important role in asset 
pricing before the introduction of the order driven trading but appears 
reduced for the rest of the periods examined with reference to FTSElOO 
stocks and iii) commonality is reduced for FTSE250 stocks and it is not 
priced. Based on the discussion above, the policy implications of our findings 
and implications for market makers and investors, are self explanatory and 
relate to the presence of liquidity commonality under different trading 
provisions and spread effects among other things. We conclude that order 
driven regimes have the ability to dampen the effect of commonality; hence 
policy makers should consider this when deciding on trading systems. For 
market participants, the evidence show that it may be more desirable to trade 
under an order driven market due to the dampened commonality and hence 
the possible negative effects of severe illiquidity. 
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEMATIC LIQUIDITY AND EXCESS RETURNS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE ATHENS STOCK EXCHANGE 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
As it was discussed in the literature review and in the introductory parts of 
the previous chapters market microstructure has traditionally concentrated 
on the characteristics of single assets exhibiting absolute disregard for 
attribute(s) that can have an effect on multiple assets simultaneously. 
Limited research has been undertaken in 'transaction costs' or 'liquidity' 
concentrating on systematic variations and how this affects stocks. The 
only published research undertaken in the area concentrates on developed 
markets such as the US market. In the previous chapters we discussed the 
effect of systematic liquidity on asset pricing for the London stock 
exchange. In this chapter we will look into the effect of systematic 
(il)liquidity on asset pricing by concentrating on less developed markets 
such as the Athens Stock Exchange. 
The Greek capital market and in particular the Athens stock exchange has 
attracted a lot of investment since the establishment of the economic and 
monetary union. During this period the Greek capital market has 
contributed significantly to the development of the Greek economy and 
provided investors with alternative methods of investment, which was 
received with unprecedented enthusiasm. The Athens stock exchange 
also served as the primary mechanism . for privatizing public law 
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companies which further increased the interest of both Greek and 
international investors. 
On the basis of the above facts, the Athens stock exchange has embarked 
on creating an economic and investing environment, which would be 
comparable to that of international capital markets. In order to achieve 
that it has introduced a number of changes concentrating on restructuring 
the legal and regulatory framework, modernizing the trading process and 
introducing new financial products. In other words the Greek market has 
gone through a number of development stages within a very short period 
of time before it achieved recognition as a developed market (31 May, 
2001). For this reason I believe that it is worth examining the effect of 
systematic liquidity on asset pricing for a market that has developed 
exceptionally fast to go from 'boom to bust' within two years. 
Besides the exceptionally fast development, briefly described above, a 
study undertaken by the department of research and development of the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) has revealed that the general index of the 
ASE exhibits a very low correlation with the indices of other European 
stock exchanges namely: United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France. 
In particular the ASE exhibits the highest correlation with the German 
market index and this is a mere 0.3. Correlations between indices for the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France excluding Greece are quite 
high ranging from 0.61 to 0.81. Oh the contrary the Greek stock 
exchange does not follow the course of the exchanges mentioned above, 
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providing the necessary differentiation that the optimum portfolio must 
have according to financial theory, therefore if an international investor 
wishes to invest in European stocks, he will definitively invest in Greek 
stocks as well given the low correlation with the market indices mentioned 
above so as to achieve as balanced a portfolio as possible. For this reason 
I believe that it is important to examine systematic liquidity in the Greek 
market and its effect on asset pricing since liquidity is an important 
component of the trading process. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate for the presence of 
commonality in liquidity in the Greek market and secondly examine the 
effect of systematic liquidity on asset pricing. Commonality refers to the 
proposition that an individual firm's liquidity is determined by market-
wide factors (unidentified yet) besides well-documented idiosyncratic 
factors such as volatility, trading volume, number of trades etc. Research 
has also shown that predictable differences in liquidity lead to cross-
sectional differences in excess returns. A natural extension of this 
argument is that if liquidity is random and co-varies across stocks then a 
stock's sensitivity to systematic liquidity randomness could play the role 
of a priced risk factor. This possibility is examined here. Traditionally 
empirical work -in the area of market microstructure has concentrated 
exclusively on trading patterns of individual assets, seasonal patterns and 
market crashes. The very first studies to look into the relation of liquidity 
-and asset,returns were those of-Amiht1d & Meiioelson (1'986), Efeswarapu 
& Reinganum (1993), Brennan & Subrahmanyam (1996) and Datar et al. 
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(1998). Quite recently research interest has shifted to the common 
components of liquidity (Chordia et al. 2000; Huberman & Halka 2001; 
Hasbrouck & Seppi 2001). Generally speaking there are a number of 
studies that have investigated the relation of liquidity and returns and 
documented the presence of commonality in liquidity but no study has 
looked into common factors in liquidity (commonality) and returns. This 
study combines those two lines of research and examines if and the extent 
to which commonality affects excess returns. In other words we seek to 
address the following questions: 
• Q 1) Is commonality in liquidity present in less developed markets 
such as the Greek market or it constitutes a stylized fact pertinent to 
major markets such as the US market and the UK market? 
• Q2) Is commonality priced? 
• Q3) Does commonality come in waves? 
• Q4) Is commonality a phenomenon pertinent to low or high market 
capitalization companies? 
The results obtained in this study contribute to the commonality literature 
in the following ways. First we show that commonality is not just a US 
or a UK characteristic but it is also pertinent in less developed markets 
namely the Greek market, secondly we find that the presence of 
commonality in the Greek capital market is not as strong as it appears to 
be in the US market and the UK market and that appears to be pertinent in 
high capitalization companies, thirdly commonality in the Greek market 
. . •:- . - :'. . . ~ -· .. 
appears to come in waves and fourthly it is not priced. 
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4.2 OVERVIEW OF SHARES TRADING IN THE ASE 
Trading hours are set between 11 :00 and 16:00 with a half an hour pre-
opening period and fifteen minutes after the end of the trading session 
until 16:15 where only 'at the close' trades are realized. ASE members -
namely brokerage firms and credit institutions - which have obtained 
approval from the Board of Directors of the ASE, are allowed to trade in 
the exchange. All transactions are realized either in cash, or through 
margin account. 
Trades are conducted electronically through the Automated Exchange 
Trading System (OASIS). Orders are entered into the system by stock 
exchange representatives, who are supplied with a code number for that 
purpose. Orders are entered from Members' offices by means of remote 
broker operations. Each ASE member is permitted up to eight terminals, 
four of which are free. The use of all terminals is restricted to the trading 
hours of the Stock Exchange. All orders introduced into the system before 
the beginning of the main trading session on 11:00 may participate in the 
formation of the opening price. Orders receive a time stamp upon their 
entry into the system. At the pre-opening period, the system accepts limit 
and market orders. Limit orders determine the day's opening price. 
Market orders get time priority and are executed upon the opening of the 
market. If rto limit orders exist,, the opening price 'will' be the' same as the 
previous closing price. The criterion used for the determination of the 
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opening price is the maximization of transactions' volume. When two 
prices produce the same maximum volume, the pnce closest to the 
previous closing price is selected. If their differential from the previous 
close coincides, the system will select the highest price of the two. 
Closing price is considered the weighted average as regards the number of 
shares, of the prices of the 1 0% of the trading realized during the session, 
at two decimal points. The calculation of the closing price is realized by 
starting from the last trading before the end of the session moving towards 
the beginning until the cardinal number of the trading that corresponds to 
10% of the total number of trading of the session is completed. If no 
trading has been realized as regard the share, the 'start price' of the share 
is taken as closing prices. The closing prices of the shares that belong to 
trading category B or C (auction) are considered the price of the last call 
auction. If no trading has been realized during the session, then the start 
price is considered as closing price. The closing price of the indices is 
calculated on the basis of the closing price of the shares. 
During the main trading session, orders are matched by price (the buy 
order at the highest price is matched with the sell order at the lowest price) 
and time. The orders, which are inserted in the OASIS before the 
beginning of the main trading session, participated in the definition of the 
opening price. The criterion for the definition of the opening price is the 
111,C1X.!mtz<;ttio~_gft}le tracling volume, which also. determines the best point 
of equilibrium between demand and supply. 
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Members can change or reverse their orders during the mam trading 
session if they feel that their orders cannot be executed at the given price. 
In case of reversing, one minute at least must have elapsed since the time 
the initial order was entered. During the trading session, the trading 
system forms a central book of pending round lot orders at any given 
moment of time. Orders are distinguished between buy and sell orders and 
are ranked by price and time. Furthermore,. the trading system forms a 
secondary book of pending odd lot orders. All new orders, depending on 
the share quantity, are automatically checked against the orders listed in 
the Main Board and the odd lot book. 
4.3.EXPERIMENT AL DESIGN1 
The experimental design is similar to the one presented in the previous 
chapter therefore it is not repeated again. 
4.4.DAT ASET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Daily price data for the FTSE/ ASE 20 Index, FTSE/ ASE Mid 40 Index 
and FTSE 80 Index companies was obtained from DA T ASTREAM. The 
data set under consideration ranges from 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2003. The 
choice of the data set reflects a different period in terms of trading activity 
for the Athens Stock Exchange. The first year of the sample, 1998, was 
an inactive year however during the two following years, the ASE reached 
a recordvolume of transactions. After the end of'2000, the ASEretumed 
1The first part of the experimental design pertinent to the identification of commonality presented here has been adopted from Huberman & Halka 
(2001) 
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to modest levels of activity. Actually during the last year in our sample 
(2003), trading activity in the ASE was even lower than 1998 signifying 
the end of an unprecedented three-year rally since the establishment of the 
ASE. The choice of dataset allows us to test if commonality is present 
under different levels oftrading activity and investor psychology. During 
1999 and 2000, every single stock's price rose reflecting unprecedented 
investor confidence regarding the future prospects of the stocks they were 
investing. However this feeling of confidence did not last for long and 
the market went into a falling trajectory at the beginning of 2001. The 
actual figures are given in TABLE4.1. The relevant variables are total 
value of transactions, volume of transactions and number of trades. The 
data obtained from DA TASTREAM includes the following variables: 
closing price and closing trading volume for each stock. These variables 
were further processed to obtain other variables such as: returns, returns 
volatility using GARCH(l, 1) and expected and unexpected trading 
volume employing the Box-Jenkins methodology. We use only one 
(il)liquidity proxy due to data unavailability which is calculated as 
absolute stock return/euro trading volume. The very same variable was 
used by Amihud (2002) in order to assess the cross section relationship 
between illiquidity and returns. This variable was selected because it 
captures the very essence of (il)liquidity and it is the only variable that can 
be calculated given bid and ask price unavailability on behalf of 
OAT ASTREAM and the AS E. 
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Liquidity is a very elusive concept and unfortunately has a number of 
aspects that cannot be captured in a simple measure. However all 
academics and practitioners agree that (il)liquidity reflects the impact of 
order flow/trading volume on price. In other words the market maker 
will sell at a higher price than he will buy because of adverse selection 
and inventory costs. Market makers cannot distinguish between informed 
and liquidity/noise traders therefore any imbalance in the observed order 
flow will be considered to incorporate asymmetric information and will 
bring about price changes. Kyle (1985) shows that market makers set 
prices, which is an increasing function of the order flow observed in the 
market. 
Academics and market microstructure researchers have used a number of 
illiquidity measures depending on data availability. Chalmers and Kaldec 
(1998) used amortised affective spread, which is estimated as effective 
spread divided by the stock's holding period. Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) measure stock illiquidity as the price response to 
signed order flow and by the fixed cost of trading. As you can see those 
measures of illiquidity require a lot of market microstructure data, which 
unfortunately are not available for many advanced markets around the 
world let alone the Greek market. Therefore as it was stated at the very 
beginning we will have to revert to simpler illiquidity measures, which 
however do capture the effect of trading/order flow on prices which 
constitutes the main definition of (il)liqtiidity. 
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Amihud (2002) employs daily absolute return to dollar trading volume as 
an (il)liquidity measure in his study and postulates that this particular 
(il)liquidity measure follows Kyle's (1985) concept of illiquidity which is 
defined as the response of price to order flow and Silber's (1975) measure 
of thinness which is defined as the ratio of absolute price change to 
absolute excess demand for trading. Amihud (2002) also argues that the 
(il)liquidity measure under consideration can also be interpreted as the 
level of consensus between investors/traders regarding the nature of 
incoming information. If investors/traders agree about the content of 
incoming information prices will change without much trading occurring 
however if investors/traders disagree about the content of incoming 
information then there will be some trading before consensus is reached. 
Amihud (2002) also empirically tests the extent to which the proposed 
variable captures (il)lliquidity by regressing the variable under 
consideration against Kyle's 'A (price impact measure) and 'V (fixed cost 
component related to the bid-ask spread) and finds that the ratio of 
absolute price change to dollar trading volume is significantly positively 
correlated to the two illiquidity regressors mentioned above. 
TABLE4.1 
TOTAL VALUE OF TRANSACTIONS AND NUMBER OF TRADES 
Year Total value of transactions Total number of trades 
1998 41,331,148,094 7,480,176 
1999 172,865,880,833 24,051,742 
2000 101,423,125,768 22,134,712 
2001 42,345,164,60 I 12,147,407 
2002 24,771,040;059 9,130,476 
2003 34,887,159,150 11,401,653 
- ....... , 
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4.5 .METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
In order to examine if commonality is present in the Greek market as well 
we need to i) describe the splitting technique ii) determine the optimal lag 
structure for each group of stocks (remember that in the experimental 
design we assume an AR(l) process just for convenience), iii) decide on 
the idiosyncratic variables and iv) test if the residuals obtained for 
mutually exclusive groups of stocks are significantly positively 
correlated2• 
Now in order to find the extent to which commonality is priced we need to 
i) extract the common factor between mutually exclusive groups of stocks 
employing principal axis factoring/singular value· decomposition and ii) 
regress the common factor (commonality) on excess returns for that 
group. 
For the third empirical question we need to examme if commonality 
remains present for all the years under consideration while for the fourth 
empirical question we need to examine if residuals correlations are 
significant for the highest market capitalization groups and not the lower 
market capitalization groups. 
J The significance of the correlation coefficients is evaluated by the t statistic given in parenthesis. If the true p=O, the sampling distribution ofr is 
symmetric: 
r-N(O,o,= ~(1- r 2 ) I -Jcn- 2) ) 
and we can apply the Student's t test for establishing the signifi~&fl~_~r ~Of!~_s!gnifi_conce of. the sample estimiite r. · Ttie value Of the t statistic is 
esti_mat~ ~~ ~e sa~ple -~~lation coefficient r. by the·e'XpiessiOU-' · ··- ·-· 
. ,.o. ·.· .. -,- - .. t*=rta,=r.Jn-2/~ 
and is compared with the theoretical value ofto.ou (for a two tailed test at the 5% level of significance) with n-2 degrees of freedom. The critica1 
value at 5% is equal to 1.960. 
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4.5 .1.SAMPLE SPLITTING TECHNIQUE 
Initially we obtain absolute return over euro trading volume 
( I return I /trading volume) for each stock in our sample and then we split 
the original sample into three size-based groups namely: MK1, MK2 and 
MK33. We further split the three size-based groups consisting of76 up to 
102 stocks4 each into smaller subgroups (A & B). At this point we ensure 
that random splitting occurs so that group A (GA) does not end up with 
the lowest market capitalization stocks in its category and group B (GB) 
with the highest market capitalization stocks. Then all type A subgroups 
are placed in a single portfolio and all type B subgroups in another 
portfolio, forming two randomly constructed, equally weighted 
portfolios. 5 Finally we obtain average values for all subgroups and the 
two portfolios. All testing to follow uses those portfolios and subgroups 
as the basis for drawing conclusions 
4.5.2.0PTIMAL LAG STRUCTURE DETERMINATION AND 
PRELIMINARY RESIDUAL CORRELATIONS 
In this part we will define the optimal lag structure for I return I /trading 
volume by running the following regressions: 
I return I /trading volume it=C+ I return I /trading volume it-
t+l return I !trading volume it-2+ I return I !trading volume it-v+ ... +eit c 4.1) 
3 MK stands for market capitalization. MK I consists of the lowest MK stocks in the sample. 
4 The sample size varies according to the year under consideration. The data available increases as we approach the current date 
'In that way portfolio I is made up of: PIMKIGA, PIMK2GA and PIMKJGA while portfolio 2 is made up of: P2MKIGB, P2MK2GB and 
P2MKJGB. 
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for a different number of lags each time. We run those regressions for all 
portfolios and all subgroups and decide on the optimal lag structure based 
on both the Box-Jenkins methodology and the Akaike and Schwarz 
information criteria. T ABLE4.2 summarizes the results obtained for each 
of the six periods at subgroup level and whole sample level. In most 
cases within each year, portfolios and subgroups follow similar 
autoregressive structures however autoregressive structures vary 
considerably for portfolios and subgroups over the years. 
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TABLE4.2 
OPTIMAL LAG STRUCTURE DETERMINATION 
WHOLE SAMPLE MKI MK2 MK3 
PORTFOLIO I PORTFOLI02 GROUP A GROUP A GROUP A GROUP A GROUP A GROUP A 
98 AR(3) AR(4) AR(3) AR(4) AR(5) AR(4) AR(3) AR(3) 
99 AR(8) AR(7) AR(6) AR(7) N/S AR(5) AR(6) AR(5) 
00 AR(4) AR(3) AR(9) AR(9) AR(5) AR(3) AR(4) AR(4) 
01 AR(5) AR(8) AR(4) AR(6) AR(4) AR(5) AR(4) AR(4) 
02 AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(4) AR(4) N/S AR(2) AR(5) 
03 AR(5) AR(3) AR(5) AR(3) AR(5) AR(3) N/S AR(5) 
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4.6.EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The statistical analysis aims at i) detecting the presence of a common 
component ii) extracting a common factor from the two sub-groups within 
each market capitalisation group or the two portfolios that comprise the whole 
sample and regress it on returns for those groups or the whole sample 
respectively over the periods examined and iii) observing the extent to which 
commonality is priced under different trading regimes. The sections that 
follow present results for each of those objectives. 
4.6.1 MODELLING LIQUIDITY: PRELIMINARY CORRELATION 
TESTS 
In order to detect the presence of a common factor, we need to model 
(il)liquidity and obtain innovations. TABLE4.3 (PANELS A,B,C,D,E & F) 
presents autoregressive estimates for I return I /trading volume for all 
portfolios and subgroups for each year separately. R2 ADJ for most portfolios 
and sub-groups appears to be quite high however for some sub-groups 
modelling was not possible because the data was not stationary. Having run 
those regressions, the next step is to obtain residuals and test the extent to 
which they are correlated. Results are shown in TABLE4.4 and TABLE4.5. 
The null hypothesis states that correlations between portfolios and subgroups 
should have an arbitrary sign a!ld be insignificaQt. TABLE~A shows that 
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correlations between portfolios are particularly strong for 200 I only. For the 
rest of the years under examination correlations between portfolios are 
insignificant. TABLE4.5 shows that correlations between subgroups are 
significant for 2000 and 200 I only. Another point that it is worth 
mentioning is that correlations between subgroups for 200 I become stronger 
between higher market capitalization groups. Correlations between 
subgroups and portfolios are zero for I998, I999, 2002 and 2003. 
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TABLE 4.3 
AUTOREGRESSIVE ESTIMATES FOR I return I /trading volume (p value in parentheses) 
PANEL A: GREEK MARKET ( 1998) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION I CAPIT ALI SA TION 2 CAPIT ALI SA TION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(I) 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.08( 0.26 0.09 0.23 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.07) 0.04) {0.00) (0.09) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.46 0.16 
(0.00) (0.65) (0.00) (0.65) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) 0.04) 
AR(3) 0.23 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.11 
(0.00) (_0.70) (0.00) (0.74) (0.39) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04) 
AR(4) 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.12 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.65) (0.03) 
AR(5) 0.27 
(0.01) 
Rz 0.:33 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.48 0.14 
ADJ 
PANEL B GREEK MARKET ( 1299) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAP IT ALI SA TION CAPITALISATION CAPITALISATION 
I 2 3 
PORTF1 PORTF2 GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP GROUP 
A B A B A B 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.07) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09) (0.02) (0.00). (0.00) 
AR(I) 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.29 
(0.33) (0.76) (0.34) (0.58) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 
(0.15) (0.04) (0.35) (0.05) (0.30) (0.03) (0.02) 
AR(3) -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.06 
(0.87) (0.77) (0.79) (0.16) (0.46) (0.49) (0.41) 
AR(4) 0.16 0.08 0.13 -0.00 0.13 -0.04 0.07 
(0.21) (0.40) (0.33) (0.90) (0.25) (0.68) (0.41) 
AR(5) 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.15 0.10 0.18 
(0.75) (0.56) (0.63) (0.03) (0.23) (0.24) (0.12) 
AR(6) 0.31 0.06 0.26 0.03 0.22 
(0.05) (0.38) (0.07) (0.26) (0.03) 
AR(7) 0.06 0.28 0.39 
(0.39) (0.14) (0.12) 
AR(8) -0.23 
(0.03) 
R" ADJ 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.11 0.24 0.32 
>-
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PANEL C GREEK MARKET (2000) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION I CAP IT ALI SA TION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)_ {_0.00) (0.00) 
AR(I) 0.02 0.17 O.Of O.G7 0.20 0.17 0.24 0.23 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.00 0.14 -0.00 0.03 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.12 
(0.45) (0.00) (0.97) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0 I) 
AR(3) 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.30 0.15 0.04 
(0.55) (0.00) (0.75) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.03) (0.52) 
AR(4) 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.22 
(0.03) (0.18) (0.51) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) 
AR(5) 0.00 0.11 0.17 
_(0.93) (0.43) (0.01) 
AR(6) 0.00 0.01 
(0.51) (0.81) 
AR(7) -0.00 0.01 
(0.26) (0.76) 
AR(8) -0.00 0.33 
(0.63) (0.63) 
AR(9) 0.01 0.28 
(0.04) (0.00) 
R" 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.22 0.44 0.27 0.35 0.19 
ADJ 
PANEL D GREEK MARKET (200 I) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION I CAPITALISATION 2 CAP IT ALI SA TION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) _{0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(I) 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.17 0.20 
(0.11) (0.24) (0.17) (0.25) (0.12) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.13 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.09 0.02 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.22) (0.16) (0.00) (0.18) (0.70) 
AR(3) 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.06 
(0.25) (0.78) (0.26) (0.93) (0.04) (0.15) (0.08) (0.28) 
AR(4) 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.11 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.04) (0.22) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) 
AR(5) 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.15 
(0.03) (0.94) (0.71) (0.03) 
AR(6) 0.19 0.23 
(0.21) (0.06) 
AR(7) 0.10 
(0.26) 
AR(8) -0.12 
(0.08) 
R" 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.21 0.17 O.Q7 
ADJ 
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PANEL E GREEK MARKET (2002) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAP IT ALI SA TION I CAP IT ALISA TION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(I) 0.04 O.o3 0.04 O.o2 0.02 0.10 -0.02 
(0.22) (0.55) (0.24) (0.57) (0.03) (0.14) (0.65) 
AR(2) 0.37 0.05 0.47 0.04 O.oi 0.11 0.00 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.25) (0.10) (0.94) 
AR(3) O.oi 0.14 0.03 
(0.47) (0.35) (0.22) 
AR(4) 0.04 0.02 -0.00 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.68) 
AR(5) 0.06 
(0.02) 
Rz 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 
ADJ 
PANEL F GREEK MARKET (2003) 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION I CAPITALISATION2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(I) 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.34 
(0.14) (0.01) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.28 0.17 0.17 
(0.51) (0.00) (0.85) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
AR(3) 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.05 0.04 0.02 
(0.21) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.42) (0.07) (0.77) 
AR(4) -0.00 -0.02 0.10 0.07 
(0.79) (0.30) (0.20) (0.38) 
AR(5) 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.22 
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) 
Rz 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.26 0.43 0.05 0.52 
ADJ 
TABLE4.4 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN PORTFOLIOS EXCLUDING 
SPREAD-DETERMINING VARIABLES 
Portfolio2 
I return I /trading 
volume 
1998 0.12 
1999 ........ 0.06 0 
2000 ...... 0.05 
-c.8 2001 t: 0.16 
2002 0 0.00 ,::l... 
2003 0.13 
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TABLE4.5 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN SUBGROUPS EXCLUDING LIQUIDITY-DETERMINING 
VARIABLES 
PRELIMINARY CORRELATIONS: GREEK MARKET 
MKIGA MKIGB MK2GA MK2GB MK3GA MK3GB 
MKIGA I 0.10 -0.04 0.09 0.03 0.09 
I 0.04 N/A 0.02 0.04 0.06 
I 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.01 
I -0.01 0.36 0.38 0.21 0.20 
I 0.00 ·o.oo N/A 0.00 -0.02 
I 0.14 0.00 O.Q2 N/A 0.12 
MKIGB I 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.04 
I N/A 0.20 0.01 0.20 
I 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.28 
I -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 
I 0.00 N/A 0.09 0.01 
I 0.23 0.09 N/A 0.25 
MK2GA I 0.06 0.06 -0.04 
I N/A N/A N/A 
I 0.61 0.54 0.49 
I 0.46 0.46 0.37 
I N/A 0.08 0.03 
I 0.22 N/A 0.48 
MK2GB I 0.16 0.22 
I "0.07 0.08 
I 0.55 0.44 
I 0.51 0.46 
I N/A N/A 
I N/A -0.08 
MK3GA I 0.25 
I 0.44 
I 0.46 
I 0.34 
I 0.09 
I N/A 
MK3GB I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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4.6.2.MODELLING LIQUIDITY: FINAL CORRELATION TESTS 
In order to detect the presence of a common component we need to model 
the time series properties of the average (il)liquidity proxies controlling 
for serial correlation and incorporating well-known (il)liquidity 
determining variables. For this reason regressions of the following type 
are estimated: 
I return I /trading volume 11=C+ I return I /trading volume 11-
1+ I return I /trading volume 't-2+ I return I /trading volume 't-
3+ I return I /trading volume 11-4+ I return I /trading volume 't-
v+NEGA TIVERETURNS11+POSITIVERETURNS\+ VOLA TILITY11+EX 
PECTEDVOLUME11+ UNEXPECTEDVOLUME11+ TERM 
PREMIUM1t+et (4.2) 
· Where I return I /trading volume\ represents absolute returns over euro 
trading volume, POSITIVE RETURNS represent daily return on the 
portfolio or group when that return is positive and zero otherwise, 
NEGATIVE RETURNS represent daily return on the portfolio or group 
when that return is negative or zero and zero otherwise, volatility is 
modelled as GARCH(l,l), expected trading volume is obtained by 
subtracting unexpected volume from actual volume, unexpected trading 
volume is obtained by modelling actual trading volume and obtaining 
innovations and interest rate term structure is estimated as the change in 
the spread between the ten-year government bond yield and the three 
month treasury bill yield. Results are presented in TABLE4.6 (PANELS 
A,B,C,D and E) for each year with exception 2002 for which correlations 
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between portfolios and sub-groups are insignificant. At this point it is 
also worth reminding readers that correlations between portfolios for all 
years are insignificant with exception 2001. In addition correlations for a 
number of subgroups for different years are also insignificant, therefore 
there is no point for running any regressions. Results presented in 
T ABLE4.6 show that higher order lags remain significant for most of the 
years under consideration while results in the previous chapters indicated 
that only the first two lags remained significant after the introduction of 
other well known (il)liquidity determining variables. The sign of 
negative returns is positive which means that negative returns increase 
illiquidity. The positive returns variable bears a negative sign, which 
means that illiquidity is reduced if a stock performs well. Returns 
volatility appears to have a positive effect on illiquidity. This finding is 
consistent with Huberman & Halka (200 1) but inconsistent with Tinic 
(1972) who finds that the standard deviation of returns in insignificant. 
Expected and unexpected volume variables appear to play some role in 
explaining illiquidity especially unexpected trading volume that always 
bears a positive sign if it significant even though in absolute terms the 
value obtained is very small. Some would anticipate unexpected trading 
volume to play a very important role in explaining illiquidity since this 
variable is supposed to capture asymmetric information effects. Expected 
trading volume bears a negative sign when it is significant. Of course 
trading volume would play a more significant role if depth variables were 
examined. Fin~lly term structure does not appear to have a significant 
explanatory power bearing mixed signs. The term structure of interest 
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rates in not included in regressions for 1998 because of lack of data. 
Residuals correlations for portfolios and subgroups are presented in 
TABLE4.7 and TABLE4.8. TABLE4.7 shows that the correlation 
between portfolios for 2001 is insignificant after inclusion of (il)liquidity 
determining variables. Correlations for the remaining years (although 
insignificant) are taken from T ABLE4.4 and are marked with (P). 
Correlations between subgroups for 2000 and 2001 remain significant 
even after the inclusion of (il)liquidity determining variables. 
Correlations for the remaining years (although insignificant) are taken 
from TABLE4.5 and are marked with (P). In other words commonality 
in liquidity in the Greek market comes in waves and is present during 
2000-2001. 
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TABLE 4.6 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR I return I /trading volume INCORPORATING LIQUIDITY DETERMINING VARIABLES (p values in brackets) 
PANEL A: GREEK FINAL 98 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION 1 CAPITALISATION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTF1 PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0 .. 00) 
AR(1) 0.31 0.09 0.24 0.11 0.21 
(0.00) (0.25) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.16 -0.01 0.18 0.38 0.17 
(0.20) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
AR(3) 0.22 -0.02 0.08 0.17 0.09 
(0.00) (0.65) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) 
AR(4) 0.22 0.11 
(0.06) (0.08) 
R(+) -0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.05) (0.59) (0.57) (0.38) (0.23) 
R(-) -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
(0.57) (0.67) (0.21) (0.01) (0.42) 
VOL -0.44 -2.70 -0.08 0.03 -0.00 
(0.91) (0.45) (0.23) (0.00) (0.53) 
EXP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.29) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.28) 
UNX 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.07) (0.52) (0.18) (0.38) (0.36) 
TERM 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.351 (0.22)_ (0.18) (0.22) (0.33) 
R" ADJ 0.35 0.09 0.22 0.38 0.15 
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PANEL B: GREEK FINAL 99 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION I CAPITALISATION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.72) (0.32) (0.45) 
AR(1) -0.09 0.35 0.29 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.29 0.21 0.08 
(0.00) (0.07) (0.34) 
AR(3) 0.14 0.01 -0.13 
(0.00) (0.92) (0.05) 
AR(4) -0.12 -0.00 0.15 
(0.00) (0.97) (0.17) 
AR(5) 
' 
-0.17 0.10 0.25 
(0.07) (0.35) (0.07) 
AR(6) 0.09 0.13 
(0.02) (0.19) 
AR(7) 0.50 
(0.07) 
R(+) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.85) (0.06) (0.00) 
R(-) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.28) (0.64) (0.00) 
VOL 0.16 -0.00 -0.00 ' 
(0.27) (0.39) (0.13) 
EXP 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.34) (0.50) (0.30) 
UNX 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.71) (0.01) (0.12) 
TERM -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.53) (0.80) (0.59) 
R'ADJ 0.63 0.26 0.39 
- --
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PANEL C: GREEK FINAL 00 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
i 
CAPITALISATION I CAPITALISATION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 I 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB I 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(l) -0.00 0.23 0.19 0.27 0.29 
(0.94) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) -0.00 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.07 
(0.96) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) 
AR(3) 0.21 0.10 0.27 0.14 0.01 
(0.01) (0.25) (0.00) (0.08) (0.87) I 
AR(4) O.ot 0.08 0.08 0.21 
(0.86) (0.18) (0.28) (0.04) 
AR(5) 0.05 0.16 
(0.65) . (0.03) 
AR(6) -0.04 
(0.44) 
AR(7) -0.02 
(0.65) 
AR(8) -0.00 
(0.96) 
AR(9) 0.26 
(0.02) 
R(+) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.79) (0.76) (0.77) (0.42) (0.06) 
R(-) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.44) (0.77) (0.86) (0.47) (0.20) 
VOL -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
(0.23) (0.1 0) (0.07) (0.01) (0.72) 
EXP -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.93) (0.56) (0.69) (0.18) 
UNX -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.35) (0.51) (0.00) (0.23) (0.63) 
TERM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.59) (0.07) (0.19) (0.44) 
R2 ADJ 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.38 0.23 
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PANEL D: GREEK FINAL 01 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION 1 CAPITALISATION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTF1 PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
AR(1) 0.10 0.19 0.03 0.28 0.13 0.14 0.19 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.42) (0.00) (0.13) (0.05) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.03 
(0.00) (0.40) (0.23) (0.51) (0.03) (0.13) (0.46) 
AR(3) 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.02 
(0.28) (0.47) (0.58) (0.07) (0.18) (0.10) (0.69) 
AR(4) 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.08 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.30) 
AR(5) 0.06 -0.04 0.09 
(0.13) (0.69) (0.16) 
AR(6) 0.22 
(0.13) 
AR(7) 0.07 
(0.44) 
AR(8) -0.12 
(0.09) 
R(+) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 I 
(0.03) (0.86) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R(-) 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.26) (0.38) (0.12) (0.03) (0.10) (0.20) (0.27) 
VOL 0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.05 
(0.64) (0.37) (0.03) (0.66) (0.68) (0.23) (0.00) 
EXP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.11 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.03) (0.54) (0.00) (0.76) (0.05) (0.24) (0.00) 
UNX 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 I 
(0.33) (0.15) (0.97) (0.47) (0.15)_ (0.00) (0.03) 
TERM 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.30) (0.99) (0.24) (0.27) (0.05) (0.20) (0.85) 
R" ADJ 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.12 
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PANEL E: GREEK FINAL 03 
WHOLE SAMPLE MARKET MARKET MARKET 
CAPITALISATION I CAPITALISATION 2 CAPITALISATION 3 
PORTFI PORTF2 GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB GROUP A GROUPB 
c -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(l) 0.03 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.35 
(0.43) (0.02) (0.06) (0.31) (0.00) 
AR(2) 0.00 -0.03 0.21 0.12 0.16 
(0.48) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) 
AR(3) 0.11 0.19 0.04 -0.00 0.00 
(0.40) (0.04) (0.50) (0.79) (0.96) 
AR(4) -0.01 0.04 0.01 
(0.51) (0.60) (0.87) 
AR(5) 0.10 0.09 0.17 
(0.00) (0.48) (0.01) 
R(+) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.24) (0.06) (0.08) (0.77) (0.83) 
R(-) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
(0.01) (0.42) (0.00) (0.38) (0.16) 
VOL 0.78 0.51 0.25 -0.89 0.13 
(0.41) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.04) 
EXP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.81) (0.07) (0.00) (0.16) (0.76) 
UNX 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.15) (0.15) (0.01) 
TERM 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R2 ADJ 0.07 0.32 0.48 0.11 0.52 
- ------
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TABLE4.7 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN PORTFOLIOS INCLUDING 
SPREAD DETERMINING VARIABLES 
Portfolio2 
I return I /trading 
volume , 
1998 0.12(P) 
1999 
-
0.06(P) 0 
2000 <8 0.05(P) 2001 t:: 0.13 
2002 
0 p... O.OO(P) 
2003 0.13(P) 
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TABLE4.8 
RESIDUALS CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN SUBGROUPS INCLUDING LIQUIDITY-DETERMINING VARIABLES 
FINAL CORRELATIONS GREEK MARKET 
MKIGA MKIGB MK2GA MK2GB MK3GA MK3GB 
MKIGA I O.IO(P) -0.04(P) 0.09(P) 0.03(P) 0.09(P) 
I 0.04(P) NIA 0.02(P) 0.04(P) 0.06(P) 
I 0.04(P) -O.OI(P) 0.04(P) 0.05(P) -O.OI(P) 
I -O.OI(P) 0.28 0.34 0.15 0.18 
I O.OO(P) O.OO(P) NIA O.OO(P) -0.02(P) 
I 0.11 O.OO(P) 0.02(P) N/A 0.12(P) 
MKIGB I O.OO(P) 0.06(P) 0.02(P) 0.04(P) 
I N/A 0.20 O.OI(P) -0.13 
I -0.10 0.35 0.13 0.28 
I -O.OI(P) 0.03(P) -0.02(P) O.OI(P) 
I O.OO(P) N/A(P) 0.09(P) O.OI(P) 
I 0.19 0.09(P) NIA 0.21 
MK2GA I 0.06(P) 0.06(P) -0.04(P) 
I N/A N/A NIA 
I -0.03 0.07 0.00 
I 0.44 0.43 0.34 
I N/A 0.08(P) 0.03(P) 
I 0.20 N/A 0.46 
MK2GB I 0.16 0.22 
I -0.07(P) 0.08(P) 
I 0.27 0.44 
I 0.46 0.46 
I NIA N/A 
I N/A -0.08 
MK3GA I 0.25 
I 0.38 
I 0.22 
I 0.34 
I 0 09(P) 
I N/A 
MK3GB I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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4.6.3.EXTRACTION OF COMMON FACTORS AND PRICING OF 
COMMONALITY 
Having established the presence of commonality in liquidity for a number of 
sub-groups over different periods, the next step is to extract that factor. 
Extraction takes place at market capitalisation groups level only since 
correlations between portfolios are not significant. The decision on how 
many factors to include was based on the Kaiser criterion6. The variance 
captured each time by the common factor is presented in TABLE4.9 along 
with the relevant eigenvalues. The lowest variance explained is 19.9% for 
1998 between subgroups MKlGA and MKlGB and the highest 27.18% 
between subgroups MK2GA and MK2GB for 200 1. In most cases there is 
no commonality and this is indicated by a dashed line At this point I must 
stress once again that common factors are extracted from residuals obtained 
from the final regressions after having considered all known variables, which 
can have an effect on (il)liquidity. The commonality observed between 
stocks with different characteristics is very unusual even though it is not as 
high as it was shown for other markets and unaccounted by market 
microstructure theory however it provides us with an excellent opportunity to 
test th~ effect of commonality on asset pricing for different periods. The 
form of the regression employed is presented right below: 
EXCESS RETURNSt=CFt+CFt-I+CFt_z+CFt-3+CFt-4+ et (4.2) 
'only common fadort with elgen-valuet higher than 1.00 1bould be retained for analysb 
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where CF stands for common factor. Four lags are used so as to capture the 
activity of a whole week. Regression results of returns against common 
factors are presented in TABLE4.IO. Goodness of fit (R2) ranges from O.OI 
to 0.07, which shows that common factors explain a very small percentage of 
asset prices. At this point I must stress once again that the explanatory 
variables (common factors) are devoid of any spread determining effects and 
R2 should have been absolutely zero if commonality is supposed to play no 
role is asset pricing. Generally speaking commonality appears to come in 
waves and it appears to be more pronounced between 2000-200 I. The 
degree to which it is priced for those years is left for the individual to decide. 
4. 7 .CONCLUSION 
Research on the Greek market for common underlying factors shows that 
commonality is considerably reduced when considering the level of 
commonality observed in other markets. Commonality appears to be 
stronger in certain years and less intense in others. In particular common 
underlying factors and their effect on pricing appear to be considerably 
stronger for 2000 and 200 I considering the explanatory power of the 
common underlying factor on excess returns. 
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TABLE4.9 
PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY PRINCIPAL FACTOR AND EIGEN VALUES FOR 
ILLIQUIDITY 
MK1GB MK2GB MK3GB 
%OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN %OF EIGEN 
VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES VARIANCE VALUES 
EXPLAINED EXPLAINED EXPLAINED 
MK1GA 19.9 1.01 
................ 
-------
.................. 
-------
--------
.. ............ 
................ .............. 
20.04 1.01 
MK2GA ................. ............... 
---------
.............. 
24.01 1.05 
27.18 1.14 
................ .. ............ 
22.01 1.07 
MK3GA ................ -------
20.08 1.03 
23.15 1.23 
26.05 1.11 
-------
.............. 
-------- -------
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TABLE 4.10 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF COMMON COMPONENT ON EXCESS RETURNS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE AND MARKET CAPITALISATION SUBGROUPS (p values 
· in parentheses) 
EXC.RET98 EXC.RE99 EXC.RETOO EXC.RET01 EXC.RET03 
MK1 MK3 MK3 MK2 MK3 MK2 MK3 MK1 MK2 
CONS 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.1 0) (0.34) (0.78) (0.88) (0.25) (0.11) 
T -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
~ (0.20) (0.68) (0.54) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
0 T-1 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 f-o 
u (0.33) (0.18) (0.35) (0.01) (0.05) (0.81) (0.91) (0.48) (0.43) ~ 
"'"' 
T-2 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
~ (0.62) (0.60) (0.89) (0.82) (0.98) (0.94) (0.85) (0.59) (0.72) 
~ T-3 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 ~ (0.87) (0.14) (0.17) (0.36) (0.51) (0.76) (0.08) (0.43) (0.81) 0 
u T-4 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.90) (0.48) (0.60) (0.57) (0.08) (0.50) (0.89) (0.56) (0.06) 
Rz O.QI 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 
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CHAPTER 5: TRADING MECHANISMS AND VALUE EFFECTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE LONDON AND ATHENS STOCK 
EXCHANGES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In today's increasingly competitive environment for stock exchanges there 
is a great payoff to those exchanges that manage to improve their 
performance by reducing execution costs and providing improved services 
for both institutions and retail clients. 
In the last few years, there has been observed a race between stock 
exchange markets all around the world to modernize their trading 
processes. This came as a response to growing competition among stock 
exchange markets to attract more and more customers and of course the 
need to introduce modem technology in trading. Modernization usually 
assumes the form of full computerization of the trading process and at the 
same time poses a question as to what form of trading mechanism should 
be used. Three basic models of trading mechanisms are applied in 
today' s exchanges, continuous quote driven systems where dealers post 
bid quotes and ask quotes before order submission, order driven systems 
where traders submit orders before prices are determined and single call 
auctions where orders are hatched and executed at discrete points in time. 
T~is" stugy will concentrate on comparing the Vallie effed:s achieved with 
respect to informational efficiency and spread sensitivity to volatility by i) 
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changing from one primary trading mechanism to the other, employing 
different closing price formations algorithms each time with reference to 
FTSE100 and FTSE250 and ii) by computerising the trading process with 
reference to the Athens Stock Exchange 
The number of changes that have occurred around the world do not 
indicate that a consensus has been reached as to which trading mechanism 
is the best or at least the most popular. Actually the issue of the best 
trading mechanism with respect to informational efficiency and spread 
sensitivity to volatility is far form being resolved. On the one hand the 
London Stock Exchange replaced SEAQ (dealer market) with SETS 
(order-driven) for FTSE100 stocks and SEAQ (dealer market) with 
SETSmm (hybrid) for FTSE250 stocks. NASDAQ has introduced public 
limit orders competing with market makers' quotes following allegations 
of market markers' collusion to maintain high bid-ask spreads (Christie & 
Schultz, 1994; Christie et al, 1994 ). Obviously those three examples 
indicate a change from quote driven markets (dealerships) to pure order 
driven markets or hybrids. On the other hand in France (NSC) and 
Germany (XETRA), market makers were introduced to provide additional 
liquidity to already electronic continuous auction markets indicating a 
change from order driven systems to hybrids. In addition continuous 
trading for less liquid stocks in the French CAC system and in German 
XETRA was replaced with call auctions. At the same time stocks listed 
on the 'French Nouveau Ma.tche were transferred fotm a call market t(nili 
electronic continuous auction system. The last two incidents indicate 
171 
movements m completely different directions (Theissen, 2000). 
Obviously a consensus as to which is the best trading mechanism or which 
of the available trading mechanisms matches stocks with specific 
characteristics is far from clear. Call auctions are usually employed at the 
beginning or the end of the trading process to provide more efficient 
opening/closing prices since they allow order flow consolidation however 
call auctions are randomly used for the whole trading process since they 
restrict information flow and trading frequency. Most stock exchanges 
that used single call auctions as their main trading system have now 
changed to continuous trading achieving tremendous gains in terms of 
liquidity and informational efficiency, (Amihud, Mendelson & 
Lauterbach, 1997). 
All those examples of stock exchange markets changing their trading 
systems suggest that more empirical research may be needed into 
identifying the value effects gained from changing from one trading 
mechanism to the other. The existing empirical literature has 
concentrated on comparing the liquidity of continuous auction and dealer 
markets (Huang & Stoll, 1996; Christie & Huang, 1994; Pagano & Roell, 
1990), to the value gained by changing from single call auctions to 
continuous trading (Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach, 1997); the effects 
of computerization of the trading process (Naidu & Rozeff, 1994) or on 
market microstructure and returns volatility (Amihud, Mendelson & 
Mhrgia~--I99o; A1nifiua & :Menaelsoh, 199'1; Gerety & M:u11hefin, f994; 
Ko & Chung, 1995). In this study we wish to examine the degree to 
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which informational efficiency changes as a result of i) computerisation of 
the trading process with reference to the Greek market, ii) changes in 
trading regime/closing price formation algorithms employed each time 
with reference to FTSEJ 00 & FTSE250 and iii) spread sensitivity to 
volatility under different trading regimes with reference to the UK market. 
We believe that there is a very good reason to focus on informational 
efficiency and spread sensitivity to volatility under different trading 
regimes because these characteristics of stock trading are linked to the 
expected rate of return on a traded financial asset. 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) had always been a pure dealership 
(quote driven market) but in October 1997 the LSE introduced an order 
driven system for FTSE100 stocks. This decision was made i) as a 
response to fear of losing market share to other European exchange 
houses and electronic networks such as Tradepoint, ii) recent UK 
regulation allowing market makers to quote better prices on electronic 
networks than those that they were quoting on the LSE and iii) EU 
regulation allowing European markets to enrol remote members in other 
EU countries without securing permission from the regulatory authorities 
in that country. In addition research (Christie & Schultz, 1994; Christie 
et al, 1994) indicating that NASDAQ market makers were colluding to 
maintain artificially higher spreads necessitated a change from quote 
driven to order driven since the LSE was a pure dealership market itself. 
Changes in FTSE250 were introduced il1 3/11/2003. The trading system 
changed from pure dealership (SEAQ) to a hybrid system (SETSmm), 
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which combines the benefits of SETS with LSE market making. Those 
changes were introduced as a result of i) growth in alternative trading 
systems covering FTSE250 and the immediate threat of shifting liquidity 
away from the central market, ii) soundings from market participants that 
SEAQ (the system that FTSE250 was trading) could eventually become 
fragmented, iii) new regulation that requires to display customer limit 
orders to the wider market, iv) requests from technical traders to be able to 
access prices on screens so as to respond to intraday price movements and 
increase liquidity. 
Changes in the Greek stock exchange market were introduced back in 
17/08/92. Those changes were necessitated because of the increased need 
to modernise the market. Even though the changes introduced had a 
major impact in the trading process, those changes did not change the 
nature of trading. The Athens stock exchange market remained an order 
driven market. The only difference in the new trading system is that 
orders are submitted electronically. The trading method changed from 
'public outcry' to ASIS (automatic system of electronic trading). 
Dealer markets appear to exhibit higher execution costs as compared to 
order driven markets (Huang & Stoll, 1996; Christie & Huang, 1994; 
Pagano & Roell, 1990) even though there is no unanimity on this issue. 
In particular Affleck-Graves, Hedge & Miller (1994) find that quoted 
spreads are the same for a m~tched sample of NASDAQ and NYSE/ ASE 
stocks in 1985. In addition Kothare & Laux (1995) report a dramatic 
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increase in quoted spread for NASDAQ between Oct 1984-1992 while 
Huang and Stoll (1994) report a decline in execution costs for NYSE 
between 1989-1991, an indication that spreads can change rapidly over 
time. Another important issue relating to market architecture is the 
degree of informational efficiency achieved by computerising the trading 
process, changing from quote driven to order driven or a combination of 
both (hybrid) and the issue of spread sensitivity to volatility under 
different trading regimes, which has not been examined at all. 
Informational efficiency and price discovery are quite important since 
they relate to the expected return of a stock. We believe that it is crucial 
to shed some light on those issues with reference to one of the most 
important exchange markets in the world (LSE) as well as developing 
markets (Greek market). 
One would expect several changes to occur once a market changes from 
quote driven to order driven. From the individual investor's point of 
view access to trading is much easier which may increase the frequency 
and the actual numbers of investors trading. , Now orders enter the 
computer straight away and they are matched instantly provided of course 
that there are orders with similar characteristics pending. It is obvious 
that the bargaining power of individual investors is increased given their 
ability to place limit orders achieving better deals. By placing limit 
orders individual investors avoid the cost of immediacy i.e. the spread. 
From the market makt?r' s pqjnt of view handling costs' are lower becau~e 
of automated order execution and bid-ask quote manipulation to maintain 
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optimal inventory is no longer necessary since they are no longer obliged 
to act as liquidity providers. Of course changes in market microstructure 
(from quote driven to order driven) can have disadvantages as well. The 
limit order 'book can make every single investor more vulnerable to 
asymmetric information and thus reduce the incentive to trade, which may 
lead to reductions in liquidity. Pagano & Roell (1992) state that 'an 
electronic auction market does not provide a means for communicating 
the trading motives or identity of traders to the market at large beyond 
displaying brokers' codes alongside limit orders'. 
The degree of informational efficiency is an issue worth examining as 
well. Every single participant in the market has access to the electronic 
limit order book and can decide more easily on the value of the asset 
based on the limit orders shown in the order book. However one might 
argue that given the easier access to trading, there will be more noise in 
the market distorting the real value of the asset and decreasing 
informational efficiency. Market makers are supposed to have a better 
'feel' of the market at any point in time in comparison to individual 
investors who trade based on what they see on their screens. Wang 
( 1999) with reference to the Sydney Futures Exchange has shown that 
floor traders can better assess the presence of adverse information i.e. they 
get a better feel of the market compared to screen traders who are isolated 
from each other. Experimental research (Thiessen, 2000) has shown that 
dealer markets can convey infotmatimf of high quality once the bid-ask 
spread is eliminated. In addition Greene & Watts ( 1996) with reference 
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to the NASDAQ/NYSE markets show that NASDAQ is faster in 
impounding information into prices. Nevertheless no research has been 
undertaken with reference to the LSE and we do not know if the alleged 
enhanced ability of the market makers to get a better feel of the market 
will dominate over the electronic limit order book. In addition we would 
like to extend this line of research to smaller European Markets such as 
the Athens Stock Exchange. 
Another issue, which has not been examined at all, is the spread 
sensitivity to volatility under different trading regimes for both FTSE 100 
and FTSE250. Spread is supposedly less sensitive to volatility under an 
order driven regime for three main reasons: i) market makers do not have 
to manipulate bid-ask quotes to maintain optimal inventory therefore 
volatility is not more of a concern to them than it is to the rest of the 
investors, ii) inventory imbalances are diffused among a greater number 
of market participants since any investor can act conceivably as liquidity 
provider and iii) in case higher spreads occur because of increased 
volatility, this will invite more liquidity providers due to the opportunity 
of making increased profits. Of course it may also be the case that 
increased volatility will discourage investors to trade and since there are 
no liquidity providers of last resort as there are in a quote driven market, 
this will further increase the spread causing severe illiquidity. 
In addition closing price formation alg()rithms could potentially affect 
price &scoverylinformational efficiency. The LSE has changed closing 
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price formation algorithms three times ever since it has become an order 
driven market to accommodate investors' demands for more 
representative closing prices. Closing prices need to be representative of 
the trading activity each day since they are used in portfolio valuation and 
for trading after the exchange has closed. Following the introduction of 
SETS for FTSE100 (order-driven), closing prices were initially based on 
the last automated transaction (20/10/97-13/12/98), then closing price 
calculation was based on the ten minutes trading volume weighted 
aver~ge (14/12/98-26/05/00) and quite recently price formation is based 
on a closing call auction (30/05/00 onwards). We believe that the last 
two closing price formation algorithms provide more efficient closing 
prices and this should be apparent in the price discovery process because 
order flow is consolidated. Closing prices have always been formed in 
the same way for FTSE250 and in the Athens Stock Exchange. As it has 
been stated above informational efficiency and spread sensitivity under 
different trading regimes and closing price algorithms are important issues 
relating to the expected return of a common stock worthy of further 
examination under real trading conditions, therefore we seek to answer the 
following questions: 
Q 1) How does the degree of informational efficiency change in response 
to different trading regimes/closing price formation algorithms for 
FTSE 1 00 and FTSE250? 
Q2) How does spread sensitivity to volatility change m response to 
different trading regimes? 
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Q3) How did the computerization of the trading process affect 
informational efficiency in the Athens Stock Exchange? . 
The results obtained in this study contribute to the trading mechanisms 
comparison literature with reference to the London Stock Exchange and 
the Greek market in the following ways. First we show that the pace with 
which information is incorporated into prices is much faster in order 
driven markets when compared to quote driven markets (FTSE100). 
Secondly we show that spread is more sensitive to volatility in dealer 
markets because of their obligation to post affirmative quotes with respect 
to FTSE 100 stocks. There appear to be no significant improvements in 
informational efficiency for FTSE250 when changing from quote driven 
to hybrid. In general terms the degree of informational efficiency 
remains the same. In addition spread sensitivity to volatility is the same 
since dealers are obliged to post affirmative quotes (committed principal 
orders) under both trading regimes. As far as spread sensitivity to 
volatility is concerned findings with respect to FTSE250 provide extra 
support for the findings with respect to FTSE 1 00. Now as far the Greek 
market is concerned, results show that the computerisation of the trading 
process has increased informational efficiency (the speed at which new 
information is incorporated into prices). To summarize we have learnt 
that the computerisation of the trading process increases informational 
efficiency, order-driven markets respond faster to new information 
(FTSEWO} and that< spread sertsitivitfis Higher indealerships because of 
their affirmative obligation to quote bid and ask prices. 
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5.2.PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In a call auction, market and limit orders are hatched and executed at 
discrete points in time. Very few exchanges around the world use this 
sort of mechanism as their main trading mechanism simply because it is 
considered to be obsolete and it does not make full use of existing 
technology. Call auctions have been found to be in serious disadvantage 
with respect to continuous trading markets (Amihud, Mendelson & 
Lauterbach, 1997). However call auctions are used by a great number of 
stock exchange houses around the world to start or finish the trading 
process. Batching which is the main characteristic of call auctions allows 
for simultaneous execution of a large number of orders, which is believed 
to lead to better price discovery and reduce the effect of asymmetric 
information. Thus it is used to determine the opening and closing prices. 
The LSE has introduced call auctions in the middle of the trading process 
in order to achieve order flow consolidation and more representative 
prices for FTSE250 stocks and closing call auctions for FTSE 1 00 stocks. 
Another· advantage of call auctions is that the effect of large orders on 
liquidity and consequently on prices is considerably reduced. Of course 
one of the main disadvantages of call auctions is that there is no 
immediacy and the fact that no information is conveyed between the calls 
may lead to severe informational inefficiency. 
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In an order driven market, participants submit · or accept limit 
orders/market orders of other participants at any point in time. All limit 
orders are displayed in the electronic order book, so participants get a 
feeling of the market. Trades may occur between individual investors or 
between an investor and a market maker. In order driven regimes, market 
makers (if they exist) are not obliged to provide liquidity therefore 
immediate execution of market orders is not guaranteed. Of course those 
who provide liquidity are compensated by the bid-ask spread. In a quote 
driven regime or dealership, market makers are the only suppliers of 
liquidity. They are obliged to quote bid and ask prices at any point in 
time in order to accommodate liquidity demand. 
The majority of theoretical work m the area of trading regimes 
concentrates on modelling a single trading mechanism. Mendelson 
(1982), Ho et al (1985), Sattertwaite & Williams (1993) and Rustichini et 
al (1994) concentrate on call auctions. Friedman (1984, 1991), Wilson 
(1987), Easley & Ledyard (1993) and Glosten (1994) concentrate on 
continuous auction markets while O'Hara (1995) presents a survey of 
dealership models. Deciding on the best trading mechanism based on the 
above models is simply impossible and this is because each model is built 
on a different set of assumptions making the results obtained each time 
difficult to compare however some general statements can be made. Call 
auctions are quite robust in information processing especially in cases of 
high information asymmetry· however immediacy ·'is a ~major problem 
since trading occurs at discrete points in time. Order driven markets offer 
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unsurpassed immediacy but the chances of trading with an informed trader 
and making losses is quite high. Of course some theoretical work has 
been undertaken in comparing different trading mechanisms on a common 
basis. In particular Kyle (1985) compares single call auction and 
continuous trading equilibria and finds that noise trader losses in 
continuous trading are twice as large as in call auctions. Pagano & Roell 
(1992) show that trading costs are lower in call markets and higher in 
dealer markets. The only study to compare all three trading mechanisms 
(call, continuous and dealership) is that of Madhavan (1992) who shows 
that call markets are more robust in the presence of information 
asymmetries. The results obtained from all those studies were expected 
since order hatching which is the main characteristic of call auctions 
consolidates order flow and all orders are executed at a single price, 
therefore informed traders cannot take advantage of the information they 
possess. 
Most empirical literature in the area of trading mechanisms has 
concentrated on i) comparing execution costs between continuous 
auctions and dealerships (Huang & Stoll, 1996; Lee, 1993; Pagano & 
Roell, 1990; Stoll, 1993) finding higher execution costs in dealer markets 
when compared to continuous trading markets even though Affleck-
Graves, Hedge & Miller (1994) find that quoted spreads are the same for a 
matched sample ofNASDAQ and NYSE/ASE stocks in 1985 ii) trading 
mechanisms and price behaviour empfiasiziif~f thir introduction of c~fl 
auctions within continuous trading mechanisms (Ko, Lee & Chung, 1995; 
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Amihud & Mendelson, 1987,1989,1991) with special reference to the 
Korean, Japanese and US stock market respectively iii) the value effects 
gained by changing from single call auctions to continuous trading 
(Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach, 1997) iv) the effects of full 
automation on trading (Naidu & Rozeff, 1994) with special reference to 
the Singapore Stock Exchange and v) a comparison between dealerships 
and continuous action with respect to informational efficiency (Greene & 
Watts, 1996). 
Summarizing the empirical results, one could say that dealer markets 
appear to have higher execution costs in comparison to continuous 
markets although there is no unanimity. However little can be said about 
how informational efficiency/price discovery changes under the two 
primary exchanging regimes: dealerships and order driven markets. 
There are only two studies looking into informational efficiency under 
different trading regimes. The first study that investigates the value 
. effects from changes in market microstructure and explicitly looks into 
price discovery and assesses the degree of informational efficiency 
achieved each time is that of Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach (1997). 
However the above study is confined to changes from single call auctions 
to continuous trading mechanisms with reference to the Tel Aviv stock 
Exchange. Stocks under the call auction regime used to trade once a day 
but after the introduction of continuous trading, trading frequency 
increased tremendously. As it was expected changes in iiif()rmatie"nal 
efficiency/price discovery and liquidity were dramatic. The second study 
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(Greene & Watts, 1996) examines market response to quarterly earnings 
announcements made during trading and non-trading hours on the NYSE 
and the NASDAQ. They find that NASDAQ is more efficient in 
impounding information into prices. We are not aware of any studies 
concentrating on spread sensitivity to volatility under a dealership and an 
order driven market. We explore price discovery/informational 
efficiency and spread sensitivity to volatility between competing trading 
mechanisms: dealerships, order driven markets and hybrid markets for 
FTSE 1 00 & FTSE250 stocks. We also examine the effect of 
computerisation on informational efficiency for the Greek market. 
5.3.METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer how the degree of informational efficiency and spread 
sensitivity to volatility changes in response to different trading 
mechanisms and closing price formation algorithms we need to formulate 
six hypotheses: 
HI) Closing auctions achieve a higher degree of informational efficiency 
when compared to trading volume weighted average pricing or closing 
prices based on the last automated transaction (with reference to 
FTSEIOO). 
The main characteristic of closing auctions is order hatching. In that way 
order flow consolidation and infotmatiori c6fisolioatibn is achieved and 
the possibility of obtaining a price incorporating as much information as 
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possible increases. In addition the ability of block trading to distort 
prices is minimised due to the hatching nature of single call auctions as 
well as the risk of trading under asymmetric information. 
H2) Order driven markets achieve a higher degree of informational 
efficiency when compared to quote driven markets (with reference to 
FTSE100). 
One the one hand one could argue that that market makers have the ability 
to get a better 'feel' of the market and respond faster to general market 
conditions when compared to individual investors who trade mainly on 
information conveyed by limit orders posted in the electronic limit order 
book. Market makers have good information on market condition 
because they can observe buyers and sellers and their transactions. 
Market makers may have information on the clients of a broker and may 
be able to draw conclusions about any sort of information that he may 
possess from his buying and selling behaviour. They may also anticipate 
the behaviour of particular traders by estimating their inventory position. 
On the other hand, one could argue that market makers cannot always 
evaluate correctly the information they are presented with and the only 
information they may get is from the outstanding limit orders on their 
screens. In addition the ability to post limit could potentially increase 
participation from individual investors increasing information flow or 
nmse. According to Pagano & Roell (1992) an electronic auction does 
not provide a means for communicating the trading lllotives or-identity of 
traders to the market at large. Thus individual traders and market makers 
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are not aware of the trading motives of their counterparts and can not 
assess their quantity and quality of information. Generally speaking the 
degree of informational efficiency between different trading regimes is an 
empidcal issue. 
H3) Hybrid markets achieve a similar degree of informational efficiency 
compared to dealerships (with reference to FTSE250). 
The degree of informational efficiency achieved in those two markets is 
an empirical issue. We are not aware of any previous studies looking into 
quote driven and hybrid markets. On the one hand some might argue that 
the ability to post limit orders will improve information flow. On the 
other hand others might argue that the posting of limit orders will not 
necessadly improve order flow since limit orders may provide mixed 
signals, reducing informational efficiency. As you can see the degree of 
informational efficiency for quote driven and hybrid is an important 
empirical issue examined for the very first time. 
H4) Spread sensitivity to volatility 1s higher m dealer markets (with 
reference to FTSE 1 00). 
In a dealership, market makers are obliged to maintain an orderly market 
under any circumstances (volatile or non-volatile). Therefore the bid and 
ask quotes they post must incorporate some sort of compensation for 
volatility. In times of high volatility investors may wish to sell volatile 
stocks and buy less volatile stocks, If this is the case since markets 
makers have to accommodate liquidity demand under any circumstances, 
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this will induce inventory imbalances accompanied by severe fluctuations 
in the value of their inventory. Obviously the spread will be more 
sensitive to volatility in dealerships in order to compensate for higher risk. 
Nevertheless in order driven markets, liquidity demand is diffused among 
a greater number of market participants since any investor can act as 
liquidity provider and in case higher spreads occur because of increased 
volatility, this will invite more liquidity providers due to the opportunity 
of making increased profits. Therefore if the market is order driven, the 
spread will be less sensitive to volatility. 
H5) Spread sensitivity to volatility is similar in dealer markets compared 
to hybrid markets (with reference to FTSE250). 
In both trading regimes, market makers are present therefore we expect 
that spread sensitivity to volatility will be similar. 
H6) Computerization of the trading process mcreases informational 
efficiency (with reference to the Greek market only) 
Computerization of the trading process allows faster dissemination of 
information and imminent reaction to posted prices on the trading screens, 
therefore the degree to which new information is incorporated into prices 
must increase. 
The methodology that follows was initially introduced by Amihud, 
. .~,.~nd~lson & Lauterbach (1997) to ~examine the degree of informaHonal 
efficiency for different trading mechanisms. It was employed to test the 
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efficiency of single call auctions and continuous trading in the Tel Aviv 
Stock exchange market. Variations of it were employed to test the 
efficiency of call auctions within the framework of continuous trading in 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange in two separate occasions. We use this 
methodology to examine the degree of informational efficiency between a 
dealership, an order driven market, a. hybrid market, different closing 
price formation algorithms and the effects of computerisation. This 
methodology is known as 'relative return dispersion' (RRD) and is based 
on the variance of returns across securities. In the first instance we need 
to regress individual stock returns on market index returns and obtain the 
residuals. Then we square the residuals obtained from the market model 
and average over the stocks included in our sample over different trading 
regimes and different closing price formation algorithms. Symbolically 
this is given by: 
The dispersion of values at every single point in time due to firm specific 
information should be independent of the trading mechanism used each 
time, therefore any systematic differences observed between the different 
trading mechanisms and the different algorithms can be attributed solely 
to the trading mechanism. Lower relative return dispersion indicates 
smaller pricing errors relative to contemporaneous market index returns, 
which means that information is. incorporated faster into prices. This may 
be due to faster adjustment to changes in the market index and smaller 
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firm specific errors. Higher relative return dispersion indicates 
underreaction and may be due to lagged adjustment to market returns and 
high firm specific noise. The extent to which each of those factors 
(adjustment to market returns and firm specific noise) affects the degree 
of efficiency of each trading regime and closing price formation 
algorithms is examined by estimating a lagged market regression model 
for each stock in the sample: 
Rit=c+PMRt+LpMRt_,+et (5.3) 
Where Rit is returns for each individual stock and MRt and MRt-I are 
contemporaneous and lagged index returns. Examination of the 
(in)significance of the coefficients obtained will allow us to determine if 
the degree of efficiency observed is due to lagged adjustment to the index. 
Controlling for lagged adjustment will also allow us to examine the 
variance of the residuals obtained from the lagged market model for each 
stock and see how fast firm specific information is incorporated in prices. 
Changes in the trading system should not have changed any fundamental 
information about the stocks traded, therefore any systematic differences 
in the variance of the residuals will reflect how fast firm specific 
information is incorporated in prices. If it turns out that the variance 
increases then firm specific information is not incorporated fast enough 
into prices and this can be attributed to the trading mechanism. 
·We modify the methodology described above (Amihud et al, 1997) by 
adding the Fama & Fferlch factors. There":tore equations (1) and (3) are 
re-written as: 
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Rit=c+pMRit+SMBt+HMLt+eit (5.4) 
Rit=c+pMRit+LPMRit-I+SMBt+HMLt+eit (5.5) 
We also employ a second methodology to examme informational 
efficiency, which can only be used with high frequency data. The issue 
of over reaction or under reaction has attracted a lot of attention recently 
(Barberis et al, 1998; Daniel et al, 1998 and Odean, 1998) and we believe 
that it is worth examining how informational efficiency changes with 
respect to the trading regime. In order to examine this we regress 
changes in transaction prices on changes in the real value of the asset 
(mid-quotes) and on past pricing errors. Symbolically this is expressed 
as: 
(pt-Pt-I)=a+p(vt-Vt-I)+y(pt-J-Vt-I)+Et (5.6) 
where p1 is the transaction price as formed under the different trading 
regimes and v1 is the real value of the asset as captured by the mid-quote. 
In all empirical market microstructure studies, the mid-quote is generally 
accepted to be the real value of the asset. Kim & Ogden (1996) consider 
the mid-quote following a transaction as the real value of the asset and 
they use it to estimate the components of the bid-ask spread. In an 
efficient market the real value of the asset as captured by the mid quote 
should be reflected imminently in prices, therefore p should assume the 
value of one. If p assumes a value lower than one then it means that the 
market underreacts to incoming information while if it assumes a value 
higher than one then it means that it overeacts to incoming information. 
Restrictions on p are tested by Wald tests. y provides estimates of the 
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effects of past pricing errors on changes in prices and the extent to which 
they are corrected. In an efficient market y should assume negative 
values meaning that past pricing errors are corrected, therefore the more 
negative the value is the faster past pricing errors are corrected. We 
strongly believe that the above methodology is the ultimate way to 
examine informational efficiency and provides first class evidence since it 
allows us to consider every single trade during the day. Our sample is in 
excess of one million trades. 
In order to examine the effect of volatility on spread sensitivity under 
different regimes we need to introduce two separate measures of 
volatility. The first one will be used as a descriptive measure to provide 
us with an idea of the level of market volatility under different trading 
regimes while the second one will be used as a regressor on the sensitivity 
model. The volatility descriptive measure is estimated as: 
Where Hit is the highest price recorded within the day and Lit is the lowest 
price recorded within the day. The difference between high price and low 
price divided by the average of those two prices can provide us with an 
indication of volatility under different regimes. However we believe that 
this is a crude measure of volatility to include as regressor in the 
sensitivity model because it fails to distinguish the effect of the trading 
mechanism from that. of the. general market environment (e.g news, 
events, liquidity and asymmetric information). For that reason we 
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estimate a GARCH(l, 1) model for each stock in our sample and 
incorporate in the variance equation changes in the real value of the asset 
as captured by the bid-ask midquote. The mean equation is given by: 
Where R1 is returns and e1 is the error term. This equation is estimated 
separately for each stock in the sample. The variance equation is given 
by: 
2 = ~ 2 r. 2 [( bid1 + ask1 ) _ ( bid1_1 + ask1_1 )] (S 9) at c + ulit-I +'='at-I + 1J 2 2 . 
where a 12 is the conditional variance, &1
2
_1 is the lagged squared residual 
from the mean equation or news about volatility from the previous period, 
a1~ 1 is the last period's forecast variance and the term in squared brackets 
represents changes in the real value of the asset. We believe that by 
including changes in the real value of the asset we manage to separate the 
effect of the trading mechanism from the market environment. Any 
news, trading activity, liquidity or asymmetric information pertinent to 
each stock in the sample should be reflected in changes in the real value, 
captured by changes in the mid quote allowing full investigation of spread 
sensitivity to volatility. Wang (1999) comparing different trading 
systems in the Sydney Futures Exchange uses 'daily average transaction 
size' and 'number of trades' to separate the effect of the trading 
mechanism from that of the market environment. We believe that by 
incorporating changes in the real value of the stock we capture every 
chaitge itfthe 'external erivirorihieiit. Spre~d sensitivity to volatility will 
be estimated by the following pool regression: 
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spreadit=c+Jlit CT;; +eit (5.1 0) 
where spread is the daily closing bid-ask spread for each stock in our 
sample and !lit is the coefficient of the conditional variance for each 
individual stock obtained by running a GARCH (1, 1 ). If !lit turns out to 
be significant then it means that volatility affects the spread set either by 
market makers or individual traders. 
The above exercise is undertaken by employing high frequency data for 
FTSE100 and FTSE250 stocks. The only difference is that returns this 
time are based on transaction prices rather than daily closing prices. 
5.4.DATASET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Daily pnce data for FTSEIOO companies was obtained from 
DA T ASTREAM and transactions data from Securities industry Research 
Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA). The data set under consideration ranges 
from 18/10/1996 to 30/04/2003. The choice of the data set reflects a 
quote-driven trading regime and an order-driven trading regime, which is 
further sub-divided into three different closing price formation periods. 
This allows us to test the degree of informational efficiency under 
different trading regimes, which relates to the first and second research 
hypotheses and the extent to which spread is sensitive to volatility under 
those regimes which relates to the fourth research hypothesis. Each 
subset represents a different trading regime/closing price formation 
algorithm and incorporates the following time period: the first subset 
ranges from 18/10/1996 to 17/10/1997 and reflects a dealership where 
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closing prices are based on the bid-ask midquote, the second subset ranges 
from 20/10/1997 to 13/12/1998 during which period the market is order 
driven and the closing prices were based on the last automated transaction 
(order book), the third subset ranges from 14/1211998 to 26/05/00 during 
which period the closing prices were based on the last ten minutes of 
trading volume (VW AP: volume weighted average price) and finally the 
fourth subset ranges from 30/05/2000 to 30/04/2003 during which period 
the closing prices were formed by a closing auction. Unfortunately the 
transactions data sample does not extend over all those periods. We use 
trade data for two months following changes in the trading regime. 
Daily pnce data for FTSE250 companies was obtained from 
DAT ASTREAM and transactions data from securities industry Research 
Centre Asia Pacific (SIRCA). The data set under consideration ranges 
from 01/01/2003 to 12/08/2004. The choice of the data set reflects a 
quote-driven trading regime (SEAQ) where liquidity is provided solely by 
market makers and a hybrid market (SETSmm) where individual traders 
can choose to trade between themselves if they wish to do so or trade with 
market makers who are obliged to provide liquidity through 'committed 
principal orders'. The change from one system to the other occurred in 
03/11/03. This allows us to test the degree of informational efficiency 
under different trading regimes, which relates to the third research 
hypothesis and the extent to which spread is sensitive to volatility under 
those regimes, which reliites tOllie fiftWresearclfhypothesis: · 
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Daily price data for the Greek stocks was obtained from DATASTREAM. 
The data set under consideration ranges from 19/08/1991 to 17/08/1993. 
The choice of the data set reflects a public outcry trading regime and a 
fully computerized electronic trading system (ASIS). This allows us to 
test the degree of informational efficiency under different trading 
processes, which relates to the sixth research hypothesis. Unfortunately 
we cannot test spread sensitivity to volatility because neither The Athens 
Stock Exchange nor DAT ASTREAM nor SIRCA have data on bid and 
ask prices. 
The daily data obtained includes the following variables: closing bid 
price, closing ask price, daily closing price, highest daily price, lowest 
daily price and closing trading volume. These variables were further 
processed to obtain other variables such as: bid-ask spread, bid-ask mid 
quote which is equal to (bid-price+ask-price)/2 and is used as a proxy for 
the real value of the asset, returns, returns volatility modeled as 
GARCH(1,1), 'volatiltity1' estimated as the difference between daily high 
and daily low prices divided by the average of those two prices and 
another liquidity measure 'LR1' which is estimated as the ratio of volume 
turnover to volatility1. The intuition behind this liquidity measure is that 
if the £ amount of stocks traded is high while price movement is small 
then the market is very liquid. However if the £ amount of stocks traded 
is relatively constant but price fluctuation is high then this particular 
market is not liqi.iitl. Tlre transactions data incorporates all . trades, 
transaction prices, bid-ask quotes and volume. 
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Descriptive statistics for FTSE 1 00 (TABLE 5.1) with reference to the two 
liquidity measures employed here (bid-ask spread and LRI) show that 
liquidity decreased once the market changed from quote driven 
(dealership) to order driven. In particular absolute spread appears to have 
increased from 2.66 to 4.18 following the change in the trading regime 
while it remains relatively stable for the rest of the periods examined. In 
order to decide on the (in)significance of changes in the mean values we 
undertake ANOV A tests. The increase in absolute spread following the 
change form quote driven to order driven is significant while changes in 
the spread for the rest of the periods are insignificant. The p values 
obtained for the estimated ANOVA statistic are much higher than 0.05. 
This result was somewhat expected since for the rest of the periods, the 
trading mechanism has remained the same; the only difference is in the 
closing price formation algorithm. The results obtained for absolute 
spread are further confirmed by LRI, which captures liquidity in terms of 
£s of stocks traded controlling for price fluctuations. Higher (lower) 
values of LRI indicate that liquidity increases (decreases). When testing 
for mean (in)equality, the ANOVA tests show that the decrease in LRI is 
significant when the trading mechanism changes but changes in the mean 
values of LRI for the rest of the periods are insignificant at 0.05. Finally 
we calculate descriptive statistics for volatility! (TABLE5.1) estimated as 
the difference between high price and low price divided by the average of 
those two prices over all four periods examined and we find that votatility 
increases through time, reaches an all time high and remains at the same 
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level for the period following. The first two ANOVA tests reject mean 
equality between the first, second and third period but they fail to reject 
mean equality between the third and the fourth period during which 
volatility is stabilized. 
Descriptive statistics for FTSE250 (TABLE5.2) show that absolute spread 
decreased over the period examined which indicates an improvement in 
liquidity however ANOVA tests show that this improvement is not 
significant. The p value obtained is equal to 0.49. LRl, which is an 
alternative measure of liquidity, shows that liquidity had actually 
decreased however ANOV A tests indicate that the decrease is 
insignificant. In other words the change from dealership (SEAQ) to a 
hybrid system (SETSmm) does not seem to have brought about any 
changes in liquidity. Finally 'volatility!' shows that volatility has 
increased. The p value obtained is equal to 0.07. 
Results for the Greek market (TABLE5.3) show th.:;a::,t_::th:.::e~in~tr~o~d~uc~t~io""'n!.Oo....,f....__--........ 
electronic trading (ASIS) increased liquidity slightly however this 
increase is not considered to be significant based on ANOVA tests. The 
p value obtained is equal to 0.88. Normally we would expect a major 
increase in liquidity given the introduction of electronic trading. 
Unfortunately we do have data on bid and ask prices for the Greek market, 
therefore the results obtained for LRl can not contrasted against anot~er 
variable such as the spr,~ad. Volatility- as captured -by 'v61ati!ittyl' 
appears to decrease; however this decrease IS insignificant. 
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Computerization of the trading process is supposed to increase both 
liquidity and volatility however this does not appear to be the case for the 
Greek market. 
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TABLE5.1: LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY MEASURES: FTSE100 (p values in brackets) 
LIQUIDITY MEASURES VOLA TILITY1 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD £ VALUE OF SHARES TRADED/STDEV 
~ 5 5 5 ::;; 
a ~ f= ~ f= ~ f= 
-< u -< u -< u ~ Cl (ll ::: ::J Cl (ll ::: ::J Cl (ll ::: ::J 
0 -< f- > -< -< f- > -< -< f- > -< ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 i5 (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll f- i5 f- i5 f- i5 0 ~ ~ ~ 
~ (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll (ll 0 0 0 ...J ...J ...J u u u 
MEAN 2.66 4.18 4.20 3.72 538.5 226.3 148.6 387.7 1539.2 41081 73809 54789 
A~OVA 10.62 0.00 0.93 2.12 0.46 1.86 4.98 2.96 1.46 
H0:-~mean (0.00) (0.96) (0.33) (0.03) (0.64) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) 
equality 
MEDIAN 2.49 3.40 3.15 2.93 196.8 89.5 64.7 136.4 9173 27757 41609 33317 
S.D 1.73 3.73 3.28 3.10 1217.3 470.8 190.5 916.7 14683 41642 86555 57605 
TABLE5.2: LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY MEASURES: FTSE250 (p values in brackets) 
LIQUIDITY MEASURES VOLATILITY I 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD £VALUE OF SHARES TRADED/STDEV 
0~ E E E 6::;; Cl E Cl E Cl E o- -< (ll -< (ll -< (ll ~0 ~ f- ~ f- ~ f-(ll ~ (ll t..I.l (ll ~ 
- f- ~ (ll (ll (ll 
};MEAN 6.84 6.14 178.3745 143.98 10059.28 15931.37 
J\NOVA 0.68(0.49) 0.66 (0.50) 1.80(0.07) 
Ha: rhean equality 
MEDIAN 4.68 4.03 51.56 40.36 3467.952 6226.750 
S.D 9.47 7.47 478.96 397.69 25573.10 29072.65 
---
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TABLE5.3: LIQUIDITY AND VOLATILITY MEASURES: GREEK MARKET (p values in brackets) 
LIQUIDITY MEASURES VOLATILITY I I 
ABSOLUTE SPREAD £VALUE OF SHARES TRADED/STDEV I 
~ >- >- >- : ~ ucn ~ ucn ~ ucn 
' G u -::>o u -::>o u -::>o 
~ f- 53~ f- 53~ f- 53~ ::::> ::::> ::::> 
0 0 ~~~ 0 ~~~ 0 ~~Cl ~ u tJE- u Uf- u tJE-~ 
~ :l "'-lZE- :l "'-lZE- :l "'-lZE-c:x:l .....lO c:x:l .....lO c:x:l .....lO ::::> "'-lU ::::> "'-lU ::::> >IlU f- t:l.. t:l.. t:l.. 
MEAN N!A N/A 234.47 247.57 2.87 2.37 
ANOVA I NIA NIA 0.14(0.88) 0.20(0.83) ;, 
H0 : mean equality I 
MEDIAN N/A N/A 67.81 71.69 0.22 0.36 
S.D NIA NIA 396.4 502.8 15.5 7.88 
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5.5.EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The statistical analysis aims at i) investigating how fast information is 
incorporated into prices and the degree to which individual stocks under/over 
react to incoming information and ii) examine if and the extent to which bid-
ask spread is sensitive to volatility under different trading regimes. 
Examination occurs under different trading regimes namely a dealership 
(SEAQ), a quote drive- market (SETS) and a combination of both (SETSmm) 
for the UK market and between a public outcry and fully computerized 
system (ASIS) for the Greek market. 
5.5.1 RELATIVE RETURN DISPERSION 
The methodology employed here allows comparisons between different 
trading regimes: quote-driven (SEAQ), hybrid (SETSmm), order-driven 
(SETS) and different closing price formation algorithms. Relative return 
dispersion has been successfully employed in the past by Amihud & 
Mendelson (1997) to test informational efficiency. This methodology 
concentrates on the squared residuals obtained from regressing individual 
stock returns against the index to which stocks belong to and of course 
against the index for which changes were introduced. It would not be 
possible to regress individual FTSE 1 OO/FTSE250 stock returns against FTSE 
ALL SHARE simply because stocks that comprise FTSE ALL SHARE trade 
in at least three different trading regimes. 
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5.5.1.1 RELATIVE RETURN DISPERSION: FTSE100 STOCKS 
The average value of squared residuals obtained by regressing individual 
FTSE 100 stocks returns against the index appears to decrease slightly over 
time (SUMMARY TABLE 5. 7, this table is at the end of the relative return 
dispersion section). The highest value is achieved when the market is quote-
driven (dealership) implying that market makers fail to assess information as 
fast as they should. Once the market regime changes from quote driven 
(dealership) to order driven the mean squared value of residuals reduces by 
0.0 1. ANOV A tests reject mean equality between the first two periods but 
fail to reject mean equality between the third and the fourth periods. This 
means that the introduction of a closing auction did not bring about the 
desired result of increasing the degree of informational efficiency achieved up 
to that moment implying that a closing auction is not much superior to that of 
VW AP (volume weighted average pricing). Actually a closing auction and 
VW AP appear to achieve the same degree of informational efficiency (H 1 is 
rejected). The observed decrease in relative return dispersion between the 
first and the second period as captured by the mean values of the squared 
residuals can be attributed either to increased adjustments to changes in the 
relevant index or/and low firm specific noise. The extent to which each of 
these factors has contributed to the observed increase in RRD is examined by 
running the following regressions: 
Rit=c+j3MRt+Lj3MRt-t+et. (5.11) 
Rit=c+j3MRit+Lj3MRit-t+SMBt+HMLt+eit (5.12) 
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Which were discussed above and are given new numbers here. 
The results presented in TABLE5.4 (PANEL A AND PANEL B) indicate 
that the degree of informational efficiency increases slightly following 
changes in the trading regime. PANEL A presents results for regression ( 11) 
and PANEL B presents results for regression (12). We will start by 
commenting on results in PANEL A and then we will proceed to PANEL B. 
When the market is quote driven (dealership) the coefficient for 
contemporaneous market returns assumes a highly significant positive value 
(0.73) implying that individual stocks respond to FTSE100 returns and the 
general market condition as captured by the index. Of course if individual 
stocks responded to a full extent the value obtained should be equal to 1. 
The R2 adj obtained in this case is equal to 0.17. When we add lagged 
market returns we find that the coefficient of contemporaneous market returns 
remains the same and the coefficient of lagged market returns assumes a 
value of 0.11 which is significant indicating that individual stocks respond 
with a small lag to the index. R2 adjusted increases slightly to 0.18. When 
the market regime changes from quote driven (dealership) to order-driven the 
coefficient of current index returns increases to 0.78 and R2 ADJ becomes 
0.20, indicating that the explanatory power of current FTSE100 returns has 
increased. When we add lagged index returns, the coefficient of 
contemporaneous index returns gets quite small. From 0.11 (quote driven 
market) reduces to 0.02 (order driven market). In this case R2 adjusted 
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increases indicating that FTSE100 stocks respond faster. This pattern 
remains valid for the rest of the periods examined. We would expect to see 
some changes for the second, third and fourth period given the change in the 
closing price formation algorithm however it appears that it is only changes in 
the trading regime itself (from quote driven to order driven) that can affect 
informational efficiency. PANEL B presents results for FTSE 100 stocks 
incorporating the FF factors: SMB (equally weighted) and HML (equally 
weighted). The results are similar to the ones obtained from the simple 
regressions. The coefficient of contemporaneous index returns is equal to 
0.69(0.00) for the first period (quote driven) and then increases to 0.72(0.00) 
for the second period (order driven). The coefficient of lagged index returns 
is equal to 0.10(0.00) for the first period (quote driven) and then reduces to 
0.02(0.00) for the second period (order driven) indicating that the degree of 
informational efficiency increases in the second period (order driven). At 
this point it is worth mentioning that R2 ADJ increases from 0.18 to 0.20. 
The FF factors are significant for both periods under consideration and their 
inclusion in the regressions does not appear to alter the results in any way. 
Results are qualitatively the same for the rest of the periods. 
Size-based analysis: Results obtained for small and big companies indicate 
that it takes longer for smaller companies to adjust to incoming information. 
The coefficient of lagged market returns is slightly higher for smaller 
companies for most of the periods under consideration. In particular in the 
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first period under examination (quote driven) the coefficient of lagged index 
returns for big companies is 0.11 and for small companies is 0. 14. Of course 
it is not a sizeable difference but you need to keep in mind that the stocks are 
under examination are FTSE100 stocks. Perhaps the results would be more 
pronounced if we employed stocks with major differences in market 
capitalisation. When the trading regime changes the coefficient of lagged 
market returns for small companies reduces from 0.14 to 0.04 and for big 
companies from 0.11 to 0.01, which is evidence of improvement in 
informational efficiency. Results remain similar even when we add the FF 
factors. 
Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach (1997) state that any increases/ decreases 
in RRD can very well be attributed to either lagged/increased adjustments to 
changes in the relevant index or/and high/low firm specific noise. The above 
exercise was undertaken to control for the effect of lagged adjustment and test 
the extent to which firm specific noise contributes to decreased RRD. The 
variance of the residuals obtained from the lagged index regression and FF 
factors as shown in SUMMARY TABLE 5.8 (all 'residuals variance' is 
summarised in TABLE 5.8 which is presented at the end of the relative return 
dispersion section) appears to decrease between the first two periods. 
ANOV A tests reject mean equality for the first two periods but fail to reject 
mean equality between VW AP and the closing auction, indicating that the 
closing auction is not superior to VW AP. Generally spe!;lking while the 
205 
change in market microstructure should not have changed any fundamental 
information about the stocks, it had an favourable effect on the precision with 
which new firm specific information is incorporated into prices. In 
conclusion the decrease in RRD can be attributed both to increased response 
to the index and reduced firm specific noise. 
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T ABLE5.4: FTSE 100 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OVER FOUR DIFFERENT PERIODS (p values in brackets) 
PANEL A 
I QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET/DEALERSHIP:SEAQ 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
,C 0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.18) 0.00(0.18) 0.00(0.19) 0.00(0.20) 0.00(0.20) 0.00(0.12) 0.00(0.25) 
·~.MR. 0.73 (0.00) 0.73 (0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.66(0.00) 0.69(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.75(0.00) 0.75(0.00) 
'MR. 0.11 (0.00) 0.14(0.00) 0.14(0.00) 0.11(0.00) 
R'ADJ 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.21 
ORDER DRIVEN MARKET: SETS-LAST AUTOMATED TRANSACTION 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
·c 0.00 (0.68) 0.00 (0.69) 0.00(0.67) 0.00(0.65) 0.00(0.69) 0.00(0.12) 0.00(0.75) 0.00(0.79) 
MR. 0.78 (0.00) 0.77 (0.00) 0.69(0.00) 0.67(0.00) 0.71(0.00) 0.70(0.00) 0.78(0.00) 0.77(0.00) 
MR,_ 0.02 (0.02) 0.04(0.00) 0.05(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 
R'ADJ 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 
VOLUME-WEIGHTED AVERAGE PRICE 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00(0.10) 0.00(0.12) 0.00(0.13) 0.00(0.15) 0.00(0.22) 0.00(0.28) 
MR, 0.76 (0.02) 0.75 (0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.67(0.00) 0.73(0.00) 0.72(0.00) 0.78(0.00) 0.77(0.00) 
AA-1 0.03 (0.00) 0.09(0.00) 0.08(0.00) 0.02(0.00) I 
RfADJ 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 I 
- - --- ----
CLOSING AUCTION 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c -0.00 (0.45) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00(0.45) 0.00(0.80) 0.00(0.20) 0.00(0.34) 0.00(0.42) 0.00(0.40) 
MR, 0.70 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 0.65(0.00) 0.66(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.66(0.00) 0.73(0.00) 0.72(0.00) 
MR,.I 0.03 (0.00) 0.05(0.00) 0.05(0.00) 0.02(0.00) 
RiADJ 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 
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PANELB 
QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET/DEALERSHIP 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
' c 0.00 (0.08) 0.00 (0.06) 0.00(0.08) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.10) 0.00(0.10) 0.00(0.11) 
'MR. 0.69 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 0.62(0.00) 0.63(0.00) 0.64(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.73(0.00) 0.74(0.00) 
SMBEW -0.002(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) -0.001(0.00) -0.001(0.00) 
HMLEW -0.001(0.01) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00)_ 
1MR,_ 0.10(0.00) 0.13(0.00) 0.09(0.00) 0.08(0.00} 
R~ADJ 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.19 
-----
ORDER DRIVEN MARKET:SETS-LAST AUTOMATED TRANSACTION 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00(0.49) 0.00(0.49) 0.00(0.50) 0.00(0.49) 0.00(0.80) 0.00(0.76) 0.00(0.42) 0.00(0.33) 
·MR, 0.72(0.00) 0.72(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.70(0.00) 0.71(0.00) 0.73(0.00) 0.76(0.00) 0.77(0.00) 
SMBEW -0.002(0.00) -0.002(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.02(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) -0.001(0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 
HMLEW -0.00 1(0.1 0) -0.001(0.10) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
MR,.t 0.02(0.02) 0.07(0.00) 0.05(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 
R'ADJ 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.19 
--
---. 
-----
VOLUME-WEIGHTED AVERAGE PRICE 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00(0.06) 0.00(0.06) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.10) 0.00(0.12) 0.00(0.15) 0.00(0.10) 0.00(0.15) 
MR, 0.72(0.00) 0.72(0.00) 0.65(0.00) 0.67(0.00) 0.70(0.00) 0.73(0.00) 0.72(0.00) 0.75(0.00) 
SMBEW -0.001 (0.05) -0.001(0.05) 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) -0.00 1(0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 
l-IMLEW -0.001(0.05) -0.01 (0.05) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
MR.,.[ 0.02(0.00) 0.07(0.00) 0.06(0.00) 0.02(0.00) 
R~ADJ 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.21 
--- - --
CLOSING AUCTION 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
.c 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
MR. 0.67(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.60(0.00) 0.63(0.00) 0.67(0.00) 0.70(0.00) 0.73(0.00) 0.74(0.00)_ 
SMBEW -0.003(0.00) -0.003(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) -0.001(0.00) -0.001(0.00) 
HMLEW -0.001 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 
MR,.t 0.03(0.00) 0.08(0.00) 0.05(0.00) 0.04(0.00) 
RLADJ 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 
-------
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5.5.1.2 RELATIVE RETURN DISPERSION: FTSE250 STOCKS 
Results obtained for FTSE250 stocks are presented in TABLE5.5, PANEL A 
and PANEL B. PANEL A presents results for the two trading regimes 
without the FF factors while PANEL B presents results for the same trading 
regimes incorporating the FF factors. The average value of squared residuals 
obtained by regressing individual FTSE250 stocks returns against the index 
and the FF factors appears to decrease over time (SUMMARY TABLE 5.7) 
however AN OVA tests do not reject the null hypothesis of mean equality. In 
other words there appears to be no change in the degree of informational 
efficiency between a dealership and a hybrid market, which implies that the 
third hypothesis is not rejected. The main characteristic of both trading 
systems (SEAQ and SETSmm) is the presence of market makers even though 
SETSmm allows trading through the electronic book. The ability to engage 
in individual trading (without employing the services of market makers) did 
not bring about an increase in informational efficiency. 
In order to be consistent with the methodology described above, we need to 
present results for FTSE250 stocks response to current and lagged index 
returns following changes in the trading regime (TABLE 5.5). By examining 
closely the results presented for all stocks in FTSE250, one might argue that 
there is an improvement in informational efficiency given the increases in the 
coefficients observed for current market returns and reductions observed for 
"> C--1 •" • • • .: • • • - - • "• • "o .~ ~ • - • ~•• -•' • • •• •- • ·- •-. • - <- - • • ••_•' -• •• • 
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lagged market returns. In particular the coefficient of current market returns 
increases from 0.60 to 0.74 while the coefficient for lagged market returns 
decreases from 0.11 to --(l.05 following the introduction of the order book, 
however we can taik about 'real' increases in informational efficiency when 
the coefficient for lagged market returns is insignificant. In addition the 
mean value of squared residuals discussed above remains unchanged between 
the two regimes, which means that the degree of informational efficiency has 
remained unchanged. At this point one should notice that the sum of current 
and lagged returns coefficients remains almost the same, 0.71 before the 
introduction of SETSmm against 0.69 after the introduction of SETSmm. 
The fundamental relation between returns on individual stocks and the market 
was unaffected by the change even though the coefficient of lagged market 
returns appears reduced. However this reduction is not significant to affect 
RRD. PANEL B presents results for FTSE250 stocks incorporating the FF 
factors. When the market is quite driven (SEAQ) the coefficient of current 
market returns is equal to 0.59 and the coefficient of lagged market returns is 
equal to 0.06. When the trading regime changes both coefficients increase. 
The increase in the coefficient of current market returns is offset by an 
increase in the coefficient of lagged market returns indicating that there is not 
any improvement in informational efficiency. Thus the insignificant 
reduction in RRD (SUMMARY TABLE 5.7). Residuals variance obtained 
by running the same regression (Ri1=c+f3MRi1+Lf3MRit-I+SMB1+HML1+eit) 
remains the same (SUMMARY TABLE 5.8).which means that the degree to 
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which firm specific information IS incorporated into pnces has remained 
unchanged. 
Size-based analysis: the number of stocks in FTSE250 compared to FTSE100 
allows us to vary the number of stocks included in the small and big groups 
so we run regressions for two different sub-samples in each category. 
Results obtained for 'the smaller groups show that the coefficient of current 
returns increases more when compared to the bigger groups. In particular the 
coefficient of current returns for the 20 smallest companies in the sample 
(TABLE 5.5, PANEL B) increases from 0.49 to 0.71 while the coefficient of 
current returns for the 20 biggest companies in the sample increases from 
0.69 to 0.77. Unfortunately however this increase in the coefficient of 
current returns for small companies, which might imply an increase in 
informational efficiency, is offset by an increase in the coefficient of lagged 
index returns from 0.04 to 0.21 following the change in the trading regime. 
The coefficient of lagged index returns for big companies is insignificant 
under both trading regimes (TABLE 5.5, PANEL B), implying that the 
change in the trading regime did not have much impact on the biggest 
companies even though it did increase the coefficient of current returns. 
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TABLE 5.5: FTSE250 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OVER SEAQ AND SETSmm (p values in brackets) 
PANEL A: FTSE250 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OVER SEAQ AND SETSmm WITHOUT FF FACTORS 
FTSE250: SEAO/DEALERSHIP 
ALL STOCKS SMALL20 SMALL30 BIG20 BIG30 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.78) (0.26) (0.35) 
MR, 0.61 0.60 0.46 0.44 0.52 0.50 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.70 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MR,., 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.11 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R~ADJ 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.19 
FTSE250:HYBRID/SETSmm 
ALL STOCKS SMALL20 SMALL30 BIG20 BIG30 
c 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.29) (0.85) (0.82) 
MR. 0.75 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.75 0;75 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 
i (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MR.., -0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) 
R"ADJ 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.15 
PANEL 8: FTSE250 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OVER SEAQ AND SETSmm WITH FF FACTORS 
FTSE250: SEAQ/DEALERSHIP FF FACTORS EQUALLY WEIGHTED 
ALL STOCKS SMALL20 SMALL30 BIG20 BIG30 
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.64) (0.23) (0.28) 
MR, 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.49 0.57 0.55 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.67 I 
,!· (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) I 
MR.., 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.76) 
SMB~EW) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.51) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HML(EW) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
', (0.09) (0.13) (0.95) (0.78) (0.91) (0.80) (0.28) (0.31) (0.60) (0.68) 
R'ADJ 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.18 
--· 
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FTSE250:HYBRID/SETSmm FF FACTORS EQUALLY WEIGHTED 
ALL STOCKS SMALL20 SMALL30 BIG20 BIG30 
c 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.67) (0.58) (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) 
'MR 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.54 0.56 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.71 
·: t (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MR,.I 0.10 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.10 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.13) (0.02) 
S~(EW) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.71) _(0.00) (0.15) (0.75) (0.45) (0.07) (0.17) (0.05) (0.72) (0.10) 
HML(EW) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.74) (0.21) (0.29) (0.04) (0.05) (0.23) (0.25) 
R;ADJ 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.04 ·o.o3 0.04 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.12 
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5.5.1.3 RELATIVE RETURN DISPERSION: THE GREEK MARKET 
The average value of squared residuals obtained by regressing individual 
stocks returns against the market index appears to decrease over time 
(SUMMARY TABLE 5.7). ANOVA tests reject the null hypothesis ofmean 
equality, which means that informational efficiency has improved. This is a 
direct result of computerising the trading process. Computerisation of the 
trading process allows more orders to be processed per unit of time and any 
information circulating in the market is incorporated into prices almost 
imminently. Results presented in TABLE 5.6 (PANEL A) show that when 
the market was a public outcry the coefficient of current returns was equal to 
0.73(0.00) and the coefficient for lagged returns was equal to -0.01(0.04). 
Following the computerisation of the trading process, the coefficient of 
current returns increased to 0.89(0.00) while the coefficient for lagged returns 
became insignificant, which indicates that the degree of informational 
efficiency improved tremendously and individual stocks respond fully to the 
market. Results remain the same once we introduce the FF factors. In 
TABLE 5.6 (PANEL B) the coefficient of current returns increases from 0.72 
to 0.87 following the computerization of the trading process while the 
coefficient of lagged index returns becomes insignificant. The variance of 
residuals (TABLE5.8) obtained by running similar regressions 
(Rit=c+[3MRi1+L[3MRit-t+SMBt+HML1+ei1) indicate that there is a decrease in 
the mean value of the variance of residuals however this is not significant 
., . _ _,_, ... ·- -.- . 
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which means that the degree to which stock specific information is 
incorporated into prices has not changed however individual stock response 
to the market has improved tremendously. The results obtained for the 
Greek market are similar to the results obtained for the Tel Aviv market by 
Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach (1997) 
Size-based analysis: Results obtained for small companies are a bit out of the 
ordinary. Even though the response to current market returns appears to 
increase following the computerization of the trading process, the coefficient 
of lagged index returns gets significant. Results for big companies are more 
or less as expected. The coefficient of lagged index returns is insignificant 
under both trading regimes implying that there is no lagged adjustment 
however the coefficient of current market returns decreases but still remains 
quite high. 
215 
~i 
TABLE 5.6: ATHENS STOCK EXCHANGE INFORMATI0NAL EFFICIENCY OVER PUBLIC OUTCRY AND ASIS (p values in brackets) 
PANEL A 
GREEK MARKET: PUBLIC OUTCRY 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MR, 0.73 0.73 0.41 0.41 0.91 0.91 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MR,_I -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.04) (0.49) (0.22) 
R'ADJ 0.18 0.18 L ... 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.35 
GREEK MARKET:ASIS 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.15) (0.15) 
MR, 0.89 0.89 0.78 0.77 0.84 0.84 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
M~-1 -0.00 0.08 -0.00 I 
(0.96) (0.00) (0.75) I 
R'ADJ 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.31 0.31 
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PANELB 
GREEK MARKET: PUBLIC OUTCRY 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00 0.02 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
(0.00) 
MR.__ 0.72 (0.00) 0.72 (0.00)_ 0.39 (0.00) 0.38 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00) 0.89 (0.00) 
MR,.t -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.36) -0.00 (0.30) 
SMB(EW) 0.09(0.00) 0.10(0.00) 0.15(0.00) 0.15(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 
HML(EW) -0.05(0.0 l) -0.05(0.02) -0.05(0.03) -0.06(0.04) -0.03(0.06) -0.04(0.06) 
R2ADJ 0.19 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.33 0.35 
GREEK MARKET:ASIS 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00 0.02 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.15) 
(0.00) 
MR, 0.88 (0.00) 0.87 (0.00) 0.76 (0.00) 0.75 (0.00) 0.82 (0.00) 0.81 (0.00) 
MR,.t -0.00 (0.99) 0.06 (0.00) -0.00 (0.75) 
' 
SMB(EW) 0.13(0.03) 0.12(0.02) 0.19(0.05) 0.17(0.03) 0.01(0.05) 0.01(0.06) 
! HML(EW) -0.08(0.02) -0.06(0.02) -0.07(0.02) -0.04(0.02) -0.01(0.05) -0.03(0.05) 
R~ADJ 0.25 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.31 0.33 
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TRADING 
REGIME 
MEAN 
ANOVA 
MEDIAN 
TRADING 
Rf;:GIME 
MEAN 
ANOVA 
MEDIAN 
SEAQ:DEALERSHIP 
0.0296 
0.0247 
SUMMARY TABLE 5.7: RELATIVE RETURN DISPERSION: SQUARED RESIDUALS 
FOR FTSE I 00, FTSE250 AND THE GREEK MARKET (p values in brackets) 
RELATIVE RETURN DISPERSION: SQUARED RESIDUALS WITH FF FACTORS 
FTSEIOO FTSE250 
SETS:LAST SETS:VWAP CLOSING SEAQ HYBRID 
TRANSACTION AUCTION (SETSmm) 
O.OI21 0.0185 0.0189 0.57*10"j 0.44*10"j 
12.7(0.00) 1.15(0.27) 1.11(0.26) 1.02(0.30) 
0.0108 0.0170 0.0177 0.29*10"3 0.24*10"3 
SUMMARY TABLE 5.8 RESIDUALS VARIANCE 
FOR FTSEIOO, FTSE250 AND THE GREEK MARKET (p values in brackets) 
RESIDUALS VARIANCE WITH FF FACTORS 
FTSE100 FTSE250 
SEAQ:DEALERSHIP SETS:LAST · SETS:VWAP CLOSING SEAQ HYBRID 
TRANSACTION AUCTION (SETSmm) 
0.5*10"3 0.2* 10"3 0.2*10"3 0.2*10"3 0.02 O.oi 
8.75 (0.00) 0.39(0.69) 0.39(0.69) 1.58(0.11) 
0.4*10"3 0.1 *10"3 0.7*10"3 0.4*10"3 0.017 O.oi5 
GREEK MARKET 
PUBLIC ASIS 
OUTCRY 
0.5*10""' 0.9*10"j 
6.63(0.00) 
0.6* 10"3 0.6*10"3 
GREEK MARKET 
PUBLIC ASIS 
OUTCRY 
0.005 o.7* 1o·J 
1.27(0.20) 
0.7*10"3 0.0005 
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5.5.2 INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY: AN ALTERNATIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section we regress the transaction price of each trade on the real value 
of the asset as captured by the mid-quote and past pricing errors. Results 
presented in TABLE 5.9 (PANEL A, all companies) show that ~ increases 
from 0.06 to 0.68 following the change from quote driven to order driven 
indicating that individual stocks react much faster to incoming information 
however do not react as fast as one would expect. This would be the case if 
~ was equal to 1. Actually ~ gets equal to 1 only if we omit past pricing 
errors. Despite the fact that the inclusion of past pricing errors produces a ~ 
of 0.68, the improvement is dramatic. y which provides an estimate of the 
past pricing error remains almost the same indicating that the degree to which 
pricing errors are corrected has not changed. In other words the 
informational efficiency of FTSE has improved dramatically following 
changes in the trading regime. This could be a direct result of increased 
trading capability. The results presented for FTSE 100 following this specific 
methodology are conducive to the results obtained by RRD. Unfortunately 
the Results obtained for FTSE250 are not as intriguing as those for FTS I 00 
however they are conducive to the results obtained by using the RRD 
methodology. In particular ~ increases from 0.40 to 0.42 following the 
change from SEAQ to SETSmm while y changes from -0.64 to -0.63. In 
other words there are no significant-changes in the market. We undertake the 
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same exercise concentrating on company size. Again the results obtained are 
not particularly intriguing. Big companies appear to react faster than smaller 
companies maybe because there is bigger coverage by analysts. The change 
in the trading regime does not seem to bring about any changes in the degree 
of informational efficiency as far FTSE250 stocks are concerned. 
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TABLE 5.9:INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY USING HIGH FREQUENCY DATA 
PANEL A:FTSE100 
QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET/DEALERSHIP:SEAQ 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00(0.00) -0.35(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
B 0.07(0.00) 0.06(0.00) 0.06(0.00) 0.05(0.00) 0.11(0.00) 0.08(0.00) 0.15(0.00) 0.13(0.00) 
y -0.89(0.00) 
-0.80(0.002_ .. -0.87(0.00) -0.93(0.00) 
ORDER DRIVEN MARKET:SETS-LAST AUTOMATED TRANSACTION 
ALL COMPANIES SMALL COMPANIES MEDIUM COMPANIES BIG COMPANIES 
c 0.00(0.12) -0.09(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
J3 1.00(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.77(0.00) 0.72(0.00) 0.90(0.00) 0.83(0.00) 1.01(0.00) 0.91(0.00) 
y -0.87(0.00) -0.60(0.00) -0.89(0.00) -0.91(0.00) 
PANELB:FTSE250 
FTSE250: SEAQ/DEALERSHIP 
ALL STOCKS SMALL20 SMALL30 BIG20 BIG30 
c 0.00(0.00) -0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
B 0.42"(0.00) 0.40(0.00) 0.30(0.00) 0.28(0.00) 0.32(0.00) 0.31(0.00) 0.67(0.00) 0.62(0.00) 0.60(0.00) 0.53(0.00) 
y -0.64(0.00) -0.54(0.00) -0.56(0.0) -0.82(0.0) -0.77(0.00) 
--
L_ __ . 
FTSE250:HYBRID/SETSmm 
ALL STOCKS SMALL20 SMALL30 BIG20 BIG30 
c 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 
J3 0.44(0.00) 0.42(0.00) 0.35(0.00) 0.30(0.00) 0.36(0.00) 0.32(0.00) 0.68(0.00) 0.61(0.00) 0.66(0.00) 0.55(0.00) 
y -0.63(0~QO) __ -0.58(0.00) -0.58(0.0) -0.85(0.0) -0.79(0.00) 
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5.5.3 SPREAD SENSITIVITY TO VOLATILITY: FTSEIOO & FTSE250 
The results presented in TABLES .I 0 show that volatility appears to be 
significant when market makers set the spread. The coefficient obtained is 
positive and significant at 0.01. The results obtained are absolutely normal 
since when volatility increases the spread increases as well. However when 
trading occurs by submission of limit orders and the spread is regressed 
against volatility, it appears to be insignificant at 0.05 or 0.1 0. The p value 
obtained is equal to 0.36. We believe that this is the case because inventory 
imbalances are distributed among all traders rather than a specific group of 
people namely the market makers, therefore volatility to market makers is not 
more of a concern than it is to every single investor. The results obtained 
indicate that the spread is more sensitive to volatility under a dealership than 
in an order driven market. This is further supported by the fact that volatility 
is at its lowest point during the first period when the spread is set by the 
market makers and increases afterwards. Despite that it has the ability to 
affect the spread however when it increases for the rest of the periods its 
ability to affect the spread is reduced. When the effect of volatility on spread 
is tested for FTSE250 stocks (TABLE5.11) before and after the introduction 
of SETSmm, we find that volatility is significant for both periods and this is 
explained from the fact that under both trading regimes markets makers are 
present. Volatility does affect their inventories and as a consequence of that 
the spread must incorporate some sort of compensa!iqn for.tl}~ e}(!ra riskdtat 
- _;_ -- ' - - . - -
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they face. The above findings provide support for the fourth and fifth 
hypothesis. 
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TABLE 5.10: FTSE 100 SPREAD SENSITIVITY TO VOLATILITY OVER A QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET (DEALERSHIP) AND AN ORDER DRIVEN MARKET (p values 
in brackets) 
QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET:SEAQ 
ALL STOCKS I SMALL BIG 
c 1.44 (0.00) I 2.39 (0.00) 1.09 (0.00) 
GARCH 0.43 (0.00) I 0.74 (0.00) 0.16 (0.00) 
ORDER DRIVEN MARKET 
ALL STOCKS SMALL BIG 
c 2.09 (0.00) 2.72 (0.00) 0.93 (0.00) 
GARCH 0.71 (0.36) 0.80 (0.11) 0.49 (0.38) 
T ABt;E 5.11: FTSE250 SPREAD SENSITIVITY TO VOLATILITY OVER A QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET (DEALERSHIP) AND A HYBRID MARKET (p values in brackets) 
QUOTE DRIVEN MARKET:SEAQ 
ALL STOCKS SMALL BIG 
c 3.23(0.00) 1.33 (0.00) 2.64 (0.00) 
GARCH 0.39 (0.00) 0.49 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 
HYBRID MARKET 
ALL STOCKS SMALL I BIG 
c 2.26 (0.00) 2.19 (0.00) I 3.10 (0.00) 
GARCH 0.42 (0.00) 0.40 (0.00) I 0.32 (0.00) 
I' 
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5.6.CONCLUSION 
The last years exchange markets around the world have embarked on a 
race to improve their services in an attempt to attract more and more 
investors. We investigate the value effects achieved by changing from an 
electronic quote driven market (dealership) to an order driven market and 
the efficiency of the various closing price formation algorithms employed 
each time in terms of price discovery/informational efficiency and spread 
sensitivity to volatility for FTSE 100 stocks. We also undertake a similar 
exercise for FTSE250 and the Greek market. We find that there is no 
difference as far as informational efficiency is concerned between 
different closing price formation algorithms since the introduction of 
SETS (order driven market). However we find that order driven markets 
respond faster to information in comparison to dealerships. We also find 
that the spread is more sensitive to volatility in a dealership than in an 
order driven market. We are not familiar with any other study examining 
spread sensitive to volatility therefore we can not compare the results 
obtained here. Stocks in FTSE250 were initially traded in a quote driven 
market (SEAQ) but then they changed to a hybrid system (SETSmm), 
which combines both market making and an order book. The degree of 
informational efficiency as well as spread sensitivity to volatility remains 
the same. Research for the Greek market shows that the computerisation 
of the trading process has increased informational efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 6: DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE 
BID-ASK SPREADS ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years there have been major changes in the way stock 
trading is conducted. Trading systems have changed from 'floor trading' 
to 'electronic trading', from 'batch trading' occurring at discrete points in 
time to 'continuous trading' and from 'quote driven' to 'order driven' or 
'hybrid' for already electronic trading continuous markets. As one can 
understand all those innovations in trading mechanisms and protocols can 
bring about significant changes to the information structure and in 
particular to the way information is disseminated between market makers 
and investors. A consequence of all those changes is that the cost 
components of the bid-ask spread will be affected. Naturally research in 
the area of spread cost components is split in two parts namely the 
theoretical and the empirical part. The theoretical part has concentrated 
on explaining the existence of spreads based on 'inventory management' 
and 'asymmetric information'. In particular Demsetz (1968) and Tinic 
(1972) postulate that the spread exists to compensate market makers for 
maintaining and managing inventories in order to accommodate investors' 
demand when it arises. Based on this proposition Stoll (1978) and 
Amihud & Mendelson ( 1980) model the inventory component of the 
spread. However Bagehot (1971) approaches tUe existence of the spread 
in an entirely different way and proposes that the spread is the result of the 
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existence of asymmetric information. In this case the market maker 
sustains losses on trades with informed traders but makes money on trades 
with liquidity traders. This proposition gave rise to the formal modelling 
of the asymmetric information cost component of the spread by Copeland 
& Galai (1983) and Glosten & Milgrom (1985). Empirical research, as 
was expected has concentrated simply on estimating the cost components 
of the spread. In particular Glosten & Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988), 
George, T.J., Kaul, G & Nimalendran, M (1991) hereafter GKN estimate 
transitory costs, which comprise a combination of inventory and order 
processing costs and of course asymmetric information costs. Stoll 
( 1989) explicitly estimates the three cost components of the spread 
namely order processing costs, inventory holding costs and asymmetric 
information costs and finds that asymmetric information costs account for 
43% of the spread for NASDAQ stocks. Although Stoll's model is 
intuitively appealing, it appears to have certain drawbacks. In particular 
GKN ( 1991) criticize the Stoll model by saying that the spread 
components are biased as a result of the existence of positive 
autocorrelation in expected returns as shown by Conrad & Kaul (1988, 
1989) and Conrad et al.(1991) which leads to a downwards bias in the 
estimation of the realised spread. GKN correct for this drawback in 
Stoll's model by estimating returns based on the difference of transaction 
returns and bid to bid quotes which are unaffected by positive 
autocorrelation and find that asymmetric information accounts only for 
10% oUhe-spread for NASE>AQ stocks.- In other words the GKN-model 
improves over the Stoll model in the sense that it relaxes Stoll's first 
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assumption, which states that the market is informationally efficient so 
that the expected price change in a security is independent of current and 
past information. Despite the improvements over the Stoll model, GKN 
adopt the rest of Stoll's assumptions, firstly that the bid-ask spread is 
constant over time and all transactions occur at the highest bid or lowest 
ask and secondly that the proportions of the bid-ask components are the 
same for all securities. Kim & Ogden (1996) improve over GKN' s 
methodology by using the bid-ask mid quote as the unobservable true 
price of the security rather than the bid price as GKN did. In addition 
Kim & Ogden improve over the assumption of equal proportion of the 
bid-ask components for all securities by employing a new estimator g 
known as the Kim & Ogden estimator and find that asymmetric 
information costs account for 50% of the bid ask spread which comes into 
contrast with GKN' s estimate of 21% for NYSE/ AMEX stocks. All the 
studies mentioned above concentrate on US stocks. There is only a 
limited number of studies that look into this area of market microstructure 
with reference to the UK. In particular Snell & Tonks (1995, 1998), 
Hansch et al. ( 1998, 1999) and Reiss & Werner ( 1998), investigate the 
significance of inventory control and/or asymmetric information in dealer 
quote behaviour however the do not decompose spread into its cost 
components. The only study we are aware of which decomposes the 
spread into its components for the UK market is that of Menyah & 
Paudyal (2000). We advan~C! .!h~ litemtyr,e _inJhis area by investigating 
. ,. --- ',- __ ....,..._,___ ~ -· . ;--· ,., -. . -~- . -~ 
the cost components of the spread under different trading regimes for 
FTSE 100 and FTS250 stocks and also examine the effect of variables 
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such as number of trades, trading volume and volatility on the asymmetric 
information and order processing costs of the bid-ask spread.. We use 
GKN's (1991) and Kim & Ogden's (1996) methodologies rather than 
Stoll's ( 1989) methodology, which imposes some unrealistic assumptions. 
We use high frequency intraday data covering a period of two months 
before and after the introduction of SETS (order driven) for FTSE 100 
stocks and two months before and after the introduction of SETSMM for 
FTSE250 stocks rather than transactions data towards the end of day, 
which fails to capture intraday activity, as is the case in some other 
studies. 
Market microstructure theory has always been concerned with 
determining the bid-ask spread set by market makers. There are two 
theoretical approaches and each one views the existence of the spread 
from a completely different point of view. 
The first group of theorists postulate that the spread emanates from the 
risk that arises when market makers process orders and hold inventories to 
accommodate liquidity demand as it arises. Even though early papers 
perceive the market maker merely as a liquidity provider, Demsetz (1968) 
views the market maker both as a liquidity provider and as a trader 
engagmg in transactions with other traders/individuals for his own 
account. Amihud & Mendelson (1980) and Ho & Stoll(1981) postulate 
that-the market maker sets bid and ask· prices as afiliiction of incoming 
orders and the discrepancies that those orders create between the optimal 
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and current level of inventory. In other words the bid ask spread is 
related to the market maker's inventory position. 
The second group of theorists postUlate that the spread arises as a result of 
asymmetric information and is mainly represented by Bagehot (1971 ). In 
this particular case the market maker is incc,tpable of distinguishing 
between informed traders, liquidity traders and noise traders therefore he 
sets a wide spread so as to reduce losses when trading with informed 
traders. However the wider the spread gets the lower the probability of 
transacting with liquidity traders, therefore there is an optimal level of 
spread. Copeland & Galai ( 1983) postulate that the market maker will set 
his spread to achieve profit maximasation. 
6.2.TRADING MECHANISMS IN THE LONDON STOCK 
EXCHANGE AND SPREAD COST COMPONENTS. 
The London Stock exchange has gone through a number of changes the 
last few years as far the trading regime is concerned. In particular the 
London stock exchange has changed from a quote driven market to an 
order driven market. The main characteristic of a quote driven market is 
the market makers who are obliged to post bid and ask quotes along with 
the numbe'r of shares (depth) they are willing to trade at each price 
(affirmative quotation). In an order driven market makers are not obliged 
limit order submission. As a consequence of the changes in the trading 
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process described above, we believe that the different cost components of 
the spread and in particular the asymmetric information cost component 
must have been affected. Nevertheless we believe that we should 
elaborate on how different characteristics of the two trading processes 
briefly described above could affect the cost components of the spread. 
When trading in a quote driven system, market makers must post 'firm' or 
'affirmative' bid and ask quotes for a minimum quantity of shares (depth) 
which is also known as normal market size (NMS) and is calculated as 
2.5% of the daily average turnover in the preceding quarter. Although 
this percentage seems to be a very small figure and some readers will 
think that it has no effect on the quotes of market makers, this impression 
can be erroneous especially when it comes to such highly traded stocks as 
FTSE 100 stocks. Single trades for FTSE 100 stocks may run in the range 
of hundreds of thousands of pounds. At this point it is worth noting that 
the NMS for stocks traded in the LSE is much higher than for stocks 
traded in other markets such as NASDAQ, which is also a quote driven 
market (Menyah & Paudyal, 2000). As one can understand, the 
affirmative obligation of market makers to post bid and ask quotes in 
combination with the high NMS mandated by the LSE 'forces' market 
makers to post wide spreads so as to finance inventory carrying cost, 
imbalances that may arise during intense trading as well as protect 
themselves against traders with superior information. Obviously the high 
NMS implies that market makers will incur enormous losses when they 
transact with investors with superior information, therefore they will 
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widen the spread so as to cover themselves against this possibility and 
make their profits from the liquidity traders. Of course one might argue 
that high NMS stocks do not pose such a big problem for market makers 
when it comes to rebalancing their inventory to reach their optimal level 
because they can unwind their positions really fast as a result of the high 
NMS. In addition if market makers feel exceptionally pressured by 
unwanted inventory they can always make use of the inter dealer 
brokerage system which allows them to trade anonymously with other 
market makers and revert to their desired inventory positions. Menyah & 
Paudyal (2000) also discuss 'preferencing' and 'internalization' as two 
practices that can affect spread cost components in opposite directions. 
'Preferencing' means the ability of a broker to direct an order to a market 
maker not posting the best quote but who has agreed to transact at the best 
quote while 'intemalisation' is used to describe the ability of the broker to 
direct an order to a market maker working for the same company. On the 
one hand, this means that the market maker may have to buy (sell) when 
his actual inventory position implies that he should sell (buy) even when 
he suspects that the transaction under consideration involves superior 
information and he might incur losses in order to satisfy the 'preference' 
that the broker has shown towards him. On the other hand preferenced 
market makers get a higher proportion of buy and sell orders and thus it is 
easier for them to manipulate their inventory to reach their optimal level 
or compensate for any losses that they might have incurred by trading 
with otherinvestors/traders who are in possession of"stifierior ·information. 
Of course the same arguments can apply for the practice of 
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'internalisation'. Hansch et al ( 1999) find that for the top 1 02 LSE stocks 
effective spreads on preferenced trades are higher than those on non-
preferenced trades and that internalised trades receive better execution 
than non-internalised trades which implies that preferencing leads to 
higher inventory costs and dealers compensate for it by higher effective 
spreads. 
The effects of 'preferencing', 'internalisaton' and high NMS on spreads 
described above should be dampened once the trading regime changes 
form quote driven to order driven. In an order driven market there is no 
obligation on behalf of any market maker to act as a 'liquidity supplier of 
last resort' therefore the effect of asymmetric information on spreads , 
should be reduced considerably. Brockman & Chung (2002) call this the 
'free-exit' aspect of order-driven trading. Of course, if the spread gets 
very wide and some traders see opportunities to go into the market and 
make money by providing liquidity then they are free to do so. This is 
called the 'free-entry' aspect of order-driven trading (Brockman & Chung, 
2002). In other words changes in the trading regime and the effect that 
such changes can have on the cost components of the spreads and in 
particular on the asymmetric component of the spread is an empirical 
question. We propose the following research hypotheses: 
HI: the asymmetric component of the spread is higher under a quote-
driven trading regime as a result of the 'affirmative obligation' on behalf 
ofmarket makers ,to ,constantly ·pose firm' l5ia and'ask quotes' l:malower 
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under an order-driven trading regime as a result of the 'free entry and exit' 
aspect of order-driven trading. 
H2: the asymmetric information component of the spread does not change 
between quote driven and hybrid markets. 
H3: volatility appears to have a stronger impact on both cost components 
under a quote driven regime but reduces significantly under an order 
driven regime (FTSE 1 00). 
H4: volatility appears to have the same impact on the cost components of 
the spread under a quote driven and a hybrid market. 
6.3.METHODOLOGY 
A number of models have been developed over the years to decompose 
bid-ask spreads into their cost components, the first one being that of Stoll 
( 1989) which was later modified by GKN (1991). The last empirical 
approach correcting for all shortcomings in the previous models is that of 
Kim & Ogden (1996). 
Stoll (1989) decomposes the spread into three cost components namely: 
asymmetric information/adverse selection, inventory holding cost and 
order processing cost based on three assumptions: 
• The market is informationally efficient so that expected price changes 
are independent of current and past information. 
• the bid-ask spread is constant over fiine and ali transactions~'occur at 
the highest bid or the lowest ask 
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• The proportions of bid-ask spread components are the same for all 
securities 
Stoll postulates that the realised spread earned by a market maker is less 
than the quoted spread. The reason for this is that the market maker will 
lower bid and ask prices after a sell order and raise bid and ask prices after 
a buy order to reflect the information content of those orders. However 
when a trade is reversed the size of a price reversal is not the quoted 
spread SQi but rather (1-8)SQi where 0:::;8:::;1 because of inventory and 
asymmetric information costs. The probability of a trade reversal is given 
by 8. As in all models that will follow the adverse selection component is 
measured as the difference between quoted spread and realised spread. 
The realised spread is further decomposed into inventory cost and order 
processing cost. The various cost components are given by: adverse 
selection cost = 1-2(8-8), inventory cost = 2(8-0.5), order processing cost 
= 1-28. 
GKN (1991) propose a new model to decompose the bid-ask spread to its 
cost components as they postulate that the Stoll estimators are biased 
because of the existence of positive autocorrelation in expected returns as 
documented by Conrad & Kaul (1988, 1989) and Conrad et al. (1991). In 
particular the estimated spread Si for each security is given by: 
Si=2[ -cov(RDi,tRDi,t-I)] 112 (6.1) 
Where RDi,t is cdefihed as the difference between transaction returns Rri,t 
and returns based on unobservable true prices Rsi,t which in this case is 
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captured by subsequent bid quotes following a transaction for each 
security i at timet (subscript tin returns always refers to transaction prices 
while subscript b always refers to bid prices). Then they run a cross 
section regression of estimated spread Si on quoted spread Soi· 
Symbolically this is expressed as: 
Si=Po+PISQi+Et (6.2) 
Where PI provides an unbiased estimator of the proportion of order 
processing cost 1t under the assumption of zero inventory cost and I-PI 
becomes the unbiased estimator of the adverse selection cost component. 
Even though the approach adopted by GKN relaxes Stoll's first 
assumption by calculating estimated spread Si as the difference between 
transaction returns and subsequent bid quote returns, they still assume that 
Stoll's second and third assumptions still hold. 
Kim & Ogden improve GKN methodology by relaxing the second 
assumption of constant spreads for each security introducing a new way to 
capture unobservable true prices. In particular they use the bid-ask 
midquote as a proxy for the true price of an asset because the bid -ask 
prices change over time and have a systematic time series structure. In 
market microstructure literature, it is considered that the mid-quote 
captures the real price of a financial asset. They also relax the third 
assumption of equal proportions of components of the bid-ask spread 
between securities by regressing estimated spread on the Kim & Ogden 
estimat~r ( ~ s~i ). 
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In our analyses in order to estimate 1t (order processing cost) we run the 
following regressions: 
Si=~o+~1Di+~2SQi+~3(DiSQi)+E1 (GKN regression) (6.3) 
Where Si is the estimated difference between transactions prices and 
subsequent bid quotes as in GKN, ~0 is the intercept, ~ 1 is the differential 
intercept coefficient, ~2 estimates the order processing cost, ~3 is the 
differential slope coefficient and Di is a dummy assuming the value of 
zero for SEAQ and 1 for SETS. 
Si=~o+~1Di+~2SQi+~3(DiSQi)+Et (K&O regression) (6.4) 
Where Si is estimated as the difference between transactions prices and 
midquotes as in Kim & Ogden relaxing the second assumption of Stoll. 
The rest of the variables are as above. 
Si=l3o+l3tDi+j32SQi+j33(Di ~ )+E1 (K&O regression with K&O estimator) (6.5) 
Where Si is estimated as the difference between transactions prices and 
midquotes quotes as in Kim & Ogden and the independent variable is 
given by ~,the Kim & Ogden estimator. The rest of the variables 
are as above. By running these regressions we expect the order 
processing cost for security (i) to be smaller when the estimated spread is 
estimated as the difference between transaction returns and mid quotes 
and even smaller when the estimated spread is calculated as the difference 
betwe~n transaction returns and mid q~otes and regressed on ~ S~; . We 
also examine the extent to which volatility, number of trades and trading 
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volume affect the asymmetric information cost component, order 
processing cost component and the spread based on all available trades to 
us by running the following panel regressions: 
Where VOL stands for volatility and is estimated as the absolute value of 
the return at day t calculated from mid points of bid-ask quotes, 
I {(P A,t+Ps,t)-(P A,t-1+Ps,t-1)]/(P A,t-1+Ps,t-1)}1, TV stands for trading volume, 
NT stands for number of trades and E is the error term. The asymmetric 
information component is estimated according to K&O as [ 1-( S / ~)] 
(6.1 0) 
" 1 T 
and according to GKN as [1-( S s/-L S0 ; 1 )] (6.11 ). T t=l -' 
The order-processing component is estimated according to K&O as 
(s / ~) (6.12) 
" 1 T 
ana accordfilg to GKN asTS 8/- I'sQi,l )(6.13) 
T t=I 
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where 
(6.14) 
" 
and S Bi =2[-cov(RDsi,tRDBi,t-J)] 112 (6.15). 
6.4.DATA 
The data used in this study covers a period of two months for FTSE 1 00 
stocks and for FTSE250 stocks. The reason we use FTSE 1 00 and 
FTSE250 stocks is that changes in the trading regime were introduced 
only for those stocks. The data was obtained from SIRCA (Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific) and contains transaction prices, 
number of shares traded, volume of trades in monetary terms, quoted bid, 
quoted ask and mid quotes for every single second. In other words our 
files contain all trades that have occurred during that period. 
6.5.RESULTS 
6.5.1 BID-ASK SPREAD DECOMPOSITION 
Results are presented in TABLE6.1. Panel A presents results for the 
GKN regression, K&O regression and K&O regression with K&O 
estimator. The order processing cost for SEAQ is given by B2 and by 
,.i;( 
order-processing component CB2) when stocks are traded in SEAQ is equal 
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to 0.33 and increases to 0.76 after the introduction of SETS. The 
asymmetric information cost component is estimated as 1-~z and is equal 
to 0.67 when stocks are traded in SEAQ and reduces to 0.24 when stocks 
are traded in SETS. This is a first indication that the non-obligatory 
nature of trading reduces the effect of asymmetric information. The 
results obtained from the GKN regression are further reinforced when we 
employ the K&O regression. In this regression Si is estimated as the 
difference between transactions prices and midquotes, which relaxes the 
second assumption of constant spread of each security. The processing 
component (~2) is equal to 0.23 and the asymmetric information 
component is equal to 0.77 under the SEAQ trading regime. Once the 
change occurs from SEAQ to SETS the processing component increases 
to 0.73 and the asymmetric information component reduces to 0.27, a 
second indication that the non-obligatory nature of trading or the free 
entry and exit aspects of trading as discussed by Brockman & Chung 
(2002) can reduce the effect of asymmetric information. Finally we 
employ the K&O regression with the K&O estimator. In this case the 
dependent variable is estimated as the difference between transactions 
prices and midquotes as above but now the independent variable is equal 
to ~ S~; . The results obtained from this final regression are consistent 
with results obtained above. The order-processing component is equal to 
0.20 (~z) under SEAQ and increases to 0.68 (~2+p3) under SETS. The 
asyiiunetric information compOriertt reduces frcnn-0.80 to 0:32 with the 
change in the trading regime. Results for FTE250 are presented in 
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TABLE6.2 and are less intriguing than those obtained for FTSEIOO 
however they are as expected. The difference in the asymmetric 
information component between regimes is very small and statistically 
insignificant. The reason for this is that under both trading regimes, 
market makers are obliged to provide liquidity and trade with every single 
investor/trader, therefore there is no change in their level of risk as 
captured by the asymmetric information cost component of the spread. 
Unfortunately the results obtained from our study can not be directly 
compared to results from other studies such as GKN(1991), K&0(1996) 
or Stoll( 1989). The reason is that we undertake a comparative study 
between different trading regimes and how this can affect cost 
components and we employ only FTSEIOO stocks and FTSE250 stocks, 
the only stocks for which there were a change in the trading regime while 
all the other studies mentioned above look into spread cost components 
for the same trading regime. The results of this study are in line with 
general findings regarding spread components in the LSE. The 
asymmetric information cost component dominates the order processing 
component which is consistent with Menyal & Paudyal (2000) and 
Hansch et al.(1999). The reason we obtain such high asymmetric 
information cost components is that a single informed trade in a high 
NMS stock as FTSElOO stocks is so much more expensive than an 
informed trade in a low NMS stock, therefore the market maker will 
charge a relatively high asymmetric information cost for high NMS stocks 
(Mehyalf'& Pa\Ydy~il: 20-00f .. Ofcourse-·tliis reverses ·-once~market nhikers 
are not obliged to provide liquidity and can choose with whom to trade if 
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they believe that somebody is trading on superior information. At this 
stage one should notice that the asymmetric information cost component 
of the spread for FTSE250 stocks under SEAQ is much lower that than of 
FTSElOO stocks under SEAQ reinforcing the explanation provided above. 
Once the trading regime changes the FTSE 1 00 asymmetric component 
reduces while the FTES250 asymmetric component remains stable. 
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TABLE 6.1: COST COMPONENTS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD FOR FTSE I 00 
PANELA 
GKN REGRESSION K&O REGRESSION K&O REGRESSION 
WITH K&O ESTIMATOR 
Bo 0.00(0.00) 0.00(0.06) 0.00(0.00) 
BI 0.00(0.22) 0.10(0.17) 0.17(0.13) 
B2 0.33(0.00) 0.23(0.00) 0.20(0.00) 
B3 0.43(0.00) 0.50(0.00) 0.48(0.00) 
R" ADJ 0.13 0.12 0.13 
-
PANELB 
ORDER PROCESSING ASYMMETRIC 
SEAQ(B2) SETS(B2+B3) SEAQ(l-B2) SETS 1-(B2+B3) 
GKN REGRESSION 0.33 0.76 0.67 0.24 
K&O REGRESSION 0.23 0.73 0.77 0.27 
K&O REGRESSION WITH 0.20 0.68 0.80 0.32 
K&O ESTIMATOR 
--- ----·- --
TABLE 6.2: COST COMPONENTS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD FOR FTSE250 
PANEII,A 
GKN REGRESSION K&O REGRESSION K&O REGRESSION 
WITH K&O ESTIMATOR 
Bo 0.00(0.09) 0.00(0.05) 0.00(0.09) 
B1 0.00(0.15)_ 0.00(0.85) 0.00(0.44) 
B2 0.41(0.00) 0.36(0.02) 0.34(0.01) 
B3 -0.02(0.12) -0.06(0.14) -0.01(0.13) 
R2 ADJ 0.10 0.10 0.11 
PANELB 
ORDER PROCESSING ASYMMETRIC 
SEAQ(B2) SETSmm(B2+B3) SEAQ(1-B2) SETSmm 1-(B2+BJ) 
GKN REGRESSION 0.41 0.39 0.59 0.61 
K&O REGRESSION 0.36 0.30 0.64 0.70 
K&O REGRESSION WITH 0.34 0.33 0.66 0.67 
K&O ESTIMATOR 
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6.5.2.DETERMINANTS OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE BID-ASK 
SPREAD 
Having discussed the changes in the asymmetric information and order 
processing components of the two groups of stocks, we now concentrate to the 
extent to which the spread itself and its components are affected by volatility, 
trading volume, and frequency of trades. Results for FTSEIOO (all stocks) 
are presented in T ABLE6.3 for both trading regimes. Again possible 
differences between trading regimes are estimated by differential slope 
coefficients. The number of trades is insignificant under both trading 
regimes. ~0 and ~ 1 are always insignificant but bear the right sign. The 
reason for this is that FTSE I 00 stocks are very highly traded stocks, therefore 
the number of times a FTSE I 00 stock is traded every day does not seem to be 
of great concern to market makers since they do not believe that any 
trader/investor is acting on superior information and even if this was the case 
market makers would be able to get rid of any unwanted FTSE I 00 stocks 
really fast because of the high trading frequency. We expect the effect of 
number of trades to be significant for smaller stocks (non FTSElOO stocks). 
The results obtained here are in line with K&O ( 1996) who find that the 
number of trades is significant and negatively related to bid-ask spread in a 
univariate regression however when they control for size the number of trades 
becomes insignificant. Trading volume has a positive effect on the spread 
and its both -~ompo~~nts uncle~ SEAQ how~ver the sign dianges when. tfie 
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trading regime changes from SEAQ to SETS, reducing the effect of trading 
volume since y0+y1 is lower than y0• This can be easily explained by the free 
exit and entry explanation attributed to Brockman & Chung (2002). The 
positive effect of trading volume on the bid-ask spread and its cost 
components under SEAQ is explained by the fact that big trades are thought 
to be initiated by individuals who might be in possession of superior 
information however when market makers are not obliged to provide liquidity 
the actual effect of TV declines. Notice that the trading volume coefficients 
for the highest capitalisation FTSE100 stocks (TABLE6.4) under SEAQ are 
slightly higher than the trading volume coefficients of FTSE 100 ALL 
STOCKS under SEAQ (TABLE6.3) but not always higher than the trading 
volume coefficients of the lowest market capitalisation FTSE 100 stocks 
(T ABLE6.5), therefore there is no clear pattern emerging here. Despite the 
fact that there is no clear pattern emerging here our results are consistent with 
Menyah & Paudyal who postulate that high NMS stocks have a higher 
asymmetric component. Volatility appears to have a significant positive 
effect on spread and its components under SEAQ (TABLE 6.3, 6.4 AND 6.5) 
however this effect reduces significantly (all 81 differential coefficients are 
negative and significant) under SETS providing support to the third research 
hypothesis even though their explanatory power appears to be quite reduced 
for the order-processing component. Generally speaking the effect of 
volatility on the bid-ask spread is positive. Another issue worth 
concentrating on atthis point is·that the coefficients of volatility for almost all 
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independent variables for the highest capitalisation FTS 100 stocks 
(TABLE6.4) are higher than the coefficients of volatility for the same 
independent variables for the lowest FTSE 100 stocks (T ABLE6.5) and 
FTSElOO all stocks (TABLE6.3) under SEAQ. Notice also that reductions 
in 81 are higher for FTSElOO BIG STOCKS (TABLE6.4) following changes 
in the trading regime. We believe that this is explained by the fact that the 
highest market capitalisation stocks have a higher NMS and therefore sudden 
changes in prices especially if they are not supported by any news or 
increased trading activity affect the bid-ask spread and its components to a 
higher extent. 
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TABLE6. 3: REGRESSION OF FTSE100 ALL STOCKS ON NUMBER OF TRADES (NT), TRADING VOLUME 
(TV) AND VOLATILITY (VOL) UNDER SEAQ AND SETS 
Bid-ask Bid-ask Assymetric-K&O Assymetric- Processing- Processing-
closing every trade GKN K&O GKN 
ao 0.00 0.00 0.01 O.ot 0.00 0.00 
(0.22) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) 
a, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.30) (0.46) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) 
Po -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.12) (0.37) (0.76) (0.53) (0.70) 
p, 0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.16) (0.64) (0.88) (0.22) (0.34) 
Yo 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.13 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
y, -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 
(0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06) 
Oo 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.00 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) 
o, -0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.02 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.35) 
IPADJ 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 
TABLE6. 4: REGRESSION OF FTSElOO BIG STOCKS ON NUMBER OF TRADES (NT), TRADING VOLUME 
(TV) AND VOLATILITY (VOL) UNDER SEAQ AND SETS 
Bid-ask Bid-ask Assymetric-K&O Assymetric- Processing- Processing-
closing every trade GKN K&O GKN 
ao 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
l0.06} (0.08) (0.09) _(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
a, -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.00) (0.19) 
Po -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
(0.19) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18) (0.22) 
p, -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
(0.56) (0.65) (0.13) (0.20) (0.33) 
Yo 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.15 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
y, -0.02 -002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) 
Oo 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.09 0.07 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) _(O.D4) (0.02) (0.03) 
o, -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.01 0.01 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.00) (0.14) (0.09) 
R2 ADJ 0.09 0.08 O.D7 0.08 0.09 0.09 
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ao 
a1 
~0 
~I 
Yo 
Yl 
lio 
Iii 
TABLE 6.5: REGRESSION OF FTSE 100 SMALL STOCKS ON NUMBER OF TRADES (NT), TRADING 
VOLUME (TV) AND VOLATILITY (VOL) UNDER SEAQ AND SETS 
Bid-ask Bid-ask Assymetric-K&O Assymetric- Processing- Processing-
closing every trade GKN K&O GKN 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.08) (_0.0 I) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.82) (0.64) (0.10) 
-0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 -0.12 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.33) 
-0.00 -0.14 -0.09 -0.07 -0.17 
(0.19) (0.17) (0.77) (0.12) (0.39) 
0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 
(0.03) (0.04) (O.Q6) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) 
0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.01) 
0.02 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.00) 
-0.01 -0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
R" ADJ 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
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The results obtained for FTSE250 ALL STOCKS and NT (number of trades) 
are quite interesting. The number of trades appears to have some 
explanatory power over the bid-ask spread, the asymmetric information 
component and the order processing cost component however the coefficients 
obtained are very small. notice that the differential coefficients for NT are 
insignificant implying that changes in the trading regime did not have any 
effect. If a stock is relatively small but it is traded relatively frequently, then 
market makers do not worry too much if they trade with somebody with 
superior information and left with unwanted inventory because they know 
that they will be able to dispose of this unwanted inventory relatively fast, 
thus the significant negative effect of the number of trades on the spread and 
its components. Trading volume has a significant positive effect on the bid-
ask spread and its components for all FTSE250 stocks. There is also a 
pattern emerging, trading volume appears to have a stronger effect on 
FTSE250 20 SMALL than it appears to have on FTSE250 20 BIG. The 
reason for this is that market makers believe that high volume trades on small 
stocks are motivated by superior information, thus the positive effect on the 
bid-ask spread and its components. Volatility appears to have similar effects 
on FTSE250 stocks under both trading regimes, providing support for the 
fourth research hypothesis. However volatility appears to have a stronger 
positive effect on FTSE250 20 SMALL than it has on FTS250 20 BIG or 
FTS250 ALL STOCKS. The reason for this is that FTSE250 20 SMALL are 
"' ,.->-, ·~--·"---
likely to be stocks which are not highly traded therefore any volatility 
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observed is not due to increased trading but changes in prices which are not 
supported by trading activity which increases the level of risk as perceived by 
market makers which in turn increases the spread and its components. The 
differential slope coefficients for volatility are insignificant which means that 
changes in the trading regime had no effect on volatility and how it affects the 
components ofthe spread. 
To summarise we find that a change in the trading regime from quote driven 
to order driven with direct reference to FTS 1 00 stocks can lead to a reduction 
on the asymmetric information cost component of the spread. This is due to 
the non-obligatory nature of trading. This is not the case when the trading 
regime changes from quote driven to hybrid with reference to FTSE250 
stocks because markets makers are still obliged to provide liquidity. Then 
we examine the effect of a number of variables such as number of trades, 
trading volume and volatility on the bid-ask spread, the asymmetric 
information cost component and order processing cost component. We find 
that volatility has a significant positive effect on both components when 
market makers are obliged to provide liquidity. We also find that the number 
of trades has a significant negative effect on the bid-ask spread and its 
components. Trading frequency has absolutely no effect on high 
capitalisation stocks such as FTSE I 00, which are highly traded by definition. 
These finding are similar to the findings of K&O ( 1996). Trading volume 
appears to have a significant positive effect on the bid ask ~pr~ad and its 
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components especially for small stocks. This is because market makers 
believe that high volumes for small stocks are motivated by superior 
information. 
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TABLE6. 6: REGRESSION OF FTSE250 ALL STOCKS ON NUMBER OF TRADES (Nn, TRADING VOLUME 
(TV) AND VOLATILITY (VOL) UNDER SEAQ AND SETSMM 
Bid-ask Bid-ask Assymetric-K&O Assymetric- Processing- Processing-
closing every trade GKN K&O GKN 
Oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.09) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(II 0.20 0.18 0.03 o.oo 0.00 0.00 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) 
~0 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
~I -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.09) (0.22) (0.12) (0.47) (0.87) 
Yo 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.14 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
Yl 0.00 0.09 0.01 O.ot 0.04 0.03 
(0.07) 
_(0.111 (0.10) _{0.14) (0.17) (0.51) 
lio 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.15 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) 
Iii 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
R' ADJ 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
TABLE 6.7: REGRESSION OF FTSE250 20SMALL STOCKS ON NUMBER OF TRADES (NT), TRADING 
VOLUME (TV) AND VOLATILITY (VOL) UNDER SEAQ AND SETSMM 
Bid-ask Bid-ask Assymetric-K&O Assymetric- Processing- Processing-
closing every trade GKN K&O GKN 
Oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
(II 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.12) (0.50) (0.00) (0.80) (0.24) (0.00) 
~0 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
~I -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 
(0.18) (0.30) (0.13) (0.25) (0.46) 
Yo 0.10 0.01 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.12 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Yl 0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 
(0.16) (0.00) (0.17) (0.19) (0.61) (0.00) 
lio 0.16 0.21 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.14 
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) .(0.00) 
Iii o:24 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.19 0.19 
(0.17) (0.33) (0.16) (0.31) (0.23) (0.28) 
R2 ADJ 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
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TABLE6. 8: REGRESSION OF FTSE250 20BIG STOCKS ON NUMBER OF TRADES (NT), TRADING VOLUME 
(TV) AND VOLATILITY (VOL) UNDER SEAQ AND SETSMM 
Bid-ask Bid-ask Assymetric-K&O Assymetric- Processing- Processing-
closing every trade GKN K&O GKN 
Uo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
UJ 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 
(0.01) (0.22} (0.11) (0.00) (0.74) (0.17) 
~0 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) 
~I -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.25) 
Yo 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.12 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Y1 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.14 
(0.03) (0.12) (0.22) (0.21) (0.04) (0.11) 
iio 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.17 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
iii 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.15 0.17 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.14) (0.01) (0.20) (0.19) 
Rz ADJ 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
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6.6.CONCLUSION 
This study used all transaction data and quotes for FTSE 100 and FTSE250 
stocks before and after the introduction of SETS and SETSmm respectively. 
The introduction of SETS (order-driven trading) for FTSE 100 stocks and 
SETSmm (hybrid market combining order driven trading with market 
making) provided us with a constructive opportunity to look into spread cost 
components and in particular into the asymmetric information component of 
the spread over different trading regimes. The results we obtained clearly 
indicate that the components of the spread change as a result of changes in the 
trading regime and the asymmetric information component reduces when the 
market makers are not obliged to provide liquidity (FTSElOO stocks). The 
asymmetric information component of the spread does not reduce when the 
market changes from quote driven to hybrid because market makers are still 
obliged to provide liquidity. In order to show this we usedthe GKN(l991) 
and K&O (1996) methodologies. We also examined the effect of number of 
trades, trading volume and volatility under different trading regimes. We 
found that the effect of volatility on the asymmetric information component 
of the spread reduces when the trading regime changes from quote driven to 
order driven. We also found that trading frequency affects mainly small 
stocks and tends to reduce the spread and its components. The effect of 
trading volume appears to be positive for almost all stocks under examination 
irrespective of trading regime. Trading volume appears to have a strong 
posit_i,ve t!fft!Ct on the _b,jcl<!s_k_ spread ':lf!d its cost components for small stocks. 
' . -- - . ..:~ '---:" - -- .,. ., .. ~~ -- -~ . ·-· -
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Unfortunately the findings of this study are not directly comparable to those 
of the studies mentioned above because of its comparative nature and sample 
however they are in line with the general findings of those studies. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this research thesis we argl!ed that while research in the area of 
market microstructure and in particular in the area of systematic liquidity, trading 
systems, informational efficiency and spread decomposition was progressing 
steadily in the US, research for the UK and other smaller, less developed markets 
was quite limited. 
Academic research into those areas has been motivated by the following 
considerations. Firstly a gap was identified in financial theory with respect to 
systematic liquidity. Systematic liquidity, which is defined as co-movement of 
liquidity for stocks with different characteristics, was observed for the very first 
time in the US. Financial theory offers no explanation for this and states that 
liquidity for each stock is determined by idiosyncratic factors such as own stock 
volatility, trading frequency, trading volume, accounting indicators etc. However 
what was being observed in the US was a co-movement in liquidity for stocks 
sharing no common characteristics. Obviously this newly observed phenomenon 
had to be further investigated so as to test if it was present in other markets as well. 
This provided us with an unprecedented opportunity to test ·for the presence of 
systematic liquidity m European markets at different stages of 
sophistication/development namely the UK and the Greek market. We also took 
this line of research a stage further by investigating how systematic liquidity could 
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affect pricing under different trading regimes. Secondly research on the effect that 
changes in the trading systems can have on the degree of informational efficiency 
as well as on the spread and its components was quite limited despite the fact that 
those changes were introduced a number of years ago for both markets under 
consideration. While the issues investigated are not exhaustive in coverage, they 
address what are perceived to be the most important aspects of liquidity, trading, 
asset pricing and informational efficiency. We believe that the findings are of 
particular interest to market participants and academics alike. 
After outlining the justification for the thesis in chapter one and reviewing the 
literature in chapter two, chapter three concentrated on examining the presence of 
systematic liquidity for FTSE 1 00 and FTSE250 stocks. Then this line of research 
was further expanded to test if and the extent to which the common underlying 
factor identified (systematic liquidity) affected the pricing of stocks. In doing so 
we also considered how changes in the trading system (e.g. from quote driven to 
order driven) could affect the common underlying liquidity factor and consequently 
stock pricing. We found that the common underlying factor can affect stock 
pricing especially FTSE100 stocks when the market is quote driven but reduces 
after the introduction of SETS (order-driven). We also identified a common 
underlying factor for FTSE250 stocks even though it is not as strong as the factor 
identified for FTSE 1 00 stocks and does not seem to affect pricing. 
257 
The fourth chapter follows the same line of research however we now concentrate 
on a less sophisticated market (Athens Stock Exchange), which managed to 
achieve unprecedented growth and eventually crash within a year or so. We 
believe that this provided us with an unprecedented opportunity to test for the 
presence of systematic liquidity under a number of different market conditions, 
shareholder sophistication, market maturity etc. We found that the common 
underlying liquidity factor appears to be stronger in certain periods while its 
presence appears to be reduced in other periods. In particular the common 
underlying factor appears to be considerably stronger for 2000 and 2001 and seems 
to be playing some role on stock pricing than it is for the rest of the periods. 
The fifth chapter concentrated on examining how informational efficiency and 
spread sensitivity to volatility is affected by changes in the trading systems for 
FTSElOO and FTSE250 stocks. We also examined how informational efficiency 
is affected by automated trading with reference to the Greek market. We made use 
of two different methodologies and different data when testing the effect of 
different trading systems on informational efficiency for the UK market and found 
that an order driven market is more responsive to new information when compared 
to a quote driven market. We also found that the spread formed in a quote driven 
market is more sensitive to volatility than in an order driven market because of 
affirmative quotation. The results obtained for the Greek market show that 
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informational efficiency has increased as a result of automation and are generally in 
line with the literature. 
The sixth chapter, which is the last chapter of the thesis, focuses on bid-ask spread 
decomposition and the underlying determinants of the spread under different 
trading regimes. We find that the asymmetric component of the spread is higher 
under a quote driven regime most likely because of affirmative quotation as far as 
FTSE 100 stocks are concerned. There appear to be no changes in spread 
decomposition for FTSE250 stocks under different trading regimes. Another 
important finding of this study is that the effect of volatility on the asymmetric 
information component of the spread reduces when the trading regime changes 
from quote driven to order driven as far as FTSElOO stocks are concerned. We are 
not aware of any research that looks into how the components of the spread as well 
as the underlying determinants of the spread are affected by changes in the trading 
regimes for the UK market therefore the results obtained are not directly 
comparable with any other studies however they are in line with other studies in the 
area for different markets around the world. 
In conclusion this study examined the effect of different trading systems on 
common underlying liquidity factors, pricing, informational efficiency, volatility, 
the components of the spread as well as their determinants primarily with respect to 
the UK market and secondarily to the Greek market. We selected the UK market 
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because of the changes in the trading system for FTSE 1 00 besides the fact that it is 
a sophisticated market and the Greek market because of the tremendous growth it 
achieved within a limited period of time and its spectacular crash. This provided 
us with a number of different environments/conditions to test our hypotheses even 
though the data we had was quite limited. 
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